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Abstract
A Logical Theory of Confirmation
by
Russell Joseph Ahmed-Buehler
Doctor of Philosophy in Logic and the Methodology of Science
University of California, Berkeley
Associate Professor Lara Buchak, Chair
This dissertation concerns the interpretation and structure of two intuitive notions: ra-
tional credence and confirmation. Probabilistic accounts of rational credence currently
enjoy a position of considerable prestige, underwriting significant work not only in phi-
losophy but also in economics and statistics. Confirmation, in contrast, is widely regarded
as ill-formed, a misleading misconception akin to phlogiston, witches, or cosmic ether
(de Finetti 1979, x). The primary project of this dissertation is to undercut the contempo-
rary consensus on both notions by first demonstrating a systemic weakness in probabilistic
accounts of rational credence (part I) and then providing a non-probabilistic account of
confirmation (part II). Since any adequate account of confirmation is prima facie an ade-
quate account of rational credence, the negative work of part one dovetails with the positive
account offered in part two. Confirmation is no misleading misconception, and rational cre-
dences are not probability functions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation concerns the interpretation and structure of two intuitive notions: rational
credence and confirmation. Probabilistic accounts of rational credence currently enjoy a
position of considerable prestige, underwriting significant work not only in philosophy but
also in economics and statistics. Confirmation, in contrast, is widely regarded as ill-formed,
a misleading misconception akin to phlogiston, witches, or cosmic ether (de Finetti 1979,
x). The primary project of this dissertation is to undercut the contemporary consensus
on both notions by first demonstrating a systemic weakness in probabilistic accounts of
rational credence (part I) and then providing a non-probabilistic account of confirmation
(part II). The current chapter provides a brief introduction to probability, rational credence,
and confirmation as well as an outline of the rest of the dissertation.
1.1 Probability
In contemporary mathematics, a probability space is a triple 〈Ω,F , µ〉 where Ω is a non-
empty set ("the state space"), F is an appropriate1 collection of subsets of Ω ("the event
space"), and µ is a function from F to the real numbers R ("the probability function")
satisfying the following three criteria:
(K1) µ(Ω) = 1;
(K2) For any A ∈ F , µ(A) ≥ 0;
(K3) For a countable collection {Ai} of pairwise disjoint sets from F ,
µ(∪{Ai}) =
∑
i
µ(Ai).
1More exactly, F is aσ-algebra, a subset ofP(Ω) containing ∅ that is closed under complement, countable
union, and countable intersection.
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Informally, µ assigns the trivially true event probability one, the trivially false event prob-
ability zero, and all other events values between these two (inclusive). In addition, µ com-
bines the weights of incompatible (i.e., disjoint) events by adding their respective values.
A die, for example, naturally gives rise to a state space Ω containing a state for each
numbered face of the die.
Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
The event space F is then typically taken to be the set of all subsets of this state space. This
includes not only singleton events—e.g., the die shows six—but also any combination of
these singletons, e.g., the die shows six or the die shows four.
F = {∅, {1}, {2}, {3}, . . . , {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}}
Finally, dice are conventionally associated with the probability function µ which maps
each singleton event to the value 16 and combination events to the sum of the corresponding
singleton events.
µ(∅) = 0
µ({1}) = 1
6
µ({2}) = 1
6
µ({3}) = 1
6
...
µ({1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}) = 1
Putting each of these components together, the triple 〈Ω,F , µ〉 is a probability space.
The contemporary meaning of ‘probability’ occupies an uncomfortable middle ground
between this mathematical definition and an unanalyzed notion of likelihood. This ambi-
guity is intolerable in the current setting, and I have found it easiest to explicitly adopt the
former, mathematical usage. There is thus no sense in asking why probability functions
should be additive or why the real numbers are the right choice for probability. There is
also, however, no special connection between the probability space described above, the
uncertainty of rolling the die in question, and the likelihood of a particular outcome. µ
is just as legitimate as an assignment of areas to each face of the die—16 square inches
each!—as it is a measure of likelihood. If probability should happen to be an adequate
formal analysis of likelihood, so much the better. If it should not, then nothing has been
lost. Probability is all and only what satisfies the mathematical definition provided.
While this thoroughly formal use of ‘probability’ breaks with some commentaries, it
is in line with the general shift towards axiomatization in mathematics and its usage there.
The fact that mathematical work on probability originates with games of chance and no-
tions of likelihood is interesting but ultimately immaterial. As Hilbert himself is supposed
2
to have remarked about geometry, "One must be able to say at all times—instead of points,
straight lines, and planes—tables, chairs, and beer mugs" (Reid and Weyl 2013, 57). Prob-
ability functions and spaces are understood here in the same spirit.
1.2 Rational Credence
We believe some claims more strongly than others. Not just in that we feel more or less
confident—though this often coincides with "believing more strongly" in our intended
sense—but rather in that we judge some claims more likely. These likelihood judgments
are known variously as graded beliefs, partial beliefs, degrees of belief, degrees of confi-
dence, and credences. The existence of credences is a psychological fact; however they
come about, credences are an integral component of many individual’s cognition.
Credences have a number of obvious features. First, they are possessed by agents.
Second, different agents are liable to possess different, even radically different, credences.
Subject to the full breadth of human malfunction, we ought not expect any appreciable
uniformity between agents.2 Third and finally, credences are identical to neither feelings
of confidence nor betting dispositions. Imagine, for instance, a Zen monk who lacks both
any emotional response and any betting dispositions with respect to the claim ‘the sun will
rise tomorrow’ (Eriksson and Hájek 2007). Such an individual may nevertheless judge this
claim to be highly likely. As a result, while different credences are often associated with
different emotional responses or betting dispositions, this association is not necessary.3
Confidence and a willingness to bet at steep odds are hallmarks of high credence in a
claim; they are not constitutive of it.
Where credences are the likelihood judgments of actual agents, rational credences are
the likelihood judgments of ideally rational agents. Rational credences are thus perfected or
idealized credences; the result of eliminating human fallibility from likelihood judgments.
Unlike credences, all rational credences agree on at least some likelihood judgments. It
would be irrational, for example, to have higher credence in a contradiction than a tautology
or, more generally, to judge ϕ more likely than ψ when ϕ entails ψ. It is the task of accounts
2Actual agents’ likelihood judgments fail both to range over propositions and to satisfy any meaningful
formal criteria. On the former count, actual people routinely fail to recognize two statements as expressing
the same proposition when they in fact do. Least contentiously, this occurs with simple calculation failures,
e.g. someone versed in propositional logic who fails to notice the connection between "¬P" and "P →
⊥". On the second count, it is certainly possible that a particular population exhibit nontrivial regularities.
Subject to the full breadth of human malfunction, however, there are no universal regularities. Actual human
judgments include not only failures of calculation and comprehension but also all those assessments made in
a compromised state. Sleep deprivation, intoxication, and severe physical trauma suffice to undermine even
those restrictions we might otherwise wish to declare universal truths of human judgment. There is nothing a
suitably compromised individual cannot honestly reject.
3This example does not rule out a necessary relationship between credences and counterfactual betting
dispositions, a position suggested by Ramsey (1931) and recently defended by Elliott (2019). Despite these
endorsements, I find counterfactual betting dispositions more mysterious than a brute appeal to likelihood
judgments, and so I retain the latter as a preferred gloss.
3
of rational credence to provide a full analysis of and justification for this common structure.
Orthodox accounts of rational credence uniformly hold that rational credences are, at
minimum, probability functions. In these accounts, the state space Ω is interpreted as a set
of possible worlds and the event space F as specifying all those propositions which admit
of credal values. The probability function µ then represents a rational credence over F ,
assigning greater or lesser values in [0, 1] according to whether the proposition in question
is judged to be more or less likely.
1.3 Confirmation
While rational credence is an idealization of a psychological phenomenon, confirmation
arises as a generalization of logical consequence. Given a set of premises Σ, there has
amassed a considerable consensus on what follows from this set, on what must be true
given only Σ. This relationship between Σ and its consequences is popularly dubbed ‘log-
ical consequence’ and straightforwardly underpins much of our reasoning. Despite these
successes, logical consequence does not extend as far as desired. In point of fact, we are of-
ten confronted with claims which are neither entailed by nor inconsistent with our premises.
Examples abound, but scientific theories—the theory of evolution, Newtonian mechanics,
Mendelian genetics—and conspiracy theories—flat earth, fake moon landing, governments
controlled by the Illuminati—are the most striking. Such theories are not treated as a single
homogeneous whole. Instead, some are held to be better confirmed or better supported by
the evidence.
As Karl Popper observed, there are actually two different relations we might plausibly
call ‘confirmation’ here. The first is absolute confirmation or support of a claim by evi-
dence. This is a relation between a set of evidence E and a single claim P or theory Γ.4
This notion was formalized by Carnap (1962), for example, as c(P|E) for c an appropriate
probability function. A claim P was then more or less (absolutely) confirmed according
to whether the probability assigned to P was closer or further from one. In contrast, in-
cremental confirmation (sometimes also ‘relative confirmation’, ‘relevance confirmation’,
or ‘increase in firmness’) is the relative support offered by a particular piece of evidence
for a particular claim. This is a relation between a set of background evidence E, a single
additional piece of evidence e, and a claim P. Using Carnap’s theory again as an example,
incremental confirmation was formalized not as the absolute probability of P relative to E
4This presentation is somewhat contentious. While Weisberg (2011) gives the same definition, Hájek and
Joyce (2008) and Crupi and Tentori (2016) present absolute confirmation as a three-place relation between a
set of background evidence E, a particular additional piece of evidence e, and a claim P. On their scheme,
absolute confirmation of P by e (relative to background evidence E) refers to the probability of P given e
(relative again to background evidence E). The separation of a evidential claim e from the main body of
evidence only for it to be immediately rolled back into this greater collection is unnatural. The only apparent
motivation here is to enforce an identical structure on both relations and to mimic the subjective Bayesian
formalism (which completely suppresses mention of background evidence into the prior probability func-
tion). Maher (1996) presents a still different definition on behalf of Carnap, giving ‘absolute confirmation’ as
increase in probability relative to no background evidence.
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but rather as the incremental change induced by the addition of e: c(P|E∪{e})− c(P|E). In-
tuitively, P is more or less (incrementally) confirmed by e according to how great or small
the change in probability produced by e is. This dissertation is concerned with only the
absolute confirmation relation; ‘confirmation’ simpliciter from here forward.
In practice, the confirmation relation is often presented under the heading of ‘logical
probability’ (Gillies 2000; Hacking 2006; Weisberg 2011; Hájek 2012).5 There are two
good reasons to support this alternate title and one decisive point against it. First, ‘logical
probability’ was the name of choice in the most influential entries on the topic: Keynes
(1921) and Carnap (1962). Second, ‘logical probability’ is an apt description of the project
itself so long as ‘probability’ is understood as an informal term for likelihood or weight.
As Keynes (1921) explains,
We are claiming, in fact, to cognise correctly a logical connection between one
set [of] propositions which we call our evidence and which we suppose our-
selves to know, and another set which we call our conclusions, and to which we
attach more or less weight according to the grounds supplied by the first. . . . It
is not straining the use of words to speak of this as the relation of probability.
(5-6)
Despite these good reasons, the increasing shift towards a formal definition of ‘probability’
over the course of the last century makes ‘logical probability’ a misleading label today. No
reason has been provided for thinking that confirmation is productively analyzed in terms of
the mathematical theory of probability. Indeed, an unreflective slide into the mathematical
theory of probability is precisely where previous accounts of confirmation go wrong.
As originally understood, the confirmation relation is both objective and normative. The
relation is objective in that it is independent of any person or persons. Confirmation does
not shift based on the individual considered, nor does it depend on our biology,6 nor does it
suppose any particular conception or perception of the world. Just like logical consequence,
confirmation is an a priori relation to be discovered rather than invented. The confirmation
relation is normative in that, absent either additional evidence or restrictions, it ought to
guide both our internal convictions and our decision making. Confirmation describes the
best that can be done on both epistemic and practical grounds in an ideal setting.
5Following Carnap (1962), confirmation is also sometimes described as ‘inductive probability’. While
Carnap (1962) takes validating induction as one of his desideratum, this does not follow from any of the
glosses provided here. Indeed, I regard it as implausible that a relation of a kind with logical consequence
should validate induction in the absence of further assumptions.
6Keynes (1921) denies this and is rightly criticized for this choice by Ramsey (1931). Keynes’ hesitance
on this point derives from the alleged possibility of logical relations which humanity is incapable of recog-
nizing. As the eventual discussion of classical logic makes clear, no such worries attach to the view of logical
consequence advocated here.
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1.4 Outline
The remaining four chapters of this dissertation are divided into two parts. The first part
focuses on the structure of rational credence and the inadequacy of probabilistic accounts
thereof. The second chapter introduces the topic with a discussion of two different for-
malisms for ranking objects. The rest of the chapter then applies both formalisms to the
case of rational credence with an emphasis on characterizing (i) those constraints that fol-
low directly from logic and (ii) the consequences of supposing uniform combination of
credal values over inconsistent sentences. The work of this chapter is largely program-
matic in nature and reappears sporadically throughout the rest of the dissertation.
The third chapter leverages this initial discussion into a criticism of probabilistic ac-
counts of rational credence. Contemporary discussion of rational credence is dominated
by probabilism in general and subjective Bayesianism in particular. The former holds that
rational credences are probability functions and the latter that this is the only synchronic
constraint on rational credence. Naturally, a large number of arguments have been offered
in defense of both. This chapter surveys three of the most influential justifications for
probabilism: Dutch book arguments, representation arguments, and gradational accuracy
arguments. In all three cases, the proposed argument is demonstrated to presuppose both
comparability and the Archimedean property, key tenets of probabilism. As a direct result,
these orthodox accounts of rational credence fail to justify their identification of rational
credences with probability functions.
The fourth chapter begins the dissertation’s second part: a non-probabilistic account of
confirmation which is faithful to the intuitions sketched above, viz. a degreed extension
of classical logic which is both objective and normative. The contemporary case against
confirmation provides three immediate barriers: Ramsey’s skepticism, d’Alembert’s riddle,
and Bertrand’s paradox. The fourth chapter considers the first two of these objections and
constructs a finite account of confirmation that overcomes both.
The fifth and final chapter begins with an extended commentary on the most substan-
tial of the three objections to confirmation: Bertrand’s paradox. Both standard character-
izations of and replies to Bertrand’s paradox are shown to underestimate the underlying
phenomenon. The first contribution of the chapter is thus a revised characterization of
Bertrand’s paradox that significantly expands its scope. Despite this generalization, the
paradox succeeds only in blocking probabilistic accounts of confirmation. The second con-
tribution of this chapter is then an extension of the finite account of confirmation from
chapter four which successfully evades the paradox. Further, it is shown that this account
of confirmation is a maximal solution to the paradox; any alternative account of confir-
mation either falls victim to the paradox or is strictly weaker. This chapter ends with a
critical discussion of degrees of confirmation and the extent to which the proposed account
supports this talk.
The work of both parts of this dissertation can be brought together with a pair of obser-
vations. First, any adequate account of confirmation is prima facie an adequate account of
rational credence. What more could one want from a theory of rational credence than an
6
objective and normative relation representing the evidential support for a claim? Second,
among the characteristic features of the proposed account of confirmation are failures of
both comparability and the Archimedean property, the very same properties left unjusti-
fied by contemporary accounts of rational credence. The negative work of part one thus
dovetails with the positive account offered in part two; confirmation is no misleading mis-
conception, and rational credences are not probability functions.
7
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Part I
Formalizing Rational Credence
9

Chapter 2
Likelihood Spaces and Structures
This chapter explores the task of formalizing rational credence with an emphasis on iden-
tifying minimal constraints rather than advocating any particular account. The first section
presents and compares two different formalisms for ranking objects: comparative rankings
and absolute rankings. The second section applies the latter to the case of rational credence,
characterizing both the constraints that follow directly from logic and a natural extension
which supposes uniformity in combining inconsistent sentences. The third and final sec-
tion is largely technical in nature, establishing simple correspondences between the work
on absolute rankings in the second section and comparative rankings.
2.1 Comparative and Absolute Rankings
In ranking any class of objects, there are two formally distinct approaches available. First,
objects may be placed into a relative or comparative ranking; a theory may stipulate when
an object o is above o′, when o and o′ are equal, and when o′ is at least o. The following
abbreviations for these relationships are typical:
o ≺ o′ o is less than o′.
o ∼ o′ o and o′ are equal.
o - o′ o is less than or equal to o′.
Second, objects may be ranked via association with some absolute scale 〈A,≤, <〉. That is,
a theory may stipulate a function µ : O→ A which assigns each object o ∈ O a value a ∈ A.
Particular objects o are then more/less/equal according to the position of their value µ(o) in
the absolute scale.
Formally, the presentation above overspecifies both approaches. Given only a binary
relation - on O, a corresponding strict relation ≺ and symmetric relation ∼ can be defined
by
(i) o ≺ o′ if and only if o - o′ and o′  o.
(ii) o ∼ o′ if and only if o - o′ and o′ - o.
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Similarly, given that ∼ is symmetric:
If o ∼ o′, then o′ ∼ o.
and ≺ is exclusive:
If o ≺ o′, then both o′ ⊀ o and o / o′.
a corresponding non-strict relation - can be defined by
(iii) o - o′ if and only if o ≺ o′ or o ∼ o′.
Proposition 2.1
Let O be a set and each of -,≺,∼ binary relations over O. Then, the following are
equivalent:
(1) (i) and (ii) hold;
(2) (iii) holds, ∼ is symmetric, and ≺ is exclusive.
Accepting (i)-(iii), it thus suffices to supply either a non-strict comparative relation - or the
pair 〈≺,∼〉 where ∼ is symmetric and ≺ is exclusive.
Parallel observations apply to absolute rankings. The comparative ∼ relation here is
induced by the identity relation over A and thus satisfies symmetry. Supposing (i)-(iii) and
that the strict relation < satisfies exclusivity, an absolute scale may be taken to be either a
set and non-strict relation 〈A,≤〉 or a set and strict relation 〈A, <〉 with the missing relation
derived by either (i) or (iii). The choice then between 〈A,≤〉 and 〈A, <〉 is likewise of little
formal consequence.
For simplicity, the convention of using the non-strict formulation of both approaches is
adopted here.
Definition 2.1 A comparative ranking over a set of objects O is a binary relation - over O
satisfying
 Reflexivity. For any o ∈ O, o - o.
 Transitivity. For any o, o′, o′′ ∈ O, if o - o′ and o′ - o′′, then o - o′′.
Since the values in an absolute scale measure different sizes, equality of size occurs only
with identity between values:
12
Definition 2.2 An absolute scale 〈A,≤〉 is a ordered pair of a set and a binary relation ≤
over A satisfying
 Reflexivity. For any a ∈ A, a ≤ a.
 Transitivity. For any a, a′, a′′ ∈ A, if a ≤ a′ and a′ ≤ a′′, then a ≤ a′′.
 Antisymmetry. For any a, a′ ∈ A, if a ≤ a′ and a′ ≤ a, then a = a′.
Definition 2.3 An absolute assignment over a set of objects O using absolute scale 〈A,≤〉
is a function µ : O→ A.
Comparative rankings are thus preorders while absolute assignments assign values from a
partial order.
Without further restrictions, there is no representational difference between comparative
and absolute rankings. Given a theory which produces an absolute ranking µ, a correspond-
ing comparative theory can be had simply by defining
o -µ o′ ⇔ µ(o) ≤ µ(o′).
Similarly, a theory which produces a comparative ranking can be replicated in an absolute
framework by taking equivalence classes under the comparative ∼ relation as an absolute
scale for O.
Proposition 2.2
Let a set of objects O be given. Then,
(i) For any comparative ranking - over O, there exists an absolute scale 〈A,≤〉 and
absolute ranking µ : O→ A such that
o - o′ ⇔ µ(o) ≤ µ(o′).
(ii) For any absolute scale 〈A,≤〉 and absolute ranking µ : O → A, there exists a
comparative ranking - over O such that
o - o′ ⇔ µ(o) ≤ µ(o′).
In the most general case, absolute and comparative rankings are entirely interchangeable
over a fixed object set O.
This straightforward relationship can, however, become significantly more complex
with the addition of further constraints. It is useful here to recognize three broad categories.
First, constraints may be imposed on the comparative ranking. It might be required, for
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instance, that the ranking be total or that a particular operation on objects interact nicely
with the comparative ranking. Second, constraints may be imposed on either the absolute
scale 〈A,≤〉 or on the absolute assignment µ : O → A. Work in formal epistemology, for
example, often supposes that only absolute assignments using the absolute scale 〈[0, 1],≤〉
are allowed. With constraints in either of these two categories, maintaining agreement
between absolute assignments and comparative rankings necessitates the introduction of
parallel restrictions on the other formalism. Identifying both adequate and intuitive choices
here can be a matter of considerable difficulty.
The final category of constraints concerns not comparisons over a particular set of ob-
jects O but rather cross-set comparisons. In many applications, a homogeneous ranking is
desired over a collection of object sets O = {O, . . . }. If this collection O is not closed under
union, novel cross-set commitments may arise. Such commitments are particularly natural
with absolute rankings. Taking, for example, two absolute assignments µ and µ′ over two
disjoint object sets O and O′ which share an absolute scale 〈A,≤〉, it is natural (though not
necessary) to interpret µ and µ′ as fixing not only a comparative ranking - over O and a
comparative ranking -′ over O′ but also the comparative ranking -+ over O ∪ O′ defined
by
o1 -+ o2 if and only if µ+(o1) ≤ µ+(o2)
where
µ+(o) =
{
µ(o) if o ∈ O
µ′(o) if o ∈ O′.
In general, endorsing cross-set comparisons may again introduce a more complicated rela-
tionship between comparative and absolute rankings.
2.2 Likelihood Spaces and Structures
Providing a formal characterization of rational credence in terms of absolute rankings
requires three distinct components. First is the specification of those entities to which
credal values will attach. Second is the choice of an absolute scale 〈P,≤〉 for these values.
Third and finally, we may concern ourselves with interactions between the first and second
components—how it is that values from the endorsed absolute scale may be assigned. It
is not difficult to see that there are dependencies between these three tasks—one should
not, for instance, be in the business of assigning values which do not exist in one’s scale.
Conversely, however, each task also possesses a significant degree of independence from
the others; a space of values does not generate the entities to which these values may be
applied, nor does a space of values and a set of entities necessitate particular interactions
between them. Each individual step above involves a non-trivial choice by the theorist.
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2.2.1 The Objects of Rational Credence
Conventional accounts of rational credence almost exclusively assign credal values to sets
of possibilities ("events" or "propositions") from some distinguished collection, cf. Halpern
(2017). While this phrasing is evocative, it is nevertheless unclear what precisely a possi-
bility (or possible world for that matter) is. Formal logic not only provides a ready replace-
ment for this loose talk but one which helps fix a minimal structure for theories of rational
credence. Rational credences properly apply to formal languages L which are equipped
with a non-empty, exhaustive collection1 of models or model space ΩL.2 A rational cre-
dence may then be taken to assign values either to the sentences of such a formal language
or to subcollections of the model space ΩL.
The interchange between sentences and collections of models is straightforward, and
so we will shift between both perspectives. Given a formal language L and a model space
ΩL, every sentence ϕ ∈ L is associated with the collection of models from ΩL which make
it true, notated ~ϕ. Sentences of L thus correspond to unique collections of models though
a particular collection of models may correspond to many or even no sentences. As an
example of this first, note that each of ϕ, (ϕ ∨ ϕ), and ((ϕ ∨ ϕ) ∨ ϕ) represent distinct
sentences but all three correspond to the same collection of models ~ϕ. In general, the
collection of models formulation collapses syntactic distinctions which do not reflect any
semantic difference. For the second, a collection of models corresponding to no sentence
of the formal language L is the hallmark of an expressive weakness, a meaningful but
inexpressible "proposition". While some care must thus be taken in the transition between
sentences and collections of models, the difficulties here are outweighed by the utility—
both philosophical and mathematical—of the dual perspective.
We will suppose both that all of the formal languages L at issue are equipped with
Boolean connectives and that any theory of rational credences applies at minimum to
propositional languages:
1Collections (sometimes also, classes) are a generalization of the notion of set. Every set is a collection
but not every collection is a set, e.g., the collection of all first-order models. I assume throughout that the
collections considered satisfy the axioms of ZFC.
2What of formal languages—e.g., propositional modal languages—which do not possess an accepted, ex-
haustive collection? Such languages necessarily lack a fixed notion of model-theoretic consequence which—
all things considered—is a larger and more immediate shortcoming than a breakdown in the notion of ratio-
nal credence. We may proceed by supposing that a particular collection of models is exhaustive though this
should be recognized as an additional and often substantial assumption.
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Definition 2.4 Given a set of propositional letters σ, the propositional language L gener-
ated from σ is the set containing all and only
(i) ⊥,
(ii) >,
(iii) Pi for every Pi ∈ σ,
(iv) For any ϕ, ψ ∈ L,
¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ψ) | (ϕ ∨ ψ) | (ϕ→ ψ) | (ϕ↔ ψ).
While it is possible to use both simpler and more complex languages, the propositional
setting is both familiar and uncontroversial. However far theories of rational credence
extend, they cannot fail to apply to propositional languages.
Every propositional language is associated with a straightforward and widely-accepted
model space.3 The relevant definitions are briefly reproduced below:
Definition 2.5 For a set of propositional letters σ and associated propositional language
L, an L-model is a function v : σ → {T, F}. Given an L-model M, truth in M is defined
recursively by:
(i) M  Pi if and only if v(Pi) = T ;
(ii) M  >;
(iii) M 6 ⊥;
(iv) For ϕ, ψ ∈ L,
M  ¬ϕ if and only if M 6 ϕ
M  (ϕ ∧ ψ) if and only if M  ϕ and M  ψ
M  (ϕ ∨ ψ) if and only if M  ϕ or M  ψ
M  (ϕ→ ψ) if and only if M 6 ϕ or M  ψ
M  (ϕ↔ ψ) if and only if either M  ϕ and M  ψ or M 6 ϕ and M 6 ψ.
3Other choices—e.g., a model space allowing differences in signature or a model space which omits
particular models—may nevertheless be useful depending on context
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Definition 2.6 For Γ ⊆ L and ϕ ∈ L, ϕ is a consequence of Γ, notated Γ |= ϕ, if and only if
for every L-model M, if M  ψ for every ψ ∈ Γ, then M  ϕ as well.
 A sentence ϕ ∈ L is a contradiction if and only if for every L-model M, M 6 ϕ.
 A sentence ϕ ∈ L is valid if and only if for every L-model M, M  ϕ.
 A set of sentences Γ ⊆ L is consistent if and only if there exists an L-model M such
that M  ψ for every ψ ∈ Γ.
We require that every model in a model space ΩL for L assigns a truth value to every
sentence in L. For any ϕ ∈ L, the corresponding set of models in ΩL is thus given by
~ϕ = {v ∈ ΩL : v  ϕ}.
Indeed, since L is equipped with Boolean connectives, the set of models formulation natu-
rally gives rise to the algebra4
FL = {~ϕ : ϕ ∈ L}.
The typical emphasis on sets of possibilities and algebras in theories of rational credence
thus falls out of the current approach.
In sum, rational credences are provided relative to a formal language L and model space
ΩL. With a little care, credal values may then be attributed either to sentences of L or to
subcollections of the model space ΩL. Given our insistence on Boolean connectives and
supposing that ΩL is a set, these subcollections of ΩL form an algebra FL over ΩL. The
most obvious examples of formal languages equipped with model spaces are particular
propositional languages together with the set of all their models. Finally, we will require
that theories of rational credence apply to propositional languages and their associated
model spaces at a minimum.
2.2.2 The Space of Values
Turning to the second component of a theory of rational credence, an absolute scale for
rational credal values is a partially ordered set with two distinguished extreme elements.
Such a scale will be called a likelihood space.
4An algebra of sets is a collection F ⊆ P(Ω) which is closed under finite union, finite intersection, and
complementation.
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Definition 2.7 A likelihood space P is a four-tuple containing
(i) a domain set, dom(P),
(ii) a distinguished impossible element, 0˙ ∈ dom(P),
(iii) a distinguished certain element, 1˙ ∈ dom(P),
(iv) a binary relation  on dom(P) satisfying
(a) Non-triviality
0˙ ≺ 1˙.
(b) Transitivity
For any p1, p2, p3 ∈ dom(P), if p1  p2 and p2  p3, then p1  p3.
(c) Reflexivity
For any p ∈ dom(P), p  p.
(d) Anti-Symmetry
For any p1, p2 ∈ dom(P), if p1  p2 and p2  p1, then p1 = p2.
(e) Boundedness
For any p ∈ dom(P) − {0˙, 1˙}, 0˙ ≺ p ≺ 1˙.
The only novelty here over and above absolute scales generally is the introduction of a dis-
tinct lower and upper bound. These two elements correspond to impossibility and certainty
respectively and reflect a necessary feature of any adequate theory of rational credence.
Whatever credal values are, they are necessarily partially ordered and range between im-
possibility and certainty.
Convention 1. Set-theoretic operations applied to likelihood spaces are understood as op-
erations on the domain of the space, e.g., p ∈ P will be used instead of p ∈ dom(P).
Convention 2. Likelihood spaces P will often be abbreviated to a pair of a domain and a
binary relation, 〈dom(P),〉 with the choice of 0˙ and 1˙ implicit as the smallest and largest
elements in the domain according to .
The actual representatives within a specified domain dom(P) are merely conventional;
it is the structural features of the space P which are of interest. Accordingly,
Definition 2.8 A likelihood space P1 is equivalent to a likelihood space P2 if and only if
there exists a -preserving bijection δ : P1 → P2.
For those familiar with modern formal logic, this may be equivalently stated as P1 and P2
are isomorphic when interpreted as first-order models of the language generated from the
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signature 〈0˙, 1˙,〉. Under this criteria, each of the following likelihood spaces is distinct:
〈 {0, 1}, 0, 1,≤ 〉
〈{0, 1
2
, 1}, 0, 1,≤ 〉
〈[0, 1], 0, 1,≤ 〉
〈[0, 1] ∪ { 1∞} ∪ {
∞ − 1
∞ }, 0, 1,≤ 〉
Each of these spaces naturally suggests a position in philosophical discussion of rational
credence. The first is naturally construed as representing a complete lack of epistemic
uncertainty, the second as a view which admits of only a degree-less uncertainty, the third
as the conventional probability account, and the last as a simplistic infinitesimal account.
This slide from likelihood space to a full theory of rational credence is—however—to
be resisted. A likelihood space alone does not force an account of what these likelihoods at-
tach to, nor—more critically—how these probabilities vary relative to their bearers. To take
a salient example, Jeffreys (1967) entertains the space 〈[0,∞], 0,∞,≤〉 for situations which
contain a countably infinite number of disjoint events. It is not difficult to show, moreover,
that this likelihood space is equivalent to 〈[0, 1], 0, 1,≤〉 in our intended sense. Jeffreys is
not thereby offering, however, the conventional account in disguise. -preserving bijection
between likelihood spaces takes no account of the behavior of likelihood values relative to
a language and model space, and it is here that the two proposals differ.
Identifying disjunction between incompatible alternatives with addition on [0,∞], the
induced disjunction operation on the space 〈[0, 1], 0, 1,≤〉 necessarily possesses instances
of sub-additivity. That is, for any ≤-preserving bijection δ : [0,∞] → [0, 1], there exists
p, p′ ∈ [0,∞] such that δ(p + p′) < δ(p) + δ(p′). Conversely, identifying disjunction be-
tween incompatible alternatives with the standard addition relation over [0, 1], the induced
disjunction operation on 〈[0,∞], 0, 1,≤〉 has instances of super-additivity. In each case, the
association of the disjunction of disjoint alternatives with addition over the likelihood space
represents an additional and substantial commitment, one which renders the two interpreta-
tions incompatible despite the equivalence of the likelihood spaces themselves. To reiterate
the caution which headed this chapter, the identification of a likelihood space does not—
despite conventional associations—by itself settle either the objects of rational credence or
interactions between these objects and the values assigned.
2.2.3 Interactions
Third and finally, a theory of rational credence must determine how values from the likeli-
hood space may be assigned. Having taken formal languages equipped with a model space
as a basis for theories of rational credence, this component requires identifying some col-
lection of functions from the language L (or algebra FL) to the likelihood space 〈P,〉 as
all and only the rational credences. This is, for example, the role of Kolmogorov’s axioms
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in the subjective Bayesian account of rational credence. Historically, this third component
has proven the most contentious of the three.
A number of restrictions on likelihood assignments follow from the requirement that
rational credences ought to refine logic. These restrictions may be summarized in three
principles:
N. Normativity of Logic
For any rational credence µ and any ϕ, ψ ∈ L, if ϕ |= ψ, then µ(ϕ)  µ(ψ).
C. Certain Validities
For any rational credence µ and any ϕ ∈ L, if |= ϕ, then µ(ϕ) = 1˙.
I. Impossible Contradictions
For any rational credence µ and any ϕ ∈ L, if |= ¬ϕ, then µ(ϕ) = 0˙.
The model-theoretic consequence relation |= is here defined as usual, viz. given L and ΩL,
every model in ΩL that makes ϕ true also makes ψ true. A formal language L and model
space ΩL thus suffice for a corresponding notion of consequence, a logic for L together with
ΩL. In terms of collections of models and the algebra FL, these three principles require
that likelihoods do not increase when moving to subcollections, that ΩL receives the value
1˙, and that the empty set receives the value 0˙.5 Put together, Normativity of Logic, Certain
Validities, and Impossible Contradictions require only that rational credences exist within
the bounds of a language’s own logic.
In the case of a propositional language L, Normativity of Logic thus guarantees, for
example, that µ(P)  µ((P∨Q)) and µ((P∧Q))  µ(P) for any rational credence µ. Certain
Validities meanwhile requires that µ(>) = µ((P ∨ ¬P)) = 1˙ and, more generally, that all
valid sentences receive maximal credence. Finally, Impossible Contradictions requires that
all contradictions receive minimal credence. Thus, µ(⊥) = µ((P∧¬P)) = 0˙ for any rational
credence µ.
Not all restrictions on rational credences need reduce to logic. Indeed, even relatively
permissive contemporary accounts embrace some extra-logical commitments. Drawing on
Krantz et al. (1971), many of these additional commitments can be usefully summarized
by stipulating that a particular operation on either sentences or collections of models corre-
sponds to a particular operation on likelihood values. In the case of probability, for exam-
ple, a correspondence between disjunction of inconsistent sentences (equivalently, unions
5A similar framework was independently developed by Friedman and Halpern (1995); Halpern (2001,
2017) under the heading of ‘plausibility measures’. A plausibility space is a triple 〈W,F , µ〉 where W is a
set of possibilities, F is an algebra over W, and µ is a function from F to a partially ordered set with two
extreme elements which satisfies the set-theoretic equivalents of (N), (C), and (I). It is not difficult to prove
that every formal language L, model space ΩL, and function µ : L → P for a likelihood space 〈P,〉 which
satisfies the logical constraints (N), (C), and (I) gives rise to a corresponding plausibility space. The explicit
use of formal languages and model spaces is specific to the current approach and casts Halpern’s plausibility
measure formalism in a new light. Likelihood assignments satisfying (N), (C), and (I) are not simply one
more general formalism among many proposals; these are the weakest constraints consistent with refining a
language’s logic. A few of Friedman and Halpern (1995)’s results will prove useful in the next section though
the eventual positive proposal deviates radically.
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of disjoint sets of models) and addition is typically postulated. After all, if ϕ and ψ are
inconsistent, the likelihood of (ϕ ∨ ψ) ought to just be the result of ‘combining’ the likeli-
hood of ϕwith the likelihood of ψ. This particular approach is both ubiquitous and intuitive
enough that it will be useful to have a shorthand for a likelihood space equipped with an
operation which corresponds to the disjunction of inconsistent sentences.
While actually stipulating the use of addition would beg the question in favor of par-
ticular likelihood spaces, an inconsistent disjunction operation ought to be at least a partial
function6 from P × P to P and addition-like:
Definition 2.9 A likelihood structure 〈P, ◦〉 is a pair containing
(i) a likelihood space P,
(ii) an operation ◦ : P × P 7→ P satisfying
(a) Commutativity
For any p1, p2 ∈ P, if ◦(p1, p2)↓, then ◦(p2, p1)↓= ◦(p1, p2).
(b) Additive Identity
For any p ∈ P, ◦(p, 0˙)↓= p.
(c) Existence of Complements
For any p ∈ P, there exists p′ such that ◦(p, p′)↓= 1˙.
(d) Associativity
For any p1, p2, p3 ∈ P, if both ◦(p1, ◦(p2, p3)) ↓ and ◦(p1, ◦(p2, p3)) ↓, then
◦(◦(p1, p2), p3) = ◦(p1, ◦(p2, p3)).
(e) Monotonicity
For any p, p1, p2 ∈ P with ◦(p, p1) ↓ and ◦(p, p2) ↓, p1  p2 if and only if
◦(p, p1)  ◦(p, p2).
While intuitive, this simple move from likelihood spaces to likelihood structures enforces
three further non-logical restrictions on likelihood assignments.
Convention 3. Likelihood structures 〈P, ◦〉 will often be presented as a triple of a domain
dom(P), a binary relation , and an operation ◦ : P × P 7→ P with the choice of 0˙ and 1˙
implicit as the smallest and largest elements in the domain according to .
First, an arbitrary likelihood assignment µ : L → P satisfying the logical constraints
(N), (C), and (I) need not induce a well-defined operation for the disjunction of inconsistent
sentences. Let L be the propositional language generated from σ = {P,Q} and ΩL the
set {v1, v2, v3, v4} of all propositional models for L. Consider the likelihood assignment
µ : FL → [0, 1] defined by
6A partial function f : A 7→ B for two sets A and B is a relation on A × B such that for any a ∈ A, there is
either exactly one b ∈ B with 〈a, b〉 ∈ f or no b ∈ B with 〈a, b〉 ∈ f . In the former case, we say " f is defined
on input a" and write f (a)↓= b or f (a)↓. In the latter, we say " f is undefined on input a" and write f (a) ↑.
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µ({v1, v2, v3, v4}) = 1˙
≺
µ({v1, v2, v3}) = µ({v1, v2, v4}) = µ({v1, v3, v4}) = µ({v2, v3, v4}) = 45
≺
µ({v1, v3}) = µ({v1, v4}) = µ({v2, v3}) = µ({v3, v4}) = µ({v2, v4}) = 35
≺
µ({v1, v2}) = 25
≺
µ({v1}) = µ({v2}) = µ({v3}) = µ({v4}) = 15
≺
µ(∅) = 0˙.
Despite satisfying (N), (C), and (I), the likelihoods of unions over {v1}, {v2}, and {v3} depend
not just on the likelihood assigned to each set individually but also on the particular set in
question. The union of {v1} and {v2}, for example, produces a set with likelihood strictly
below the union of {v2} and {v3} despite {v1}, {v2}, and {v3} being assigned equal likelihood.
While intuitive, the introduction of an operation for the disjunction of inconsistent sen-
tences thus introduces an additional functionality restriction on likelihood assignments.
F. Functionality for Inconsistent Disjunction / Disjoint Union
For any two pairs of inconsistent sentences ϕ, ψ and ϕ′, ψ′, if µ(ϕ) = µ(ϕ′) and µ(ψ) =
µ(ψ′), then µ((ϕ ∨ ψ)) = µ((ϕ′ ∨ ψ′)).
Given a likelihood assignment µ : FL → P which satisfies (F), the induced operator ◦
for disjunction of inconsistent sentences satisfies the commutativity, additive identity, and
existence of complements restrictions over the values used by µ, P|µ[FL].
Proposition 2.3
Given a formal language L with Boolean connectives, a model space ΩL for L, and
a likelihood assignment µ : L → P satisfying (N), (C), and (I), µ satisfies (F) only if
◦ satisfies commutativity, additive identity, and existence of complements over P|µ[FL]
where ◦ : P × P 7→ P is defined by
µ(ϕ) ◦ µ(ψ) = µ((ϕ ∨ ψ))
for ϕ, ψ ∈ L inconsistent.
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Absent from this result are the associativity and monotonicity restrictions imposed on
the inconsistent disjunction operator ◦ in likelihood structures. Given a triple of inconsis-
tent sentences ϕ, ψ, γ, any likelihood assignment µ : L → P satisfying the logical con-
straints (N), (C), and (I) as well as the non-logical constraint (F) is associative over ϕ, ψ,
and γ, i.e.,
µ(ϕ) ◦ [µ(ψ) ◦ µ(γ)] = [µ(ϕ) ◦ µ(ψ)] ◦ µ(γ).
While this is sometimes taken to show that ◦ is associative in general—e.g., by Fine
(1973)—this is not true. The following example shows that an arbitrary likelihood as-
signment µ : L → P satisfying (N), (C), (I), and (F) need not induce an operation for the
disjunction of inconsistent sentences which satisfies associativity. The existence of such
an example was first noted by Friedman and Halpern (1995) but was never explicitly pre-
sented. Let L be the propositional language generated from σ = {P,Q,R} and ΩL a subset
{v1, v2a, v2b, v2c, v3, v4} of all propositional models for L. Using only the subscript for each
model while dropping both µ and explicit set notation in order to reduce clutter,
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12a2b2c34
2a2b2c34
12a2b34 ∼ 12b2c34 ∼ 12a2c34
2a2b34 ∼ 2b2c34 ∼ 2a2c34
12a34
12b34
12c34
2a34 ∼ 2b34 ∼ 2c34 ∼ 12a2b2c4
134
2a2b2c4
12a2b4 ∼ 12b2c4 ∼ 12a2c4 ∼ 34
2a2b4 ∼ 2b2c4 ∼ 2a2c4
12a4 / 12b4 / 12c4
2a4 / 2b4 / 2c4
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4
12a2b2c3
2a2b2c3
12a2b3 ∼ 12b2c3 ∼ 12a2c3
2a2b3 ∼ 2b2c3 ∼ 2a2c3
12a3 / 12b3 / 12c3
2a3 ∼ 2b3 ∼ 2c3 ∼ 12a2b2c
13
2a2b2c
12a2b ∼ 12b2c ∼ 12a2c ∼ 3
2a2b ∼ 2b2c ∼ 2a2c
12a / 12b / 12c
2a / 2b / 2c
1.
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The ≺ relation is encoded here based on the vertical placement of sets while incompara-
bilities are both explicitly specified and bolded for clarity. The induced ◦ operation is not
associative in this example since
µ(12b34) ≺ µ(12a34)
µ(3) ◦ µ(12b4) ≺ µ(1) ◦ µ(2a34)
µ(12a2c) ◦ µ(12b4) ≺ µ(1) ◦ µ(12a2b2c4)
[µ(1) ◦ µ(2a2c)] ◦ µ(12b4) ≺ µ(1) ◦ [µ(2a2c) ◦ µ(12b4)].
This failure relies critically on a scarcity of sets with particular sizes. If this last row were
expressible in terms of a collection of pairwise disjoint sets, then (F) together with the
logical restrictions entails associativity.
The second non-logical restriction built into likelihood structures blocks cases of pre-
cisely this sort. The induced inconsistent disjunction operator ◦ ought to be associative
even if there are too few sets to force this property:
A. Associativity for Inconsistent Disjunction / Disjoint Union
For any ϕ, ψ, γ, if both µ(ϕ) ◦ [µ(ψ) ◦ µ(γ)] ↓ and [µ(ϕ) ◦ µ(ψ)] ◦ µ(γ) ↓, then µ(ϕ) ◦
[µ(ψ) ◦ µ(γ)] = µ(ϕ) ◦ [µ(ψ) ◦ µ(γ)].
Likelihoods ought to be insensitive to the order in which they are combined.
A final example establishes that an arbitrary likelihood assignment µ : L→ P satisfying
the logical constraints (N), (C), and (I) as well as both (F) and (A) need not induce an
operation for the disjunction of inconsistent sentences which satisfies monotonicity. Let L
be the propositional language generated from σ = {P,Q} and ΩL the set {v1, v2, v3, v4} of all
propositional models for L. Consider the likelihood assignment µ : FL → [0, 1] defined by
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µ({v1, v2, v3, v4}) = 1˙
≺
µ({v1, v2, v3}) = µ({v1, v2, v4}) = µ({v1, v3, v4}) = µ({v2, v3, v4}) = 56
≺
µ({v1, v2}) = µ({v1, v3}) = µ({v1, v4}) = 23
≺
µ({v2, v3}) = µ({v3, v4}) = µ({v2, v4}) = 12
≺
µ({v2}) = µ({v3}) = µ({v4}) = 13
≺
µ({v1}) = 16
≺
µ(∅) = 0˙.
The union of disjoint sets of models is now both functional and associative. The results of
these unions are nevertheless intuitively malformed. {v1}, for example, is strictly less likely
than both {v2} and {v3} yet the union of {v1} and {v2} is strictly larger than the union of {v2}
and {v3}.
The final non-logical restriction built into likelihood structures is that sentences or sets
of models have a fixed magnitude regardless of which other inconsistent sentences or dis-
joint sets are combined with them.
M. Monotonicity for Inconsistent Disjunction / Disjoint Union
For any ϕ, ψ, γ where γ is inconsistent with both ϕ and ψ, µ(ϕ)  µ(ψ) if and only if
µ((ϕ ∨ γ))  µ((ψ ∨ γ)).
Either adding or taking away a disjoint set does not change relative likelihood. Given a
likelihood assignment µ : FL → P, the examples above establish that
(N) ∧ (C) ∧ (I) ∧ (F) 6⇒ (A).
(N) ∧ (C) ∧ (I) ∧ (F) ∧ (A) 6⇒ (M).
While instructive, the six restrictions presented in this section are not minimal. It is easy to
prove, for example, that
(N) ∧ (C) ∧ (I) ∧ (M)⇒ (F)
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Accordingly, explicit commitment to (F) will be dropped in any context which also sup-
poses (M).
While the set of restrictions (N), (C), (I), and (M) is minimal, whether or not
(N) ∧ (C) ∧ (I) ∧ (M)⇒ (A)
is an open question. As the second example above shows, failures of (A) are consistent
with a slight weakening of (M) identified by Friedman and Halpern (1995),
D. Decomposition
For any disjoint A1, B1 ∈ FL and disjoint A2, B2 ∈ FL such that µ(A1)  µ(A2) and
µ(B1)  µ(B2), µ(A1 ∪ B1)  µ(A2 ∪ B2).
At the same time, however, working through this example shows that the discrepancy be-
tween (M) and (D) is precisely what gives rise to the failure of associativity.
Proposition 2.4
Given a formal language L with Boolean connectives, a model space ΩL for L, and a
likelihood assignment µ : L→ P satisfying (N), (C), (I), and (M), µ also satisfies
D. Decomposition
For any disjoint A1, B1 ∈ FL and disjoint A2, B2 ∈ FL such that µ(A1)  µ(A2)
and µ(B1)  µ(B2), µ(A1 ∪ B1)  µ(A2 ∪ B2).
F. Functionality for Inconsistent Disjunction / Disjoint Union
For any two pairs of inconsistent sentences ϕ, ψ and ϕ′, ψ′, if µ(ϕ) = µ(ϕ′) and
µ(ψ) = µ(ψ′), then µ((ϕ ∨ ψ)) = µ((ϕ′ ∨ ψ′)).
Proposition 2.5
For a formal language L with Boolean connectives, a model space ΩL for L, and a
likelihood assignment µ : L→ P,
(i) (N), (C), (I) 6⇒ (M).
(ii) (M), (C), (I) 6⇒ (N).
(iii) (N), (M), (I) 6⇒ (C).
(iv) (N), (C), (M) 6⇒ (I).
Given a likelihood assignment µ : FL → P which satisfies the logical restrictions (N),
(C), and (I) as well as the non-logical restrictions (A) and (M), 〈P|µ[FL], ◦〉 where ◦ is the
induced inconsistent disjunction operator is a likelihood structure.
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Proposition 2.6
Given a formal language L with Boolean connectives, a model space ΩL for L, and a
likelihood assignment µ : L → P satisfying (N), (C), (I), (A), and (M), 〈P|µ[FL], ◦〉 is a
likelihood structure where ◦ : P × P 7→ P is defined by
µ(ϕ) ◦ µ(ψ) = µ((ϕ ∨ ψ))
for ϕ, ψ ∈ L inconsistent.
The definition of equivalence between likelihood spaces generalizes to a notion of
equivalence across likelihood structures:
Definition 2.10 A likelihood structure 〈P1, ◦1〉 is equivalent to another likelihood structure
〈P2, ◦2〉 if and only if there exists a -preserving bijection δ : P1 → P2 such that for any
p, p′ ∈ P1, ◦2(δ(p), δ(p′)) = δ(◦1(p, p′)).
Equivalently, we may also view each of 〈P1, ◦1〉 and 〈P2, ◦2〉 as models of the first-order lan-
guage generated from 〈0˙, 1˙,, ◦〉 in which case equivalence is again isomorphism between
models in the typical sense.
The subjective Bayesian account, Jeffreys’ (1967) infinitary proposal, a rational ana-
logue of the subjective Bayesian account, and elimitivism about epistemic uncertainty all
provide salient examples of likelihood structures:
〈[0, 1],≤,+〉
〈[0,∞],≤,+〉
〈Q ∩ [0, 1],≤,+〉
〈{0, 1},≤〉 with ◦ (x, y) =
↑ if x = 1 and y = 1max(x, y) otherwise
Nothing, however, requires that a likelihood structure uses numerical objects; the interval
approach entertained by Levi (1985) also generates a distinct likelihood structure:
〈{[a, b] : a, b ∈ [0, 1] with a ≤ b}, [a1, b1]  [a2, b2]⇔ a1 ≤ a2 and b1 ≤ b2〉
with ◦ ([x1, x2], [y1, y2]) =
[x1 + y1, x2 + y2] if x2 + y2 ≤ 1↑ otherwise
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Taking all functions from FL to these likelihood structures which not only satisfy (N),
(C), and (I) but also use the specified inconsistent disjunction operator provides a maximal
collection of likelihood assignments that may be endorsed as rational credences. In the
case of 〈[0, 1],≤,+〉, this is at last the set of all finitely additive probability functions.
Accepting both the logical restrictions (N), (C), and (I) as well as the non-logical re-
strictions (A) and (M), theories of rational credence must provide a collection of functions
from either L or FL to a likelihood structure 〈P, ◦〉. Further, this collection must both refine
the formal language’s logic and combine likelihood values in an intuitive manner. Any the-
ory of rational credence which falls short of this mark is either underspecified or incoherent
according to whether it admits more than one such collection of functions or none.
Unfortunately, a particular collection of functions from a formal language L to a like-
lihood structure 〈P, ◦〉 does not determine a corresponding theory of rational credence. It
is entirely admissible for particular theories to posit that rational credence is dependent
on some factor outside of L and ΩL, e.g., a set of evidence or a prior probability func-
tion. Distinct theories may then endorse the same collection of functions from a particular
language L to a particular likelihood structure 〈P, ◦〉 but nevertheless disagree on the rela-
tionship between these further parameters and rational credence. In these circumstances, a
formalization of these additional parameters is owed along with a collection of functions
from L together with these parameters to a particular likelihood structure 〈P, ◦〉. Note that
such an account still determines a collection of functions from L to 〈P, ◦〉 by allowing the
additional parameters to vary freely. A well-defined collection of functions from L to a
likelihood structure 〈P, ◦〉 thus represents a necessary component of any theory of ratio-
nal credence which accepts (A) and (M) even if it does not suffice to individuate all such
theories.
In light of this, theories of rational credence may be usefully classified based on two
criteria. First and foremost, by the collection of rational credences they endorse for a formal
language L and model space ΩL. Within this first criteria, it is useful to distinguish accounts
which make use of only a single likelihood structure:
Definition 2.11 A theory of rational credence is categorical if and only if it fixes a single
likelihood structure 〈P,, ◦〉 for any formal language L and model space ΩL.
Contemporary accounts of rational credence are not only almost exclusively categorical
but also in widespread agreement on the use of the 〈[0, 1],≤,+〉 likelihood structure. As
the current section shows, neither of these is delivered by purely logical considerations nor
even by the intuitive restrictions encoded in (A) and (M). Second, theories of rational cre-
dence may be usefully classified by whether or not they endorse any further parameters, and
if so, the exact structure and nature of these parameters. Even if we are in agreement that
〈[0, 1],≤,+〉 is the correct likelihood structure and that all probability functions are possi-
ble for propositional languages, there may remain significant disagreement about whether
or not a particular set of evidence from a propositional language determines a unique prob-
ability function as the rational credence. Contemporary debates around rational credence
tend to fall into this second category; the next chapter argues that there is good reason to
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be worried over the first.
2.3 Connecting Assignments and Comparative Relations
At the outset of this chapter, two formalisms for ranking objects were presented: absolute
and comparative rankings. We come full circle in this section and connect the previous
section’s work on likelihood spaces and structures with better known work on comparative
likelihood rankings.
2.3.1 NCI-Assignments and C01a23bN-Relations
Assignments into a likelihood space satisfying each of Normativity of Logic (N), Certain
Validities (C), and Impossible Contradictions (I) correspond to comparative likelihood rela-
tions satisfying (C0), (C1a), (C2), (C3b), and (CN)—or, more briefly, C01a23bN-relations.
Proposition 2.7
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, P a
likelihood space, µ : FL → P an NCI-likelihood assignment. Then, the relation -µ
over FL defined by
A -µ B⇔ µ(A)  µ(B)
satisfies
C0. Nontriviality
∅ ≺ ΩL.
C1a. Reflexivity
A - A.
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
C3b. Boundedness
⊥ - A - ΩL.
CN. Normativity of Logic.
If A ⊆ B, then A - B.
Definition 2.12 Given a formal language L and a model space ΩL for L, a likelihood as-
signment µ : FL → P represents7 a binary relation - on FL just in case for any A, B ∈ FL,
A - B if and only if µ(A)  µ(B).
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Definition 2.13 Given a formal language L and a model space ΩL for L, a binary rela-
tion - on FL is representable in a likelihood space P just in case there exists a likelihood
assignment µ : FL → P such that for any A, B ∈ FL,
A - B if and only if µ(A)  µ(B).
Proposition 2.8
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, and -
a binary relation on FL satisfying
C0. Nontriviality
∅ ≺ ΩL.
C1a. Reflexivity
A - A.
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
C3b. Boundedness
⊥ - A - ΩL.
CN. Normativity of Logic
If A ⊆ B, then A - B.
Then, there exists a likelihood space P- ("the likelihood space induced by -") such that
- is representable in P- by an NCI-Likelihood Assignment.
Definition 2.14 Given a formal language L with Boolean connectives, a model space ΩL
for L, and a C01a23bN-relation - defined over FL, the likelihood space induced by - is
 domain FL/ ∼
 0˙P- = [∅]
 1˙P- = [ΩL]
 P-= {〈[A], [B]〉 | A - B}.
7This notion is ‘agrees’ in Fine (1973) and ‘strictly agrees’ in Savage (1972).
31
Definition 2.15 A likelihood space P embeds in a likelihood space P′ if and only if there
exists an injection δ : dom(P)→ dom(P′) such that
δ(0˙P) = 0˙P
′
,
δ(1˙P) = 1˙P
′
,
and for any p1, p2 ∈ P,
p1 -P p2 if and only if δ(p1) -P
′
δ(p2).
Definition 2.16 A likelihood structure 〈P, ◦〉 embeds in a likelihood structure 〈P′, ◦′〉 if and
only if there exists an injection δ : dom(P)→ dom(P′) such that
δ(0˙P) = 0˙P
′
,
δ(1˙P) = 1˙P
′
,
and for any p1, p2 ∈ P,
p1 -P p2 if and only if δ(p1) -P
′
δ(p2),
δ(p1 ◦P p2) = δ(p1) ◦P′ δ(p2).
Proposition 2.9
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, and
- a binary relation on FL. If - is representable in a likelihood space P and P em-
beds into another likelihood space P+, then - is representable in P+. Further, if - is
representable in a likelihood structure 〈P, ◦〉 and 〈P, ◦〉 embeds into another likelihood
structure 〈P+, ◦+〉, then - is representable in 〈P+, ◦+〉.
Definition 2.17 Let a formal language L with Boolean connectives and model space ΩL be
given. A likelihood space P is the minimal representing space for a relation - over FL if
and only if - is representable in P and for any likelihood space P′ capable of representing
-, there exists an embedding of P into P′.
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Proposition 2.10
Let L be a formal language, ΩL a model space for L, and - a binary relation on FL
satisfying
C0. Nontriviality
∅ ≺ ΩL.
C1a. Reflexivity
A - A.
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
C3b. Boundedness
⊥ - A - ΩL.
CN. Normativity of Logic
If A ⊆ B, then A - B.
Then, - is representable in a likelihood space P by an NCI-likelihood assignment if
and only if P- embeds into P.
2.3.2 NCIAM-Assignments and C01a23b4A-Relations
Assignments into a likelihood space satisfying each of Normativity of Logic (N), Certain
Validities (C), Impossible Contradictions (I), Associativity (A), and Monotonicity (M) cor-
respond to comparative likelihood relations satisfying C01a23b4A.
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Proposition 2.11
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, P a
likelihood space, µ : FL → P an NCIAM-likelihood assignment. Then, the relation -µ
over FL defined by
A -µ B⇔ µ(A)  µ(B)
satisfies
C0. Nontriviality
∅ ≺ ΩL.
C1a. Reflexivity
A - A.
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
C3b. Boundedness
⊥ - A - ΩL.
C4. Monotonicity
If A ∩C = B ∩C = ∅, then A - B if and only if A ∪C - B ∪C.
CA. Associativity
If A1 ∼ H4, B1 ∼ E3, C2 ∼ A1 ∪ B1, D2 ∼ F3, and G4 ∼ F3 ∪ E3 with matching
subscripts disjoint, then C2 ∪ D2 ∼ H4 ∪G4.
Despite its complexity, the comparative associativity condition above is a direct trans-
lation of associativity for ◦ into the comparative setting.
( p1 ◦ p2 ) ◦ p3 = p1 ◦ ( p2 ◦ p3 )
C2 D2 H4 G4
A1 B1 E3 F3
C2 is thus a collection with likelihood p1◦ p2 while A1 is a collection with likelihood p1 and
B1 is a collection with likelihood p2. Note that sets with matching subscripts are required
to be disjoint in the comparative formulation so that the ◦ operation may be applied.
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Definition 2.18 Given a formal language L and a model space ΩL for L, a binary relation -
on FL is representable in a likelihood structure 〈P, ◦〉 just in case there exists a likelihood
assignment µ : FL → P such that for any A, B ∈ FL,
A - B if and only if µ(A)  µ(B)
and for any disjoint sets C,D ∈ FL,
µ(C ∪ D) = µ(C) ◦ µ(D).
Proposition 2.12
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, and -
a binary relation on FL satisfying
C0. Nontriviality
∅ ≺ ΩL.
C1a. Reflexivity
A - A.
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
C3b. Boundedness
⊥ - A - ΩL.
C4. Monotonicity
If A ∩C = B ∩C = ∅, then A - B if and only if A ∪C - B ∪C.
CA. Associativity
If A1 ∼ H4, B1 ∼ E3, C2 ∼ A1 ∪ B1, D2 ∼ F3, G4 ∼ F3 ∪ E3, and all sets with
matching subscripts are disjoint, then C2 ∪ D2 ∼ H4 ∪G4.
Then, there exists a likelihood structure 〈P-, ◦-〉 ("the likelihood structure induced by
-") such that - is representable in 〈P-, ◦-〉.
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Definition 2.19 Given a formal language L with Boolean connectives, a model space ΩL for
L, and a C01a23b4A-relation - defined over FL, the likelihood structure 〈P-, ◦-〉 induced
by - is
 domain FL/ ∼
 0˙P- = [∅]
 1˙P- = [ΩL]
 P-= {〈[A], [B]〉 | A - B}
 [A] ◦- [B] ↓= [C] if and only if there exists disjoint A′, B′ ∈ FL such that A′ ∈
[A], B′ ∈ [B], and A′ ∪ B′ ∈ [C].
Definition 2.20 Let a formal language L with Boolean connectives and model space ΩL be
given. A likelihood structure 〈P, ◦〉 is the minimal representing structure for a relation -
over FL if and only if - is representable in 〈P, ◦〉 and for any likelihood structure 〈P′, ◦′〉
capable of representing -, there exists an embedding of 〈P, ◦〉 into 〈P′, ◦′〉.
Proposition 2.13
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, and -
a binary relation on FL satisfying
C0. Nontriviality
∅ ≺ ΩL.
C1a. Reflexivity
A - A.
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
C3b. Boundedness
⊥ - A - ΩL.
C4. Monotonicity
If A ∩C = B ∩C = ∅, then A - B if and only if A ∪C - B ∪C.
CA. Associativity
If A1 ∼ H4, B1 ∼ E3, C2 ∼ A1 ∪ B1, D2 ∼ F3, G4 ∼ F3 ∪ E3, and all sets with
matching subscripts are disjoint, then C2 ∪ D2 ∼ H4 ∪G4.
Then, - is representable in 〈P′, ◦′〉 if and only if 〈P-, ◦-〉 embeds into 〈P′, ◦′〉.
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Chapter 3
The Problem with Probabilism
Since the credences of actual agents are largely consistent in only their lack of consistency,
rational credence is the natural focus of theoretical discussion. The mainstream conception
of rational credence is and always has been dominated by probabilism:
 Probabilism
If c is a rational credence over the event space F , then c is1 a probability function.
Note that probabilism only provides a necessary condition on rational credences; it is per-
fectly consistent to also maintain, for example, that there is a unique rational credence in a
given circumstance. Probabilism is thus a strictly weaker commitment than either subjec-
tive or objective Bayesianism. A large number of arguments have been offered in support
of probablism, most famously (i) the Dutch book argument, (ii) representation arguments
from comparative probability, and (iii) gradational accuracy arguments. The current chap-
ter argues that none of these provides an adequate justification.
The root of this inadequacy is a systematic failure to justify the use of real numbers.
This is most immediately apparent with the following two consequences of probabilism:
 Comparability for Rational Credences
For any rational credence c and propositions ϕ, ψ, either c(ϕ) ≤ c(ψ) or c(ψ) ≤ c(ϕ).
 Archimedean Property for Rational Credences
For any rational credence c and proposition ϕ, either c(ϕ) = 0˙ or there exists n ∈ N
such that c(ϕ)n = c(ϕ) ◦ c(ϕ) ◦ · · · ◦ c(ϕ)︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
n times
is undefined.
Neither comparability nor the Archimedean property appear as explicit axioms in the usual
presentation of probability theory:
1I follow Pettigrew (2016) and Bradley (2017) here. It is not unusual, however, to see ‘is represented by’,
‘can be represented’ (Caie 2013), or even ‘can be faithfully represented by’ (Easwaran and Fitelson 2012).
None of these reformulations escape the shortcomings noted in this chapter.
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Definition 3.1 A probability space is a triple 〈Ω,F , µ〉 where Ω is a non-empty set ("the
state space"), F is a σ-algebra2 ("the event space"), and µ is a function ("the probability
function") from F to R satisfying the following three axioms:
K1. Normality
µ(Ω) = 1;
K2. Non-Negativity
For any A ∈ F , µ(A) ≥ 0;
K3. Countable Additivity
For a countable collection {Ai} of pairwise disjoint sets from F ,
µ(∪{Ai}) =
∑
i
µ(Ai).
Indeed, neither property is entailed by the combination of (K1), (K2), and (K3).
Probabilism is nevertheless committed to both comparability and the Archimedean
property for rational credences by the stipulation that µ maps into the real numbers. In the
case of comparability, this is obvious. Since the real numbers themselves satisfy compara-
bility, using any subset of the real numbers as our likelihood space immediately imposes
the same structure on rational credences. The situation with the Archimedean property is
essentially similar. If our likelihood space is stipulated to be any subset of the real numbers
and the disjunction of inconsistent sentences is identified with addition—i.e., a likelihood
structure 〈P,+〉 for P ⊆ R is adopted—then rational credences immediately inherit the gen-
eral features of this structure. Since for any r ∈ R, n × r > 1˙ for some n ∈ N,3 among these
general features is the Archimedean property, viz. a prohibition against infinitesimal val-
ues. The stipulation that probability functions map into the real numbers thus introduces
additional commitments. Probabilism is committed to substantially more than just (K1),
(K2), and (K3).
While widespread,4 explicit focus on (K1), (K2), and (K3) alone as ‘the axioms of prob-
ability theory’ is thus deeply misleading. A complete axiomatization of probability theory
includes an additional entry for the initial restriction on each component of a probability
space:
KΩ. Ω is a non-empty set.
KF . F is a σ-Algebra over Ω.
2A σ-algebra over a set Ω is a subset of P(Ω) containing ∅ which is closed under complement, countable
union, and countable intersection.
3Note that the certain value 1˙ need only be some real number r∗ here.
4See, for example, the presentation of probabilism in Bradley (2017), Pettigrew (2016), Caie (2013),
Joyce (1998, 2009), and Jeffrey (1986).
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Kµ. µ is a function from F to R.
The first of these additional constraints is, by all accounts, unproblematic. While the in-
finitary nature of (KF ) has attracted sporadic criticism in combination with (K3), the dif-
ficulties here pale in comparison to those introduced by (Kµ). R (or the intended model
of the real numbers), while familiar, is not uniquely identified by any first-order theory.
Since (Kµ) explicitly invokes R, this complexity is inherited by the probability formalism.
Probabilism thus embraces a second-order axiom in the form of (Kµ) while only drawing
explicit attention to (K1), (K2), and (K3).
Intentional or not, contemporary arguments for probabilism have perpetuated and
played on this sleight of hand to the point of being actively misleading. The Dutch book
argument, representation arguments from comparative probability, decision-theoretic rep-
resentation arguments, and gradational accuracy arguments all systematically fail to justify
comparability and the Archimedean property much less (Kµ) as a whole. In isolation,
this shortcoming exposes a lacuna in contemporary accounts and calls into question the
consensus on probabilism. Criticisms of comparability and the Archimedean property are
not, however, novel. Influential commentaries like Keynes (1921) and Koopman (1940)
explicitly reject comparability while equally important entries like Koopman (1940), Shi-
mony (1955), Kemeny (1955), and Lewis (1981) reject the Archimedean property under
one guise or another. The situation only worsens in the current literature with a large
number of advocates for incomparability in the form of imprecise credences (Joyce 2010)
as well as proponents of explicitly non-Archimedean conceptions of probability (Narens
2007; Benci et al. 2013). This long history suggests that defenders of probabilism have not
so much overlooked this weakness in their account as deliberately ignored it. I conclude
that the case for probabilism has been systematically overstated.
3.1 The Dutch Book Argument
The Dutch book argument first explicitly appears in Ramsey (1931): "If anyone’s mental
condition violated these laws [of probability], his choice would depend on the precise form
in which the options were offered him, which would be absurd. He could have a book
made against him by a cunning better and would then stand to lose in any event" (182).
After Ramsey’s premature death, this argument was independently redeveloped and then
popularized by de Finetti ([1937] 1980) with substantive refinements from Kemeny (1955),
Lehman (1955), and Shimony (1955). In what will quickly become a running theme, the
most egregious shortcomings of the Dutch book argument can be readily identified by
focusing on the means by which comparability and the Archimedean property are secured.
3.1.1 Terminology and Argument
Both the Dutch book argument and the surrounding discussion are steeped in gambling
terminology. A bet on an event E for a stake S is an ordered pair 〈S − qS ,−qS 〉 where
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S − qs is paid out in the case E is true and −qS otherwise. Diagrammatically,
E ¬E
Bet on E for stake S S − qS −qS
The product qS is known as the betting price while q in isolation is the betting quotient
or betting ratio. Note that, for a particular stake S , betting prices can be easily derived
from betting quotients and betting quotients can be easily derived from betting prices. Fi-
nally, both the terminology and payouts given above are particularly natural if one imagines
paying qS for a bet which returns S if E and 0 otherwise.
Given this framework, it’s natural to talk not only about bets 〈S − qS ,−qS 〉 on E but
also about the corresponding bet against E, 〈−S + qS , qS 〉. Bets on and bets against simply
reverse gain and loss relative to a fixed stake S :
E ¬E
Bet on E S − qS −qS
Bet against E −S + qS qS
Where bets on E are naturally thought of as buying a bet for qS which pays S if E and
nothing otherwise, bets against E correspond to selling a bet for qS which pays S if E and
nothing otherwise. For a fixed betting quotient q, note that a bet against E is the same as a
bet on E for stake −S but distinct from a bet on ¬E for stake S .
Finally, for a collection of betting quotients, a Dutch book is a combination of bets
(either for or against events) which ensures a net positive outcome. Such a combination
requires that the inverted combination (replacing bets for with bets against and vice-versa)
is a sure loss. Given the structure of the Dutch book argument, commentators often adopt
the perspective of the side suffering a sure-loss and talk of a Dutch book being made against
an agent or being ‘Dutch bookable’. While it plays no role in the following discussion, it
is common—following de Finetti ([1937] 1980)—to call a collection of betting quotients
coherent if and only if there does not exist a Dutch book at those betting quotients.
The Dutch book argument ostensibly forges a link between probabilistic credences and
immunity to Dutch books. Let a σ-algebra F over a nonempty set Ω be given. The con-
temporary Dutch book argument can be summarized as follows:
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The Dutch Book Argument:
(P1) If an agent has credence c over F , then they endorse q = c as betting quotients
over F .
(P2) For any collection of betting quotients q over F , there exists a Dutch book with
respect to q if and only if q is not a probability function.
(P3) If there exists a Dutch book under a collection of betting quotients q, then it is
irrational to endorse these betting quotients.
(C) If c is a rational credence over an algebra F , then c is a probability function.
Each of the premises here bears some comment. The first premise (P1) postulates an indi-
rect connection between credences and betting. Agents may, of course, choose to bet in a
manner which does not conform to their credences for any number of reasons. Neverthe-
less, there is a natural sense in which a credence c endorses the particular betting quotients
q = c, viz. supposing utility linear in dollars and evaluation of bets by expectation, these
are the betting quotients for which betting prices accord with the agent’s own valuation.5
Following Christensen (1996), this—rather than any explicit act on the part of the agent—is
the sense of the endorsement in (P1).
The second premise (P2) is intended as a purely mathematical result and sometimes
separated into two components:
 The Dutch Book Theorem: For any collection of betting quotients q over F , there
exists a Dutch book with respect to q if q is not a probability function.
 The Converse Dutch Book Theorem: For any collection of betting quotients q over
F , there exists a Dutch book with respect to q only if q is not a probability function.
While the validity of the Dutch book argument only requires the former, the converse result
blocks possibilities which might call the truth of (P1) and (P3) into question, most obvi-
ously if no betting quotients were immune to Dutch book (Hájek 2009; Hájek 2008). Since
the converse result is relevant to the overarching discussion and there is no loss in opting
for a stronger mathematical result, I make use of the combined result.
Issues with the third premise (P3) of the Dutch book argument almost exclusively re-
volve around the meaning of ‘irrational’. In particular, it is tempting to read ‘irrational’
here as something like ‘ill-advised on pragmatic grounds’. This reading, however, is doubly
problematic. First, it may sometimes be pragmatically rational to endorse betting quotients
susceptible to Dutch book if one has an overriding incentive or the other bettors are not
intelligent enough to take advantage. Supposing the pragmatic reading, (P3) is then false
5These are the fair odds in the terminology of Christensen (1996).
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as stated. Second, the pragmatic reading appears to sever any connection to epistemology;
Kennedy and Chihara (1979) provide a classic statement of the issue:
The factors that are supposed to make it irrational to have an inadmissible set
of beliefs [in these betting situations] are entirely irrelevant, epistemologically,
to the truth of the propositions in question. The fact (if it is a fact) that one will
be bound to lose money unless one’s degrees of belief are admissible just isn’t
epistemologically relevant to the truth of those beliefs. (30)
Following Skyrms (1980) and Christensen (1996), both problems can be avoided with a
non-pragmatic reading of (P3). In particular, we ought to maintain that the existence of a
Dutch book exhibits an inconsistency of judgment which is incompatible with endorsement
by an epistemically rational agent.
Put together, (P1), (P2), and (P3) appear to require that any rational agent’s credence
is a probability function. Not because such agents are required to bet at their credences
or because they might lose money if they do not, but because credences endorse particular
betting quotients in a simple sort of betting situation and these betting quotients are incon-
sistent if they are not probabilistic. The sin here is not the possibility of a sure loss; it is the
inconsistent valuations which lead to the sure loss.
3.1.2 The Problem with the Dutch Book Argument
The Dutch book argument is not sound. The culprit, however, is neither (P1) nor (P3); it is
the ‘mathematical theorem’ (P2). There is a theorem which looks very much like (P2):
Theorem 3.1 Kemeny (1955); Lehman (1955)
For any σ-algebra F and any collection of betting quotients q : F → R, there exists a
Dutch book with respect to q if and only if q is not a probability function.
Unlike (P2), however, this theorem assumes that betting quotients are real numbers; q is a
function to R and thus already satisfies both comparability and the Archimedean property.
Without this guarantee, probability functions are no longer the only likelihood assignments
which are immune to Dutch books, and so (P2) is false.
A minimal counterexample can be obtained by setting Ω = {w1,w2}, F = P(Ω), and
betting quotients
q(∅) = 0
q({w1}) = 12a
q({w2}) = 12b
q({w1,w2}) = 1
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where 12 a and
1
2 b are incomparable to one another but otherwise behave as
1
2 . Bets for or
against either Ω or ∅ then behave as usual. The events {w1} and {w2}, however, are somewhat
odd in that there is no price which produces indifference between bets for and bets against.
Any price strictly below 12S is acceptable with a bet for either {w1} or {w2} while any price
strictly above 12S is acceptable for a bet against. Bets costing exactly
1
2S for or against
either event, however, are uniformly rejected. Since any sequence of acceptable bets with
these quotients is also acceptable to an agent who sets q({w1}) = q({w2}) = 12 , these betting
quotients are both non-probabilistic and immune to Dutch books. It follows immediately
that (P2) is false.
This discrepancy between the actual Dutch book theorem and the premise invoked in
the Dutch book argument is widespread. Compare, for instance, the premise provided by
Baillie (1973, 393):
"[betting quotients] are coherent only if a probability."
or Kennedy and Chihara (1979, 20-21):
"a set of betting quotients is coherent if and only if it [conforms to the proba-
bility calculus]."
or Gillies (2000, 59):
"A set of betting quotients is coherent if and only if they satisfy the axioms of
probability."
The Dutch book theorem guarantees only that real-valued betting quotients which avoid
Dutch books are probabilistic. The example above proves that this result does not general-
ize to all betting quotients, and so each premise is false as stated.
Commentators explicitly concerned with the Dutch book theorem tend to avoid this
mistake. Each of Lehman (1955), Kemeny (1955), and Shimony (1955) for example ex-
plicitly recognize a restriction to real numbers. Surveying these presentations suggests two
strategies for repairing (P2); neither strategy, however, allows for the Dutch book argument
to function as a justification for probabilism. First, we might follow Lehman (1955) and
Shimony (1955) in simply stipulating that rational credences are real-valued. In light of
(P1), this makes replacing (P2) with the Dutch book theorem proper unproblematic. Un-
fortunately, whether or not rational credences are real-valued is precisely the point at issue.
This strategy is clearly question begging in a justification for probabilism ex nihilo.
Second, we may follow Kemeny (1955) and derive that betting quotients are real-valued
by supposing a single betting price over both bets on and bets against an event E.6 Since
betting prices are sums of money, the resulting betting quotients must then be real-valued.7
6Kemeny (1955) is not quite so straightforward. The crucial combination in the text is fixing a betting
quotient for every event E (263) and supposing that the resulting qS and (1 − q)S are actual sums of money
(265). For any S and E, this entails a single betting price over both bets on and bets against E.
7Indeed, betting quotients are rational-valued if the monetary system admits of a smallest unit.
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Kemeny’s requirement thus limits the possible structure of betting quotients by requiring
expressibility as a ratio of two monetary values. Even if we are willing to accept this sort of
constraint on betting quotients, it merely pushes the current difficulties onto (P1). If betting
quotients are necessarily real-valued, credences can only be endorsed as betting quotients
if they too satisfy both comparability and the Archimedean property. Any failure of com-
parability or the Archimedean property in our credences then immediately entails that (P1)
is false since no corresponding collection of betting quotients exists to be endorsed. As
a result, this strategy too fails to provide us with a coherent argument for probabilism ex
nihilo.
Despite its fame, the Dutch book argument falls short of its intended conclusion. This
failure is not, however, a result of either (P1) or (P3), the traditional points of criticism.
The flaw in the argument is instead to be found with (P2). The restriction to real-valued
betting quotients in the Dutch book theorem proper is critical for the result. By dropping
this restriction in (P2), the Dutch book argument exchanges a mathematical theorem for a
straightforward falsehood. Unfortunately, the validity of the Dutch book argument requires
this stronger claim. Replacing (P2) with the Dutch book theorem proper, we may at best
obtain a conditional conclusion: if rational credences are real-valued, then they must be
probability functions.
3.2 Representation Arguments
Outside of the Dutch book argument, the most ubiquitous arguments for probabilism are
representation arguments. Ideally, representation arguments for probabilism advance in
two stages. First, a set of intuitively true rationality axioms are identified in some domain.
Second, a formal theorem is proved which shows that satisfying these rationality axioms
is necessary and sufficient for probabilism. The intuitively true rationality axioms demand
as it were that rational credences are probability functions. This section presents the most
straightforward attempt to implement this strategy. Despite their fame, actual representa-
tion arguments fall far short of the ideal.
3.2.1 Representation Argument from Finite Comparative Likelihood
The most straightforward representation arguments target comparative likelihood. Where
probability functions provide an absolute, quantitative measure of likelihood, the compar-
ative likelihood relation makes only binary comparisons:
ϕ - ψ if and only if ψ is at least as likely as ϕ.
If an intuitive set of rationality axioms for the comparative likelihood relation - can be
shown to guarantee equivalence to a probability function, then we will have an instance of
the ideal representation argument and a powerful justification for probabilism.
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For a nonempty set of possibilities Ω, an algebra F over Ω, and A, B,C ∈ F , a number
of simple restrictions on - are clearly necessary for a correspondence with probability
functions:
C0. Nontriviality
∅ ≺ Ω.
C1a. Reflexivity
A - A.
C1b. Comparability; Totality; Connected
A - B or B - A.
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
C3a. Nonnegativity
⊥ - A.
C3b. Boundedness
⊥ - A - Ω.
(C1a) and (C2) entail that - is a preorder while (C1b) and (C2) entail that - is a total
preorder.
Definition 3.2 A preorder over a space F is a reflexive and transitive binary relation; a
total preorder over a space F is a preorder which also satisfies comparability.
Preorders are so called because of their close relationship with orderings; given a preorder
- over a space F , an ordering  is induced over F / ∼ by taking [a]  [b] if and only if
a - b. Adding (C0) and (C3) as additional restrictions on - produces a total preorder with
∅ as a minimal element and Ω as a maximal element.
It is nevertheless easy to construct C01a1b23ab-preorders which are both implausible
for a rational agent and non-probabilistic:
∅ ≺ A ∪ B ≺ A ≺ B ≺ Ω.
It is clearly illicit for the union operation to reduce comparative likelihood as in the exam-
ple above. In response, de Finetti ([1937] 1980) proposes the additional requirement that
unions with a disjoint set preserve inequalities:
C4. Monotonicity; Additivity
If A ∩C = B ∩C = ∅, then A - B if and only if A ∪C - B ∪C.
De Finetti ([1937] 1980) famously conjectured that any C01b23b4 comparative likelihood
relation over an algebra F on a finite set of possibilities Ω is representable by a probability
45
function; that these rationality axioms were all that was needed in the finite case. An
example due to Kraft et al. (1959) proves that this is not the case:
∅ ≺ a ≺ b ≺ c ≺ ab ≺ ac ≺ d ≺ ad ≺ bc ≺ e ≺ abc ≺ bd ≺ cd ≺ ae ≺ abd
≺ be ≺ acd ≺ ce ≺ bcd ≺ abe ≺ ace ≺ de ≺ abcd ≺ ade ≺ bce ≺ abce
≺ bde ≺ cde ≺ abde ≺ acde ≺ bcde ≺ abcde = Ω.
C01b23b4 comparative likelihood relations need not fix a consistent size for all possibili-
ties.
To bridge the gap between C01b23b4 likelihood relations and probability functions,
Scott (1964) introduces
C5S. Finite Cancellation
If two sequences of sets from F , 〈A1, . . . , AN〉 and 〈B1, . . . , BN〉, contain each pos-
sibility in Ω the same number of times and Ai - Bi for all i < N, then BN - AN .
For a finite set of possibilities Ω, the collection C01b3a5S is sufficient to guarantee repre-
sentation by a probability function.
Theorem 3.2 Scott (1964)
For any algebra F over a finite set Ω and any binary relation - on F , - is repre-
sentable by a probability function µ : F → [0, 1] if and only if - satisfies C01b3a5S .
Note that all of the remaining axioms introduced in this section—(C1a), (C2), (C3b), and
(C4)—follow from C01b3a5S even without the restriction to finite Ω.
Proposition 3.1
Let Ω be a set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, and - a binary relation over F .
Then,
(i) (C1b)⇒ (C1a)
(ii) (C5S )⇒ (C2)
(iii) (C3a), (C5S )⇒ (C3b)
(iv) (C5S )⇒ (C4).
Comparative likelihood relations satisfying C01b3a5S are comparative likelihood relations
satisfying C01ab3ab45S .
Though seldom discussed, an initial representation argument for finite cases is now
available:
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C01b3a5S Representation Argument
(P1) Each of (C0), (C1b), (C3a), and (C5S ) are rational restrictions on comparative
likelihood relations.
(P2) For any finite Ω, a comparative likelihood relation satisfies C01b3a5S if and
only if it is representable by a probability function µ : F → [0, 1].
(C) If c is a rational credence over an algebra F with finite Ω, then c is a probability
function.
The first premise (P1) is intended to be intuitively true while the second premise (P2)
is Scott (1964)’s theorem. Put together, we have that rational credences are probability
functions whenever Ω is finite.
3.2.2 The Problem with the Argument from Finite Comparative Like-
lihood
There are two clear problems with the C01b3a5S representation argument. First and most
egregiously, the argument has already begged the question in favor of probabilism. Com-
parability was one of two dubious properties singled out at the start of this chapter, and
yet it appears in (P1) as a requirement of rationality. The comparison with (C0), (C1a),
(C3a), or (C3b) here is telling. Per chapter 2, each of these restrictions follow from the
assumption that rational credences extend logic; any NCI-likelihood assignment gives rise
to a comparative relation satisfying (C0), (C1a), (C3a), and (C3b). The correspondence
results proved there establish that neither the comparability axiom (C1b) nor Scott (1964)’s
(C5S ) rise to this same standard. Instead, the primary motivation for declaring comparabil-
ity a requirement of rationality appears to be all and only that this is necessary in order to
establish a correspondence with probability functions. We thus have good reason to reject
(P1).
Second, the conclusion of the C01b3a5S representation argument does not follow from
the premises; we are entitled only to the conclusion that c is representable by a probability
function. In general, representability in a likelihood space P or likelihood structure 〈P, ◦〉
does not imply non-representability in other spaces or structures. This is obviously true for
particular instances. For any particular choice of Ω, the comparative likelihood relation
∅ ≺ Ω
is, for example, representable in every likelihood space and likelihood structure. More sur-
prisingly, establishing necessary and sufficient conditions for representability in some like-
lihood space P or likelihood structure 〈P, ◦〉 also does not guarantee that this relationship is
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unique. Notational variants—e.g., the structure 〈[1, 2], 1, 2,≤, ◦(x, y) = x + y− 1〉 in lieu of
the conventional probability structure—are a trivial counterexample. If these were the only
difficulties, then the stronger conclusion—rational credences are probability functions—
would be defensible. This phenomenon also extends, however, to non-isomorphic likeli-
hood spaces and structures:
Proposition 3.2
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a finite model space for L,
and - a binary relation on FL. - is representable by an NCI-likelihood assignment
into 〈Q ∩ [0, 1], 0, 1,≤,+〉 if and only if - satisfies C01b3a5S .
Theorem 3.3 Narens (2007)
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a finite model space for L,
- a binary relation on FL, and ∗[0, 1] a non-standard extension of the unit interval. -
is representable by an NCI-likelihood assignment into 〈 ∗[0, 1], 0, 1,≤,+〉 if and only if
- satisfies C01b3a5S .
The formal result underpinning (P2) is thus not nearly so impressive as it first appears. The
"rationality" axioms C01b3a5S are consistent with both the truth and falsity of probabilism
over finite sets.
The multiplicity of representation theorems here stems from the restriction to finite sets.
Representation theorems establish only that the relevant likelihood assignments do not go
awry over the specified domain. Disagreements between likelihood spaces or structures
which fall outside this domain (a countably infinite number of values versus continuum
many, the existence or non-existence of infinitesimal values) fail to manifest, and so we
have a proliferation of representations. The relevant interactions here can be brought to the
fore with an extreme example. It is not difficult to establish a representation theorem for
C01b3a5S likelihood relations and the likelihood structure which denies any intermediate
values:
Proposition 3.3
Let L be a formal language, ΩL a model space for L which contains only a single
model, and - a binary relation over FL. Then, - satisfies C01b3a5S if and only if it is
representable in
〈{0, 1}, 0, 1,≤〉 with ◦ (x, y) =
↑ if x = 1 and y = 1max(x, y) otherwise .
The trick is simply to eliminate all the problematic cases using restrictions on L or ΩL.
So long as L and ΩL are small enough, C01b3a5S comparative likelihood relations are all
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representable with only certainty and impossibility. Weakening the restrictions on L and
ΩL, however, the discrepancy is obvious, and the correspondence fails. The restriction to
finite sets operates in the same way. At most one of
〈[0, 1], 0, 1,≤,+〉
〈Q ∩ [0, 1], 0, 1,≤,+〉
〈 ∗[0, 1], 0, 1,≤,+〉
is the correct likelihood structure, but the differences between them only manifest outside
finite Ω.
As a result, each likelihood structure may either undergenerate or overgenerate com-
parative likelihood relations if the restriction to finite Ω is dropped. Supposing that rational
comparative likelihood relations are all and only the C01b3a5S relations, for example, the
probability structure undergenerates:
Proposition 3.4
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives and ΩL a model space for L.
Then, there exists a binary relation - on FL satisfying C01b3a5S which is not repre-
sentable in 〈[0, 1], 0, 1,≤,+〉.
Indeed, this result generalizes; no single likelihood structure can represent C01b3a5S rela-
tions over arbitrary propositional languages.
Proposition 3.5
Let 〈P, ◦〉 be a likelihood structure. Then, there exists a propositional language L,
model space ΩL, and C01b3a5S relation - on FL such that - is not represented in
〈P, ◦〉 by any NCI-likelihood assignment.
If C01b3a5S comparative likelihood relations are all rational, rational credences require an
absolute ranking formalism which is not categorical.
The C01b3a5S representation argument is then doubly flawed. First, (P1) asserts that
comparability is a requirement of rationality. This both contradicts a number of prima facie
coherent accounts of rational credence and is not borne out by our earlier discussion of the
relationship between rational credence and logic. Second, the conclusion of the C01b3a5S
representation argument is overstated. In the finite case, C01b3a5S comparative likelihood
relations are consistent with a number of non-isomorphic likelihood structures. Dropping
the restriction to finite sets of possibilities, moreover, breaks the correspondence with the
probability formalism. If rationality only requires a C01b3a5S comparative likelihood re-
lation, then probabilism is false.
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3.2.3 Representation Arguments from Comparative Likelihood
To circumvent the latter difficulty, a characterization of all rational comparative likelihood
relations over arbitrary sets of possibilities together with a representation theorem estab-
lishing that these relations are exactly the relations representable with probability functions
is required. Much of the formal work here is owed to Koopman (1940), Luce (1967),
Krantz et al. (1971), Savage (1972), and Fine (1973). The strategy is to supplement the
axioms for the finite case with both a decomposition axiom and an Archimedean axiom.
Decomposition Axioms
Decomposition axioms require that sets of possibilities can be partitioned into pieces of
approximately equal size. The earliest proposal derives from de Finetti ([1937] 1980) and
Koopman (1940) and concerns only the set of all possibilities Ω.
CDDK For every n ∈ N+, there exists a partition {C1, . . . ,Cn} of Ω such that for any i, j ∈
{1, . . . n}, Ci ∈ F and Ci ∼ C j.
Kraft et al. (1959) propose extending this to F as a whole.
Definition 3.3 Let A ∈ F and ∼ an equivalence relation over F . A is polarizable in F if
and only if there exists A′, A′′ ∈ F such that
 A = A′ ∪ A′′
 A′ ∩ A′′ = ∅
 A′ ∼ A′′.
CDKPS For any A ∈ F , A is polarizable.
Drawing on Savage (1972), Fine (1973) works with a weaker condition that doesn’t
require equal likelihood between parts.
Definition 3.4 An n-fold almost uniform partition of Ω is a partition {C1, . . . ,Cn} of Ω such
that if Uk+1 is a union of k + 1 sets from the partition and Uk is a union of k sets from the
partition, Uk - Uk+1
An n-fold almost uniform partition is thus a partition whose components, while not neces-
sarily equal, are close enough that k-unions are always less likely than k + 1 unions. The
decomposition condition itself is,
CDF For infinitely many n ∈ N+, there exists an n-fold almost uniform partition of Ω.
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In the presence of C01b23a4, Savage (1972) proves that infinitely many n-fold almost
uniform partitions entails n-fold almost uniform partitions for every n ∈ N+. (CDF) thus
guarantees n-fold almost uniform partitions generally.
All three of the decomposition axioms above force Ω to be infinite. Luce (1967)’s
contribution does not:
CDL If A, B,C,D ∈ F are such that A ∩ B = ∅, C ≺ A, and D - B, then there exists
C′,D′, E ∈ F such that:
(i) E ∼ A ∪ B
(ii) C′ ∩ D′ = ∅
(iii) C′ ∪ D′ ⊂ E
(iv) C′ ∼ C and D′ ∼ D.
The most esoteric of the conditions, CDL doesn’t guarantee a straightforward decomposi-
tion of either a given set or Ω; rather, for any starting set expressible as the union of two
disjoint sets and for any two sizes in our hierarchy smaller than our disjoint sets (at least
one strictly so), we are guaranteed the existence of a correspondent for our original set
which contains a disjoint set of each size.
Archimedean Axioms
Archimedean axioms ensure that the comparative likelihood relations under consideration
do not violate one of the characteristic properties of the real numbers, viz. no infinitely
large elements and no infinitely small elements. In a countable setting, all total orders are
consistent with representation by real numbers:
Theorem 3.4 Cantor (1895)
If 〈A,〉 is a countable total order, then there exists an embedding of 〈A,〉 into 〈R,〉.
As the previous subsection showed, however, this not true in general. In the case of total
orders, Debreu (1954) proved that real-valued representation coincides with the existence
of a countable, order-dense subset.
Definition 3.5 Given a total order 〈A,〉 and B ⊆ A, B is order-dense in A if and only if for
all a, c ∈ A − B such that c ≺ a, there exists b ∈ B with c  b  a.
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Theorem 3.5 Debreu (1954)
Let 〈A,〉 be a total order. Then, the following are equivalent:
(i) There is a countable (possibly finite) order-dense subset of A.
(ii) There is an embedding of 〈A,〉 into 〈R,≤〉.
The most straightforward means of ensuring that comparative likelihood relations are
also representable in the real numbers is to directly impose Debreu’s characterization of
〈R,≤〉.
CAD There exists a countable, order-dense (relative to the strict total order induced by -)
A ⊆ F .
This immediately guarantees representability of the comparative likelihood relation by
some NCI-likelihood assignment into the unit interval.
Theorem 3.6 Fine (1973)
Let Ω be a non-empty set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, and - a binary relation
on F . - satisfies C1b23a4AD if and only if there exists an NCI-likelihood assignment
µ : F → [0, 1] which represents -.
Given only C01b23a4AD, however, the additivity requirement in probability functions re-
mains problematic.
An alternative strategy is to cast the prohibition against infinitely large and infinitely
small elements more directly in terms of the inconsistent disjunction operator ◦.
Definition 3.6 For a likelihood structure 〈P, ◦〉 and p ∈ P, a standard sequence relative to
p is a (possibly finite) sequence of the form
p, p ◦ p, p ◦ p ◦ p, p ◦ p ◦ p ◦ p, . . .
where each term is defined.
Stipulating that standard sequences are finite for every non-0˙ likelihood p thus naturally
blocks infinitely small elements. Unfortunately, the purely comparative analogue of a stan-
dard sequence is significantly more complicated.
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Definition 3.7 LetF be an algebra, ∼ an equivalence relation onF , and A ∈ F . A sequence
of sets A1, A2, . . . drawn from F is a standard sequence relative to A if and only if for any
Ai, there exists Bi,Ci ∈ F such that:
(i) A1 = B1 and B1 ∼ A
(ii) Bi ∩Ci = ∅
(iii) Bi ∼ Ai
(iv) Ci ∼ A
(v) Ai+1 = Bi ∪Ci.
The focus here is not on re-adding A to our sequence since set union does not recognize
multiplicity; rather, each Ai is some set from F with the likelihood we would expect from
unioning copies of A together. Each Ci is thus a copy of A (i.e., a set with equivalent
likelihood) while each Bi is a disjoint set whose likelihood is equal to that of the previous
stage in our sequence, thus allowing the union Bi ∪ Ci to represent the "addition" of a new
copy.
The actual axiom we need to impose is then
CAS. For every A ∈ FL with ∅ ≺ A, every standard sequence relative to A is finite.
Setting aside sets equivalent to the empty set, no standard sequence for a set is unbounded,
and thus no set can force an infinitely small value by way of additivity.
Dual Purpose Axioms
Unlike other commentators, Savage (1972) introduces an axiom which acts simultaneously
as a tool for decomposition and rules out both infinitely small and infinitely large elements.
CS. If A, B ∈ F and B ≺ A, then there exists a partition {C1, . . . ,Cn} of Ω such that
Ci ∈ F and B ∪Ci ≺ A for every i.
Savage also provides a useful alternative characterization of (CS).
Definition 3.8 For A, B ∈ F , A is almost equivalent to B—notated A ∼∗ B—if and only if
for any C,D ∈ F with ∅ ≺ C,D and A ∩C = B ∩ D = ∅, B - A ∪C and A - B ∪ D.
Informally, A and B are almost equivalent if and only if any disjoint set in F is enough to re-
verse the comparative likelihood relationship between the two. (CS) can now be expressed
as the conjunction of two more intuitive properties.
Definition 3.9 A binary relation - on an algebra F is fine if and only if for every A ∈ F
with ∅ ≺ A, there exists a partition {C1, . . . ,Cn} of Ω such that Ci - A for i = 1, . . . , n.
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Definition 3.10 A binary relation - on an algebra F is tight if and only if for every A, B ∈
F , if A ∼∗ B, then A ∼ B.
Theorem 3.7 Savage (1972)
Let Ω be a non-empty set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, and - a binary relation
on F satisfying C01b23b4. - satisfies CDS if and only if - is both fine and tight.
Several implications between Savage’s (CS) and the other axioms detailed in this sec-
tion are known to either hold or fail. In general, (CS) is a relatively powerful decomposition
condition.
Proposition 3.6
Let Ω be a non-empty set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, and - a binary relation
satisfying C01b23b4. Then,
(i) Savage (1972): (CS)⇒ (CDDK) and (CDDK) 6⇒ (CS)
(ii) Luce (1967): (CS)⇒ (CDL) and (CDL 6⇒ (CS).
Since (CDDK) implies (CDF), Savage’s proposal is strictly stronger than the decomposition
requirements imposed by Luce and Fine.
Representation Theorems and Arguments for Finitely Additive Probabilism
Three different combinations of the axioms above are known to suffice for representation
by finitely additive probability functions.8
Theorem 3.8 Savage (1972)
Let Ω be a non-empty set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, and - a binary relation
on F . If - satisfies C1b23a4S, then there exists a unique finitely additive probability
function µ : F → [0, 1] which represents -.
Theorem 3.9 Fine (1973)
Let Ω be a non-empty set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, and - a binary re-
lation on F . If - satisfies C1b23a4DF AD, then there exists a unique finitely additive
probability function µ : F → [0, 1] which represents -.
8A finitely additive probability function over an algebra F is a function µ : F → R which satisfies (K1),
(K2), and additivity over finite collections of pairwise disjoint events. Every probability functions is thus
a finitely additive probability function, but not every finitely additive probability function is a probability
function.
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Theorem 3.10 Luce (1967); Krantz et al. (1971)
Let Ω be a non-empty set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, and - a binary re-
lation on F satisfying C01b23a4DLAS . Then, there exists a unique, finitely additive
probability function µ : F → [0, 1] which represents -.
This in turn gives rise to three representation arguments for finitely additive probabilism. I
combine them here for simplicity.
C012b3a4+S/DFAD/DLAS Representation Argument
(P1) (C0), (C1b), (C2), (C3a), and (C4) are rational restrictions on comparative like-
lihood relations.
(P2) Either (CS), (CDF)∧(CAD), or (CDL)∧(CAS ) is a rational restriction on com-
parative likelihood relations.
(P3) If a comparative likelihood relation satisfies one of
C01b3a4S
C01b3a4DFAD
C01b3a4DLAS
then it is representable by a unique finitely additive probability function µ :
F → [0, 1].
(C) If c is a rational credence over an algebra F , then c is a finitely additive proba-
bility function.
Representation Theorems and Arguments for Probabilism
In all three cases the jump to a probability function can be made with one final continuity
axiom.
C8. For any countable collection of downward nested9 sets {Bi}, if ∩iBi = ∅, then for
any set {Ai : ∅ ≺ Ai  Bi}
∩iAi = ∅.
9A countable collection of sets {Bi}i∈I is downward nested if and only if Bi+1 ⊆ Bi for all i.
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Theorem 3.11 Fine (1973)
Let Ω be a non-empty set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, and - a binary relation
on F . If - is representable by a finitely additive probability function µ : F → [0, 1],
then µ is countably additive if and only if - satisfies (C8).
A final representation argument from comparative likelihood to probabilism is thus avail-
able.
C01b23a48+S/DFAD/DLAS Representation Argument
(P1) (C0), (C1b), (C2), (C3a), and (C4) are rational restrictions on comparative like-
lihood relations.
(P2) Either (CS), (CDF)∧(CAD), or (CDL)∧(CAS ) is a rational restriction on com-
parative likelihood relations.
(P3) (C8) is a rational restriction on comparative likelihood relations.
(P4) If a comparative likelihood relation satisfies one of
C01b23a4S8
C01b23a48DFAD8
C01b23a4DLAS 8
then it is representable by a unique probability function µ : F → [0, 1].
(C) If c is a rational credence over an algebra F , then c is a probability function.
At last, representation by a probability function has been guaranteed.
3.2.4 The Problem with Arguments from Comparative Likelihood
Structurally, both the C012b3a4+S/DFAD/DLAS representation argument for finitely ad-
ditive probabilism and the C01b23a48+S/DFAD/DLAS representation argument for proba-
bilism do not fit the outline of the ideal representation argument. In both cases, the final
premise as well as the underlying theorems supply sufficient but not necessary conditions
for representation. This is a direct result of the decomposition axioms requiring a minimal
amount of structure in the algebras themselves. All things considered, this discrepancy is
not too worrying; each of (CDDK), (CDKPS ), (CDF), and (CDL) are intuitively true in a nat-
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ural extension of any given probability space.10 As Savage (1972) advises, we need only
find a coin and start flipping it.
The real problem with representation arguments from comparative likelihood is the
choice of axioms. The probabilist was already forced to beg the question in the finite
case, and the situation has only worsened. Setting aside the issue of comparability, (CAD),
(CAS ), and (CS) are all designed to force the Archimedean property. Not only does this
too go beyond the purely logical restrictions explored in Chapter 2, it flies directly in the
face of several robust intuitions about comparative likelihood. If we are willing to allow
infinite sets of possibilities, is it not rationally permissible to judge each single possibility
equally likely? (CAS ) and (CS) entail that it is not; (CAD) together with (CDF) entails
that it is not. Is it not rationally permissible to judge each single possibility more likely
than a contradiction? Either (CS) or (CAS ) together with (CDL) entail that it is not; (CAD)
together with (CDF) entails that it is not. The motivation for these answers is not any
principle of rationality but rather that these answers are necessary for representation in
terms of a probability function. Representation arguments from comparative likelihood
fail because the axioms they must supply are implausible as purely rational constraints.
Probabilism gains no ground here.
3.3 Gradational Accuracy Arguments
Gradational accuracy arguments for probabilism derive from Rosenkrantz (1981) and Joyce
(1998) though inspiration is drawn also from work on calibration (van Fraassen 1983; Shi-
mony 1988). The explicit goal of Joyce (1998) is to identify a nonpragmatic criterion of
success for credences, a means of separating "good" credences from "poor" without refer-
ence to their material efficacy (cf. the Dutch book argument). Joyce proposes accuracy for
this role, arguing that credences are successful in so far as they are accurate and unsuccess-
ful in so far as they are not. We will not contest this; the current section will instead focus
only on whether or not accuracy suffices to establish probabilism.
Joyce (1998) motivates his accuracy-based approach to rational credences with an anal-
ogy to traditional epistemology. Joyce holds that in the case of full belief there is a clear
and uncontroversial notion of epistemic success:
An epistemically rational agent must strive to hold a system of full beliefs
that strikes the best attainable overall balance between the epistemic good of
believing truths and the epistemic evil of believing falsehoods (fully believing
a truth is better than being agnostic, being agnostic is better than fully believing
a falsehood). (577)
Drawing inspiration from Jeffrey (1986), Joyce contends that partial beliefs or credences
admit of a similar norm:
10In truth, I think there is good reason to reject this intuition and thus these decomposition axioms. The
current argument can, however, be made independent of these concerns, and so I leave them aside here.
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An epistemically rational agent must evaluate partial beliefs on the basis of
their gradational accuracy, and she must strive to hold a system of partial be-
liefs that, in her best judgment, is likely to have an overall level of gradational
accuracy at least as high as that of any alternative system she might adopt.
(579)
The difference between full belief and credences is thus like the difference between guess-
ing a value and estimating it. The former is correct only when the guess matches reality
exactly. The latter, however, are evaluated on a closeness criteria—the goal isn’t to get the
correct value but rather to be as close as possible to the correct value.
3.3.1 Forecasts and Scoring Rules
While philosophically novel, accuracy arguments for probabilism co-opt a preexisting for-
mal framework for scoring forecasts (de Finetti 1979; Savage 1971; Lindley 1982; Predd
et al. 2009). Let Ω be a set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, and E an n-tuple of events
〈E1, . . . , En〉 with n ≥ 1 and E1, . . . , En ∈ F . A forecast f for E is an element of [0, 1]n.
A scoring rule is a function from a forecast f and particular outcome w ∈ Ω to a score in
[0,∞]. The most well-known example of a scoring rule is the Brier score:
S B( f ,w) =
∑
i
1
n
[w(Ei) − fi]2
where
w(Ei) =
{
1 w ∈ Ei
0 w < Ei.
A straightforward generalization of the Brier score gives the set of quadratic loss rules,
scoring rules of the form
S ( f ,w) =
∑
i
λi[w(Ei) − fi]2
where λi ∈ R+ − {0} for every i and ∑i λi = 1. Note that the Brier score and quadratic loss
rules assign larger values to worse forecasts. For this reason, scoring rules are often (and
profitably) thought of as penalties.
The foundational theorems in this area are owed to both de Finetti (1979) and Savage
(1971) and relate forecasts scored by quadratic loss rules to probabilities:
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Theorem 3.12 de Finetti (1979); Savage (1971)
Let Ω be a finite set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, S a quadratic loss rule, and
E a tuple of events 〈E1, . . . , En〉 with n ≥ 1 and E1, . . . , En ∈ F .
(i) For any forecast f over E, if f is not probabilistic, then there exists a probabilis-
tic forecast f ∗ such that S ( f ∗,w) < S ( f ,w) for every w ∈ Ω.
(ii) For any probabilistic forecast f over E, there exists no forecast f ∗ such that
S ( f ∗,w) ≤ S ( f ,w) for every w ∈ Ω and S ( f ∗,w) < S ( f ,w) for some w ∈ Ω.
Theorem 3.13 de Finetti (1979); Savage (1971)
Let Ω be a finite set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, S a quadratic loss rule, and
E a tuple of events 〈E1, . . . , En〉 with n ≥ 1 and E1, . . . , En ∈ F . For any probability
function µ : F → [0, 1], setting f = 〈µ(E1), . . . , µ(En)〉 minimizes expected score with
respect to µ: ∑
j
µ(w j)S ( f ,w j).
The first of these theorems shows that probabilistic forecasts are better than non-
probabilistic forecasts with respect to quadratic loss rules. The second establishes that,
given a probability function, the forecast which matches this function has the minimal ex-
pected score. Every probability function is, by its own lights, best.
These two ideas are brought together in a later result due to Predd et al. (2009).
Definition 3.11 A scoring rule S ( f ,w) =
∑
i s( fi,w(Ei)) for s : [0, 1] × {0, 1} → [0,∞] is
proper if and only if
 (p)s( fi, 1) + (1 − p)s( fi, 0) is uniquely minimized at fi = p for all p ∈ [0, 1], and
 s is continuous, i.e., for i ∈ {0, 1},
lim
n→∞ s(xn, i) = s(x, i)
for any sequence xn ∈ [0, 1] converging to x.
Proper scoring rules are thus continuous functions which reward honesty; the fi value which
does best by the lights of p is p itself.11 It is easy to verify that the Brier score is an example
of a proper scoring rule.
11Best, that is, with respect to the expression (p)s( fi, 1) + (1 − p)s( fi, 0). While this expression enforces
normalization with the use of (1 − p) in the second term, something like this is required if we are to have any
scoring rule which meets the criteria.
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Theorem 3.14 Predd et al. (2009)
Let Ω be a set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, S a proper scoring rule, and E a
tuple of events 〈E1, . . . , En〉 with n ≥ 1 and E1, . . . , En ∈ F .
(i) For any forecast f over E, if f is not probabilistic, then there exists a probabilis-
tic forecast f ∗ such that S ( f ∗,w) < S ( f ,w) for every w ∈ Ω.
(ii) For any probabilistic forecast f over E, there exists no forecast f ∗ , f such that
S ( f ∗,w) ≤ S ( f ,w) for every w ∈ Ω.
Proper scoring rules in general thus hold that probabilistic forecasts are better than non-
probabilistic forecasts.
3.3.2 Three Accuracy Arguments for Probabilism
Accuracy arguments for probabilism now fall out of these formal results by interpreting
forecasts as credences and presenting scoring rules as measures of accuracy. Rosenkrantz
(1981), for example, sketches something like the following argument:
Rosenkrantz (1981) Accuracy Argument for Probabilism
(P1R) Any reasonable measure of accuracy for credences is a proper scoring rule.
(P2R) For any proper scoring rule and any non-probabilistic credence f , there exists a
probabilistic credence f ∗ which scores strictly better than f no matter how the
world turns out.
(P3R) It is irrational to hold a credence f which is strictly less accurate than another
credence f ∗ no matter how the world turns out.
(C) If f is a rational credence, then f is a probability function.
Taking each premise in order, (P1R) ought to be accepted because reasonable measures of
accuracy ought not encourage even non-probabilistic forecasters "to misrepresent, at any
rate, his actual relative degrees of belief" (Rosenkrantz 1981, 2.2-3). Credences—even
non-probabilistic ones—ought to be maximally accurate by their own lights. While only
familiar with de Finetti (1979), Rosenkrantz (1981) conjectured that something like the
Predd et al. (2009) theorem held.12 From the modern perspective, (P2R) is true simply in
virtue of this result. Finally, (P3R) encodes only that accuracy is the criteria of epistemic
12Rosenkrantz (1981) specifically conjectured that the quadratic loss rules were the only scoring rules
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success for credences. Putting all three together, we will have "nail[ed] down the sense in
which incoherence incurs a purely cognitive penalty" (Rosenkrantz 1981, 2.2-3).
While Joyce (1998) agrees that this argument favors probabilism, he contends that it
fails to do so from neutral premises. In particular, the use of expectation built into the def-
inition of a proper scoring rule is only motivated if credences are, in fact, probabilities. If
credences are non-probabilistic, it unclear why we would desire that fi = p is a unique min-
imum for (p)s( fi, 1) + (1− p)s( fi, 0); this expression has lost its significance. Joyce himself
endeavors to give a more satisfactory result by replacing the requirement that scoring rules
be proper with a set of six axioms for accuracy measures which he takes to be both neutral
and intuitive.
Let Ω be a set of possibilities and F a countable algebra over Ω. Joyce (1998) takes
accuracy measures I to be functions
I : B ×W → [0,∞]
where B is the set of all credence functions over F .13 Joyce then adopts the following six
axioms for I:
(a) Structure
For every w ∈ Ω, I(b,w) is a non-negative and continuous function of b such that
lim
b(E)→∞
I(b,w) = ∞
for any E ∈ F .
(b) Extensionality
At every w, I(b,w) is a function of only the values assigned by w and b to E ∈ F .
(c) Dominance
If b(E) = b′(E) for every E ∈ F other than E∗, then I(b,w) > I(b′,w) if and only if
|w(E∗) − b(E∗)| > |w(E∗) − b′(E∗)|.
(d) Normality
If |w(E) − b(E)| = |w′(E) − b′(E)| for all E ∈ F , then I(b,w) = I(b′,w′).
(e) Weak Convexity
If I(b,w) = I(b′,w), then I(b,w) ≥ I( 12b + 12b′,w) with identity only if b = b′.
which (i) decrease with proximity to the true value and increase with proximity to the false value, (ii) are
twice differentiable, and (iii) minimized expected score for normalized µ : F → [0, 1] over a finite F . If
correct, the de Finetti (1979)-Savage (1971) theorem would then establish probabilistic dominance.
13Joyce (1998) never explicitly specifies the exact bounds on this space. Given his axioms, he appears to
intend that B contains at least all functions b : F → R+. In his criticism, Maher (2002) explicitly takes B to
be the set of all b : F → R. By Joyce (2009), Joyce’s formal framework has changed. F is stipulated to be
finite, and B is defined as the set of all functions b : F → [0, 1].
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(f) Symmetry
If I(b,w) = I(b′,w), then for any λ ∈ [0, 1], I(λb+ (1−λ)b′,w) = I((1−λ)b+λb′,w).
Structure guarantees that accuracy is non-negative, that small changes in credences result
in small changes in accuracy, and that inaccuracy increases without limit as credences
do. Extensionality requires that nothing besides the facts and an agent’s credence matter
for inaccuracy. Dominance ensures that accuracy increases with an agent’s confidence
in a truth and a decreases with an agent’s confidence in a falsehood. Normality dictates
that credences equally far from the truth of every E ∈ F are equally accurate. Weak
convexity encodes the maxim that extremism is not a virtue. If a particular shift to an
agent’s credences doesn’t improve accuracy, then doing it twice won’t improve accuracy
either. Finally, symmetry requires that, given equally inaccurate starting credences b and
b′, accuracy gains occur equally when shifting b a little towards b′ and b′ a little towards b.
From these six axioms Joyce establishes a dominance result for probabilistic credences.
Theorem 3.15 Joyce (1998)
Let Ω be a set of possibilities, F a countable algebra over Ω, and I an accuracy
measure satisfying axioms (a)-(f). Then,
(i) for any b : F → R, if b is not probabilistic, then there exists a probabilistic
credence b∗ such that I(b∗,w) < I(b,w) for every w ∈ Ω.
This generates the following argument for probabilism:
Joyce (1998) Accuracy Argument for Probabilism
(P1J) Any reasonable measure of accuracy for credences satisfies axioms (a)-(f).
(P2J) For any accuracy measure I satisfying (a)-(f) and any non-probabilistic cre-
dence b, there exists a probabilistic credence b∗ which is strictly more accurate
than b no matter how the world turns out.
(P3J) It is irrational to hold a credence b which is strictly less accurate than another
credence b∗ no matter how the world turns out.
(C) If b is a rational credence, then b is a probability function.
Since Joyce’s accuracy axioms were selected precisely because they are obviously true,
(P1J) is true. (P2J) meanwhile is simply Joyce’s theorem. Finally, (P3J) is guaranteed if
we take accuracy as the criterion of epistemic success for credences. Put together, (P1J),
(P2J), and (P3J) deliver probabilism.
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Since its publication, three salient lines of objection to Joyce (1998)’s argument have
appeared. First, Joyce’s theorem provides no guarantee that the more accurate credence
f ∗ does not change depending on the particular accuracy measure I used (Hájek 2009). It
would be significantly better to prove that for any non-probabilistic credence f there exists
a probabilistic credence f ∗ such that for any accuracy measure I, f ∗ is strictly more accurate
than f no matter how the world turns out. Given only Joyce’s weaker result, (P3J) must
be understood as claiming that f is irrational if it is accuracy-dominated according to any
reasonable measure of accuracy (rather than all). Second, it is not obvious that accuracy-
dominated credences are irrational; these credences may have a virtue other than accuracy,
perhaps according with your evidence (Easwaran and Fitelson 2012) or determining the
truth of particular propositions (Caie 2013; Greaves 2013). Third and finally, Maher (2002)
challenges Joyce’s weak convexity and symmetry axioms by noting that several intuitive
accuracy measures violate both, most notably the distance measure I(b,w) =
∑
i |b(Ei) −
w(Ei)|. Maher (2002) further proves that Joyce’s theorem fails without these axioms.
In response to these objections, Pettigrew (2016) presents our third and final accuracy
argument for probabilism:
Pettigrew (2016) Accuracy Argument for Probabilism
(P1P) The only reasonable measure of accuracy for credences is the Brier score (or a
linear transformation thereof).
(P2P) For any non-probabilistic credence f , there exists a probabilistic credence f ∗
with a strictly better Brier score than f no matter how the world turns out.
(P3P) It is irrational to hold a credence f given that there exists another credence f ∗
such that (i) f is strictly less accurate than f ∗ in every world and (ii) there is
no credence f ′ that is at least as accurate as f ∗ in every world and strictly more
accurate in some particular world.
(C) If f is a rational credence, then f is a probability function.
Like Joyce (1998), Pettigrew’s approach to measuring accuracy is axiomatic. Unlike Joyce
(1998), the axioms endorsed by Pettigrew (2016) suffice to restrict accuracy measures to
the Brier score or some linear transformation thereof. For the sake of brevity, I omit the
axioms here; all are, however, similar in style to those introduced by Joyce. These axioms,
then, are to ground (P1P). (P2P) is, as usual, secured by a formal theorem; in this case,
the original de Finetti (1979)-Savage (1971) result. Given this theorem, our final premise
(P3P) can be weakened to require an alternative credence f ∗ which both strictly accuracy
dominates f and is not itself even weakly accuracy dominated. Combining (P1P), (P2P),
and (P3P), we again have probabilism.
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3.3.3 The Problem with Accuracy Arguments
The first and second premises in all three accuracy arguments are false. Further, the under-
lying error is by this point quite familiar. Each of (P1R), (P1J), and (P1P) tacitly assume
that credences are real-valued. If credences are not real-valued, the definition of a proper
scoring rule, the Brier score, Joyce (1998)’s axioms, and Pettigrew (2016)’s axioms are un-
derdetermined. The situation is even more damning with (P2R), (P2J), and (P2P). All three
are supposed to be secured by a corresponding formal result. These formal results, how-
ever, are about real-valued functions not arbitrary credences as each of (P2R), (P2J), and
(P2P) claim. Perhaps the mental life of accuracy proponents is significantly different from
mine, but my credences don’t appear to be so sharp as to be real-valued nor do they appear
to satisfy either comparability or the Archimedean property. Here we have arguments for
the conditional conclusion ‘if credences are real-valued, then probabilism’ masquerading
as arguments for probabilism.
A simple example helps to drive this point home. Consider the likelihood space with
domain [0, 1]×[0, 1], minimal element 〈0, 0〉, maximal element 〈1, 1〉, and the lexicographic
ordering
〈x1, y1〉  〈x2, y2〉 if and only if either x1 < x2 or both x1 = x2 and y1 ≤ y2.
This space naturally lifts into a likelihood structure by setting
〈x1, y1〉 ◦ 〈x2, y2〉 =
{ 〈x1 + x2, y1 + y2〉 if x1 + x2, y1 + y2 ≤ 1
↑ otherwise.
While reminiscent of the conventional probability structure 〈[0, 1],≤,+〉, the behavior of
the ◦-operation makes this 2-probability structure distinct.14 Finally, we can obtain the 2-
probability functions—the analogue of probability functions—by taking all NCI-likelihood
assignments which conform to ◦ in even the case of a countably infinite collection of dis-
joint sets. This is equivalent to saying that a function µ : F → [0, 1] × [0, 1] is a 2-
probability function if and only if µ satisfies
2K1. µ(∅) = 〈0, 0〉;
2K2. µ(Ω) = 〈1, 0〉;
2K3. For any countable collection of disjoint sets {Ei} ⊆ F ,
µ(∪{Ei}) = 〈
∑
i
µ(Ei)[1],
∑
i
µ(Ei)[2] 〉.
14Both structures contain a unique element p such that p ◦ p = 1˙, 12 in the probability structure and 〈 12 , 12 〉
in the 2-probability structure. Any isomorphism between the two structures must thus take 12 to 〈 12 , 12 〉. Note
next that any element in the probability structure strictly below 12 can be "added" to itself at least once. 〈0, 1〉,
however, is an element strictly below 〈 12 , 12 〉 which cannot be "added" to itself. It follows immediately that no
isomorphism exists between the probability structure and the 2-probability structure.
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where µ(Ei)[ j] is the j entry in µ(Ei).
Just as there is a connection between forecasts, the Brier score, and probability
functions, there is a parallel relationship between 2-forecasts, the 2-Brier score, and 2-
probability functions. Let Ω be a set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, and E an n-tuple
of events 〈E1, . . . , En〉 with n ≥ 1 and E1, . . . , En ∈ F . A 2-forecast f for E is an n-tuple
of elements from [0, 1]2. A 2-scoring rule S ( f ,w) is a function from a 2-forecast f and
particular outcome w ∈ Ω to a score in R+ × R+. The most natural example of a 2-scoring
rule is the 2-Brier score:
S B( f ,w) = 〈
∑
i
1
n
[w(Ei)[1] − fi[1]]2,
∑
i
1
n
[w(Ei)[2] − fi[2]]2〉
where
w(Ei)[ j] =
{
1 w ∈ Ei
0 w < Ei
and fi[ j] is the jth entry in the ith value of f . If f = 〈〈1, 0〉, 〈12 , 0〉〉 for example, then
f1[1] = 1, f1[2] = 0, f2[1] = 12 , and f2[2] = 0. The 2-Brier score itself simply returns a
pair containing the Brier score with respect to the first entry in fi and the Brier score with
respect to the second entry in fi. Just as with the 2-probability structure, these values from
R+ × R+ are ordered lexicographically by . A score of 〈3, 7.9〉 is strictly less than a score
of 〈5.1, 1〉, notated 〈3, 7.9〉 ≺ 〈5.1, 1〉.
An analogue of the de Finetti (1979)-Savage (1971) result for 2-forecasts, the 2-Brier
score, and the 2-probability functions can be easily established:
Proposition 3.7
Let Ω be a finite set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, S B the 2-Brier score, and E
a tuple of events 〈E1, . . . , En〉 with n ≥ 1 and E1, . . . , En ∈ F .
(i) For any 2-forecast f over E, if f is not 2-probabilistic, then there exists a 2-
probabilistic 2-forecast f ∗ such that S B( f ∗,w) ≺ S B( f ,w) for every w ∈ Ω.
(ii) For any 2-probabilistic 2-forecast f over E, there exists no 2-forecast f ∗ such
that S ( f ∗,w)  S ( f ,w) for every w ∈ Ω and S ( f ∗,w) ≺ S ( f ,w) for some w ∈ Ω.
Theorem in hand, we now have an argument for 2-probabilism:
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Accuracy Argument for 2-Probabilism
(P1) The only reasonable measure of accuracy for credences is the 2-Brier score.
(P2) For any credence f that is not 2-probabilistic, there exists a 2-probabilistic cre-
dence f ∗ with a strictly better 2-Brier score than f no matter how the world
turns out.
(P3) It is irrational to hold a credence f given that there exists another credence f ∗
such that (i) f is strictly less accurate than f ∗ in every world and (ii) there is
no credence f ′ that is at least as accurate as f ∗ in every world and strictly more
accurate in some particular world.
(C) If an agent is rational, then their credence c over F is a 2-probability function.
If the accuracy arguments provided by Rosenkrantz (1981), Joyce (1998), and Pettigrew
(2016) establish probabilism, this accuracy argument establishes 2-probabilism. Indeed,
it is not difficult to generalize this example into an argument for k-probabilism for any
k ∈ N − {0}.
This is plainly absurd. The accuracy argument for 2-probabilism fails because it takes
the restriction to the 2-probability structure for granted. All three accuracy arguments do
precisely the same thing only for the probability structure. The only point of disanalogy is
that the probability structure is conventional, and so the restriction is liable to be overlooked
in that case. A satisfactory argument for probabilism must establish that the probability
structure is the correct likelihood structure for rational credence not simply assume it.
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Part II
A Logical Theory of Confirmation
67

Chapter 4
Foundations of Confirmation
The origins of confirmation theory are typically traced back to the work of W.E. Johnson
and two of his Cambridge students: Sir Harold Jeffreys and John Maynard Keynes (Gillies
2000; Hacking 2006). While Jeffreys (1967) regarded the probability formalism as a con-
ventional and somewhat arbitrary choice for confirmation, Keynes (1921) actively rejected
it as inadequate. Despite this early hostility, work on confirmation eventually came to fo-
cus exclusively on the probability formalism under the dual influences of Carnap (1962)
and the subjective Bayesian account of rational credence. This emphasis on probability has
continued unabated to date with ruinous consequences for the original program.
The current chapter sets the foundations for the proposed account of confirmation. The
first section summarizes the contemporary case against confirmation. This case resolves
into three different objections: Ramsey’s skepticism, d’Alembert’s riddle, and Bertrand’s
paradox. While the primary objective of both this chapter and the next is a satisfactory
account of confirmation, these three objections supply a series of challenges that deeply
inform the eventual proposal. Accordingly, the discussion is laid out in terms of these
objections and the refinements they require in the proposed account.
The rest of the current chapter tackles the first two of these objections. Ramsey’s skepti-
cism is taken up in section 4.2 alongside a basic discussion of rankings and the relationship
between classical logic and confirmation. Despite its obscurity, d’Alembert’s riddle pro-
vides a more substantial challenge and takes up the final two sections. By the last of these,
an adequate theory of confirmation for finite cases has been constructed and defended.
4.1 Three Objections
There are three objections which face any theory of confirmation and which have served
to convince contemporary theorists that there is no such thing: Ramsey’s skepticism,
d’Alembert’s riddle, and Bertrand’s paradox. The first and most basic of these objections
is the general skepticism famously expressed by Frank Ramsey in his posthumous Ramsey
(1931). In his discussion of Keynes’ early work on confirmation, Ramsey—widely recog-
nized as a brilliant mathematician and logician—observed that the confirmation relations
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Keynes purported to analyze were entirely inaccessible to him. Still further, these allegedly
objective and a priori relations appeared equally inaccessible to anyone outside Keynes
himself. For all the intuitive appeal of confirmation, there existed little agreement on even
the simplest cases, and thus Ramsey argued that there is a prima facie case here for skep-
ticism. For all its initial appeal, confirmation may be just "an ancient habit of thought that
dies hard" (Howson 1991, 550).
This case for skepticism is bolstered by the second and third objections to confirmation.
The second objection, d’Alembert’s riddle, was first formulated in the 18th century by
the French mathematician Jean-Baptiste le Rond d’Alembert. The central difficulty has
reappeared several times since, most notably with the book paradox presented by Keynes
(1921) and the solution space observations made by Edwards (1978). During d’Alembert’s
life, confidence in the power of probability was nearing its high-water mark, and theorists
seemed on the verge of a successful account of confirmation. The implicit basis for this
confidence was an inference latter dubbed ‘the principle of non-sufficient reason’.
Theories of confirmation attempt to move from lack of evidence to degrees of confir-
mation. First used by Bernoulli (1713), the principle of non-sufficient reason is both the
earliest inference of this kind and the most famous (Keynes 1921; Gillies 2000). Nearly
three centuries after its first use, Keynes found this received name clumsy and provided its
contemporary moniker: the principle of indifference.
The Principle of Indifference: "If there is no known reason for predicating of our sub-
ject one rather than another of several alternatives, then relatively to such knowledge
the assertions of each of these alternatives have an equal probability" (Keynes 1921,
45).1
While theories of confirmation are not required to validate either this principle or some
variant thereof, confirmation and (POI) are a natural pairing. (POI) itself is only plausible
if the "probabilities" it mentions are both objective and "knowledge"-relative. Theories
of confirmation meanwhile would be well served by a principle which forges an intuitive
connection between evidence and likelihood. Accordingly, proponents of confirmation
have universally defended some variation of (POI) and vice-versa for proponents of (POI).
For all this principle’s intuitive appeal, d’Alembert’s riddle displays a serious lacuna in
its application. In order to apply (POI) properly, there must first exist a well-defined collec-
tion of alternatives. Still further, if (POI) is to be the basis for a theory of confirmation, then
either this collection of alternatives should itself be objective or it must be established that
1As the locus classicus for the principle of indifference, Keynes’ presentation has exerted significant
influence on later work and is as authoritative a statement of the principle as is possible. For comparison,
Jeffreys provides a similar and somewhat simpler gloss: "If there is no reason to believe one hypothesis
rather than another, the probabilities are equal" (33). In the manner characteristic of this area, the principle of
indifference is nevertheless somewhat amorphous in nature. Not only do different commentators often have
conflicting commitments with respect to "probability", but the progenitors of the principle also used it only
implicitly. Accordingly, precise formulations will be labeled as ‘variants of the principle of indifference’
even though it is entirely possible that particular authors intended a particular variant as the principle of
indifference.
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all acceptable choices here lead to the same confirmation relations. It is thus insufficient for
a collection of alternatives to merely be supplied by intuition or general agreement; if (POI)
is to underpin a theory of confirmation, a rigorous account of the alternatives mentioned
by the principle is required. D’Alembert’s riddle forces this issue by describing a simple
game and then outlining two conflicting sets of alternatives which both cohere with the
provided description. Without a satisfactory account of the alternatives underlying (POI)
and thus resolution to d’Alembert’s riddle, any confirmation theory based upon (POI) is
underdetermined.
The final and most influential objection to confirmation is Bertrand’s paradox (some-
times also ‘the multiple partitions problem’). Popularized in 19th century mathematics
circles by the French mathematician Joseph Bertrand, the paradox rose to broad philosoph-
ical prominence only after its reformulation in van Fraassen (1989) as ‘the mystery cube
factory’. Further instances of the same phenomenon include both the wine and water para-
dox from von Mises (1957) and the volume - specific volume paradox presented in von
Kries (1886). At its core, Bertrand’s paradox presents a well-defined space of possibilities
where the confirmation judgments endorsed by (POI)-style reasoning change depending on
how that space is presented. Extended discussion of Bertrand’s paradox will be postponed
until the next chapter.
Not only then do Ramsey’s observations give us reason to doubt the existence of a
confirmation relation but d’Alembert’s riddle and Bertrand’s paradox purport to undermine
the few robust intuitions available. These three objections together with the lack of any
plausible formalization of confirmation have convinced most commentators that there is in
fact no such thing (van Fraassen 1989; Howson 1991; Gillies 2000). The next two chapters
construct a comparative theory of confirmation, addressing each of these objection along
the way.
4.2 Ramsey’s Skepticism
Ramsey (1931) famously sets out the foundations for the subjective Bayesian account of ra-
tional credence. Before giving his own positive proposal, however, Ramsey lodges a num-
ber of complaints against the theory of confirmation set out by Keynes (1921). Amongst
these complaints, only a single objection is brought against confirmation itself:
...there really do not seem to be any such things as the [confirmation] relations
[J.M. Keynes] describes. He supposes that, at any rate in certain cases, they
can be perceived; but speaking for myself I feel confident that this is not true.
I do not perceive them, and if I am to be persuaded that they exist it must be by
argument; moreover I shrewdly suspect that others do not perceive them either,
because they are able to come to so very little agreement as to which of them
relates any two given propositions. (Ramsey 1931, 161)
Ramsey here makes a simple argument for skepticism. If there is such a thing as confir-
mation, then there ought to be cases where these relations can be recognized by suitably
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careful and intelligent persons. There is little agreement on cases despite the existence of
a large number of careful and intelligent commentators. Thus, there is no such thing as
confirmation.
The most striking feature of Ramsey’s objection to confirmation is that it is entirely
negative. The lack of an accepted set of confirmation relations is the sole justification sup-
plied for denying the existence of confirmation itself. Accordingly, Ramsey’s skepticism
only survives so long as the stock of accepted confirmation relations remains small. The
remainder of this section rectifies this shortcoming. Contra Ramsey, intuitive instances of
confirmation abound; the only scandal here is that these cases have gone unrecognized for
so long.
The central difficulty with confirmation is the treatment of those propositions which
outrun the evidence. Given a set of evidence E, classical logic divides propositions into
three classes. First, those propositions which contradict the evidence, claims which are
necessarily false given the truth of E. Second, those propositions which are entailed by
the evidence, claims which are necessarily true given the truth of E. Third and finally,
those propositions which neither contradict nor are entailed by the evidence, claims whose
truth and falsity are consistent with E. The first and second categories supply a lower
and upper extreme for confirmation, maximal dis-confirmation and maximal confirmation
respectively. The true difficulty with confirmation is thus only in the ranking of contingent
propositions.
It follows immediately that there exists a large stock of accepted confirmation relations.
Whenever a claim P is entailed by evidence E, it follows both that P is maximally con-
firmed by E and that ¬P is maximally disconfirmed by E. There is no lack here in sheer
number of cases. Nevertheless, this stock of accepted confirmation relations does fall short
in diversity. Ramsey’s objective is better framed then not as a matter of quantity but of
variety. Since confirmation differs from logical consequence in admitting multiple degrees,
proponents of confirmation ought to be able to supply a number of intuitive confirmation
relations which also vary in degree.
Even here, classical logic suffices to undercut Ramsey’s objection. Viewed correctly,
both propositional and first-order logic induce minimalist confirmation theories and there-
fore supply an infinite stock of intuitive confirmation rankings. There is thus no lack in
intuitive confirmation relations, and Ramsey’s skepticism about confirmation is entirely
undeserved. Keynes, Ramsey, and subsequent commentators were simply focused on the
wrong sort of ranking.
4.2.1 Minimal Comparative Confirmation
As a preliminary to the main proposal and rebuttal to Ramsey’s skepticism, both proposi-
tional and first-order logic straightforwardly induce corresponding comparative confirma-
tion relations over propositional and first-order languages respectively. Classical logic as a
whole is, in a precise sense, just a minimalist comparative theory of confirmation.
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Propositional Logic as Confirmation Theory
Let L be a propositional language, and let |=PL denote the propositional consequence rela-
tion. For consistent Σ ⊆ L and any ϕ, ψ ∈ L, define
ϕ -PLΣ ψ⇔ Σ, ϕ |=PL ψ.
The derived relation -PL
Σ
thus ranks sentences of L by their deductive strength relative to
the theory Σ. As usual, define ϕ ∼PL
Σ
ψ as both ϕ -PL
Σ
ψ and ψ -PL
Σ
ϕ, and define ϕ ≺PL
Σ
ψ as
ϕ -PL
Σ
ψ and ψ PL
Σ
ϕ.
Definition 4.1 For a propositional language L, Σ ⊆ L, ϕ ∈ L, define
~ϕΣ = {v ∈ Models(L) | v(ϕ) = T and for any ψ ∈ Σ, v(ψ) = T }.
~ϕΣ is thus the collection of Σ-models which also make ϕ true.
Proposition 4.1
For a propositional language L, consistent Σ ⊆ L, and ϕ, ψ ∈ L,
ϕ -PLΣ ψ⇔ ~ϕΣ ⊆ ~ψΣ.
Presented in terms of models, the defined -PL
Σ
relation corresponds to the subset relation
over sets of Σ-models. It follows immediately that -PL
Σ
has the properties of the subset-
relation over this space:
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Proposition 4.2
For a propositional language L, consistent Σ ⊆ L, and ϕ, ψ ∈ L,
(i) Non-triviality
⊥ ≺PL
Σ
>.
(ii) Transitivity
For any ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3 ∈ L, if ϕ1 -PLΣ ϕ2 and ϕ2 -PLΣ ϕ3, then ϕ1 -PLΣ ϕ3.
(iii) Reflexivity
For any ϕ ∈ L, ϕ -PL
Σ
ϕ.
(iv) Boundedness
For any ϕ ∈ L such that ϕ /PL
Σ
⊥ and ϕ /Σ >, ⊥ ≺PLΣ ϕ ≺PLΣ >.
(v) Monotonicity
If ϕ ∧ γ ∼PL
Σ
ψ ∧ γ ∼PL
Σ
⊥, then ϕ -PL
Σ
ψ if and only if ϕ ∨ γ -PL
Σ
ψ ∨ γ.
Given any propositional language L and any consistent L-theory Σ, the propositional
consequence relation induces a comparative ranking over the sentences of L. There thus
exists a large stock of widely-accepted confirmation relations of varying degree. While a
specific value in an absolute scale may be difficult to identify, it is nevertheless obvious
that, with no evidence, P ∨ Q is better confirmed than P, P ∧ Q is less confirmed than P,
and so forth. Ramsey’s skepticism is thus unwarranted. Propositional logic itself provides
an example—albeit a weak one—of the kind of theory sought.
First-Order Logic as Confirmation Theory
First-order logic can likewise be viewed as a minimalist confirmation theory. Let L be a
first-order language and let |=FOL denote the first-order consequence relation. For consistent
Σ ⊆ L and any ϕ, ψ ∈ L, define
ϕ -FOLΣ ψ⇔ Σ, ϕ |=FOL ψ.
The derived relation -FOL
Σ
again ranks sentences of L by their deductive strength relative to
the theory Σ. ϕ ∼FOL
Σ
ψ will again be taken as an abbreviation for both ϕ -FOL
Σ
ψ and ψ -FOL
Σ
ϕ
while ϕ ≺FOL
Σ
ψ is shorthand for ϕ -FOL
Σ
ψ and ψ FOL
Σ
ϕ. The sets of models characterization
provided in the propositional case is unavailable in the general first-order case because the
collection of models which make Σ true need not form a set. All of the characteristics are
nevertheless retained:
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Proposition 4.3
For a first-order language L, consistent Σ ⊆ L, and ϕ, ψ ∈ L,
(i) Non-triviality
⊥ ≺FOL
Σ
>.
(ii) Transitivity
For any ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3 ∈ L, if ϕ1 -FOLΣ ϕ2 and ϕ2 -FOLΣ ϕ3, then ϕ1 -FOLΣ ϕ3.
(iii) Reflexivity
For any ϕ ∈ L, ϕ -FOL
Σ
ϕ.
(iv) Boundedness
For any ϕ ∈ L such that ϕ /FOL
Σ
⊥ and ϕ /FOL
Σ
>, ⊥ ≺FOL
Σ
ϕ ≺FOL
Σ
>.
(v) Monotonicity
If ϕ ∧ γ ∼FOL
Σ
ψ ∧ γ ∼FOL
Σ
⊥, then ϕ -FOL
Σ
ψ if and only if ϕ ∨ γ -FOL
Σ
ψ ∨ γ.
Given any first-order language L and any consistent L-theory Σ, the first-order conse-
quence relation thus induces a comparative ranking over L which satisfies all the axioms
of intuitive probability save comparability. Despite Ramsey’s skepticism, philosophers
have been in possession of an objective and normative theory of confirmation for decades.
The only question is whether confirmation can be rigorously strengthened beyond classical
logic.
4.3 The Equipossibility Account
The classical conception of probability suggests a simple method for extending confirma-
tion beyond logic. For an extended overview of this period, Daston (1995) and Hacking
(2006) provide excellent and contrasting accounts. The most iconic proponent of classical
probability was the French mathematician Pierre-Simon Laplace who, following Gottfried
Leibniz and Jakob Bernoulli, explicitly defined probability as degree of possibility2 (Hack-
ing 1971). In Laplace’s ([1814] 1951) conception,
The theory of chance consists in reducing all the events of the same kind to
a certain number of cases equally possible, that is to say, to such as we may
be equally undecided about in regard to their existence, and in determining the
number of cases favorable to the event whose probability is sought. The ratio
of this number to that of all the cases possible is the measure of this probability,
2As Hacking (1971, 2006) argues at length, there is good reason to worry over the meaning(s) of ‘possibil-
ity’ in these works. Authors in this period tend to switch between a physical interpretation (ease of bringing
about) and an epistemic interpretation (consistency with the evidence).
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which is, thus simply a fraction whose numerator is the number of favorable
cases and whose denominator is the number of all the cases possible. (6)
Laplace offers here a two-step account of probability:
(1) If evidence is symmetrically distributed among cases, then these cases are equally
possible.
(2) The probability of a proposition P is the number of equally possible cases which
make P true divided by the total number of equally possible cases.
Probability is thus derived from equal possibility or ‘equipossibility’ between cases.
This equipossibility account is the basis both for Laplace’s use of (POI) and his identi-
fication of probabilities with numerical values ranging between zero and one. (POI) asserts
that symmetric evidence between alternatives entails equal probability. Given Laplace’s
commitment to (1), symmetric evidence between alternatives requires either that these al-
ternatives are themselves Laplace’s equally possible cases or that these alternatives have
Laplace’s equally possible cases distributed uniformly among them. In either situation,
Laplace’s definition of probability—(2) above—entails that each alternative is equally
probable. (POI) is thus a straightforward consequence of pairing (1) and (2). Similarly,
if the probability of a proposition is the ratio of equal possibilities favorable to a propo-
sition to the total number of equal possibilities, then at minimum there are no favorable
possibilities and at maximum all possibilities are favorable. The minimal and maximum
probabilities are thus zero and one respectively with intermediate sets appearing between
these two bounds. The equipossibility account is thus simultaneously the basis for the most
widely accepted and the most controversial aspects of classical probability.
Two centuries before the widely acknowledged foundations of confirmation, Laplace
not only alleges the existence of a degreed relation which is evidence-relative, objective,
and normative but also provides an extended account of this relation. Further, Laplace
regularly applies this account to problems characteristic of confirmation. The most infa-
mous instance here is the likelihood that the sun will rise tomorrow given only that it has
done so in the past, already a default example in discussions of induction by Laplace’s time
(Zabell 1989). Provided both Laplace’s explicit commitments and his application of the
account, there is good reason to regard the equipossibility account—and by extension the
mathematical theory of probability—as an early analysis of confirmation. Laplace is not
investigating a particular axiomatic system dubbed ‘probability’ but rather formalizing the
same intuitions that would later drive Keynes, Jeffreys, and Carnap. Popular history has
gotten the relation between confirmation and probability backwards.
Early theory of confirmation or not, the equipossibility account is widely held to be
circular (von Mises 1957; Reichenbach 1971; Hacking 2006). The worry is that equally
possible cases are equally probable cases not because the equipossibility account is correct
but rather because the notion of equipossibility is a flagrant repackaging of equal probabil-
ity. This account then presupposes an antecedent notion of probability, and so no ground
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has been gained. This circularity charge is accepted even among contemporary commenta-
tors who are favorably disposed towards the equipossibility account. Rosenkrantz (1981),
for example, accepts that Laplace means equiprobable by ‘equipossible’ but maintains—
despite Laplace’s explicit claim to the contrary—that (2) is not offered as a definition. De-
fenses of this kind have rightfully proven unpersuasive, and so the equipossibility account
has been relegated to a historical note.
4.3.1 Finite, Atomic Confirmation for Propositional Languages
Despite this, a non-circular variant of the equipossibility account is readily available. Re-
placing Laplace’s talk of cases with an exhaustive collection of atomic3 possibilities and
Laplace’s appeal to symmetrically distributed evidence with taking all atomic possibilities
consistent with the evidence, (1) claims that all and only the atomic possibilities consis-
tent with our evidence are equally possible.4 (2) need only be modified to talk explicitly
about degrees of confirmation over collections of these atomic possibilities. Restricted to
propositional languages, this gives:
Finite, Atomic Confirmation for Propositional Languages
Let L be a propositional language, ΩL a finite model space for L, and Σ ⊆ L a
consistent (with respect to ΩL) set of evidence.
(1’) If ΩL is an exhaustive collection of atomic possibilities, then every possibility in
the subcollection ΩL,Σ is an equal possibility relative to ΩL and Σ.
(2’) For a finite, non-empty set of equal possibilities, the degree of confirmation for a
sentence ϕ is the number of equal possibilities which make ϕ true divided by the
total number of equal possibilities.
Given a finite set of atomic possibilities and a set of evidence from some propositional lan-
guage L, this interpretation of the equipossibility account defines a degree of confirmation
for every sentence of L. The talk of equal possibilities here is evocative but inessential; con-
firmation is ultimately reduced to the collection of atomic possibilities that are consistent
with the evidence.
The atomic confirmation account described by (1’) and (2’) nevertheless coheres with
characteristic applications of the equipossibility account. Suppose, for example, that we
are faced with exactly two logically independent propositions P and Q, most famously ‘the
coin lands heads on the first toss’ and ‘the coin lands heads on the second toss’. Exactly
four propositional models are available here:
3An atomic possibility is a complete or indivisible way the world could be. Note that this is consistent
with both the existence and non-existence of a set of atomic elements within a given possibility.
4This modification was anticipated by Keynes (1921) in his analysis of the principle of indifference.
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P Q
v1 : T T
v2 : T F
v3 : F T
v4 : F F
Each of these gives a way the world could be with respect to P and Q.
Suppose further that we regard each of these propositional models as atomic, as de-
scribing an irreducible way the world could be. With the current example, this is clearly
false; the world contains more than a single coin landing either heads or tails. The current
example is nevertheless instructive, and failures of atomicity need not always occur. Still
further, there is significant intuitive appeal to regarding a set of possibilities as atomic when
we are faced with a question which doesn’t require further detail. Even if we eventually
come to recognize this as an error, it is an intuitively appealing error that helps makes sense
of both early commentaries and pretheoretic intuitions.
Lastly, suppose that we are supplied no evidence as to the outcome of either the first
coin toss or the second. Each of the atomic propositional models v1-v4 is thus by (1’) to
be accounted equally possible. Following (2’) and defining degrees of confirmation as the
ratio of favorable equal possibilities to all equal possibilities:
Sentence Atomic Models Degree of Confirmation
⊥ ∅ 0
P ∧ ¬Q {v2} 14
P {v1, v2} 14 + 14 = 12
P ∨ Q {v1, v2, v3} 14 + 14 + 14 = 34
P ∨ ¬P {v1, v2, v3, v4} 14 + 14 + 14 + 14 = 1
The cumulative effect is a probabilistic ranking of propositional sentences which accords
with the expected frequencies for a fair coin.
Given a propositional language L, a finite model space ΩL for L, and a consistent (with
respect to ΩL) set of evidence Σ ⊆ L, (1’) and (2’) supply a unique degree of confirmation
for every sentence in L.
Definition 4.2 For L a propositional language, ΩL a finite model space for L, and Σ ⊆ L
consistent (with respect to ΩL), the atomic confirmation ranking is
µL
Σ
(ϕ) =
|~ϕL,Σ|
|ΩL,Σ|
where ΩL,Σ is the set of models from ΩL which make Σ true while ~ϕL,Σ is the set of
models from ΩL which make both Σ and ϕ true.
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Definition 4.3 For L a propositional language, ΩL a finite model space for L, and Σ ⊆ L
consistent (with respect to ΩL), the comparative atomic confirmation ranking is defined by
ϕ -L
Σ
ψ⇔ µL
Σ
(ϕ) ≤ µL
Σ
(ψ).
As in Chapter 2, a formal language L with Boolean connectives together with a col-
lection of models ΩL defined over L straightforwardly gives rise to the algebra FL =
{~ϕΩL : ϕ ∈ L}. A formal language L with Boolean connectives, a model space ΩL
for L, and a consistent (with respect to ΩL) set Σ ⊆ L similarly gives rise to an algebra
FL,Σ = {~ϕΩL,Σ : ϕ ∈ L}. If we wish to abstract from the expressive limitations of L,
we can generalize these to F +L = P(ΩL) and F +L,Σ = P(ΩL,Σ) respectively. Both µLΣ and -LΣ
may be unambiguously extended to F +L by setting
µL
Σ
(E) =
|E ∩ΩL,Σ|
|ΩL,Σ|
for any E ∈ F +L .
Just like Laplace’s presentation of the equipossibility account, the atomic confirmation
account described by (1’) and (2’) is closely related to the mathematical theory of proba-
bility.
Proposition 4.4
Let L be a propositional language, ΩL a finite model space for L, and Σ ⊆ L a consis-
tent (with respect to ΩL) set. Then, µLΣ satisfies Kolmogorov’s probability axioms overF +L .
Upon learning some ϕ consistent with ΩL,Σ, the account also endorses conditionalization.
Proposition 4.5
Let L be a propositional language, ΩL a finite model space for L, Σ ⊆ L a consistent
(with respect to ΩL) set, and ϕ a sentence consistent with ΩL,Σ. Then, for any ψ,
µL
Σ
(ψ|ϕ) = µL
Σ∪{ϕ}(ψ).
Atomic confirmation thus leads us directly to the hallmarks of contemporary objective
Bayesianism. If (1’) and (2’) are a plausible formalization of (1) and (2), this is no accident.
Much of the perennial appeal of objective Bayesian reasoning is underwritten by implicit
appeals to (1’) and (2’).
History aside, (1’) and (2’) provide a comparative confirmation ranking which strictly
extends the comparative confirmation relation induced by propositional logic.
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Proposition 4.6
Let L be a propositional language, ΩL a finite model space for L, and Σ ⊆ L a consis-
tent (with respect to ΩL) set. Then,
ϕ -PLΣ ψ⇒ ϕ -LΣ ψ
ϕ -L
Σ
ψ 6⇒ ϕ -PLΣ ψ.
The intuition behind this extension is interchangeability. Given a set of atomic models, the
subsequent restriction to models consistent with the evidence supplies a set of possibilities
which are on par in all relevant dimensions. Every such model corresponds to precisely one
way things could be, and no such model is in a better position vis-á-vis the evidence. All
that then distinguishes more confirmed sentences from less is the corresponding number of
atomic models satisfying Σ.
Contrary to the modern consensus, the charge of circularity against the equipossibility
account of probability can be coherently evaded. Indeed, while Laplace lacked the logical
framework underlying (1’) and (2’), the retreat to atomic possibility itself is exceedingly
natural, particularly in the context of games of chance.5 Beyond this historical point, atomic
confirmation for propositional languages provides a natural extension of confirmation the-
ory beyond propositional logic. Given a set of atomic models, any model from this set
which is consistent with our evidence is as good as any other.
4.4 D’Alembert’s Riddle
The atomic confirmation account sketched in the previous section depends on either being
supplied or identifying a set of atomic models. While in some cases we might be explic-
itly supplied such a set, this seems the exception rather than the rule. Is it possible, then,
to identify a set of atomic models? The first suggestion that it is not comes from a "rid-
dle" posed by the 18th century French mathematician Jean-Baptiste d’Alembert. While
contemporary criticism of the equipossibility account centers on its perceived circularity,
d’Alembert focused instead on Laplace’s talk of cases, offering a simple two-player coin
game to illustrate his misgivings.
In d’Alembert’s proposed game, the first player wins just in case the coin lands heads
within two tosses (Todhunter 1865). If the coin fails to land heads within two tosses,
the second player wins instead. When asked for the space of equipossibilities in this game,
5Is a retreat to atomic possibility what Laplace really intended all along? No, not in any explicit sense.
This is supported by the injunction that we need only reduce "all the events of the same kind" to equal
possibilities in the quoted passage. More generally, there is a salient intuitive notion of physical possibility
(or ease of accomplishment) which appears to underwrite some of Laplace’s intuitions (Hacking 2006). For
an extended development of this idea, see Myrvold (2019).
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most commentators—Laplace among them—provide a space which fixes outcomes for two
tosses of the coin:
HH HT TH TT
Applying (2’), the proposition ‘at least one coin toss lands heads’ or HH ∨ HT ∨ T H
receives degree of confirmation 34 . This solution is challenged by d’Alembert who notes
that a second coin toss needs occur in this game only if the first toss is tails. He therefore
contends that the space of equipossibilities is instead:
H TH TT
It then follows that the degree of confirmation for ‘at least one coin toss lands heads’ or
H ∨ T H is 23 .
Modern commentaries tend to treat d’Alembert’s proposed solution as a quaint mis-
step. As many have been quick to point out, actually playing d’Alembert’s game a large
number of times gives frequencies which accord with the standard response of 34 and not
d’Alembert’s value of 23 . A small amount of probability theory likewise shows that a fair
coin lands heads at least once with probability 34 . Despite their popularity, both of these
responses to the riddle are inadequate. The coin at issue in the puzzle is not indicated to be
fair or indeed biased in any particular manner; it is likewise not required that the coin used
is similar to any coin with which we are acquainted.6 Both probability calculations which
suppose a fair coin and the outcomes of experiments are thus irrelevant to d’Alembert’s
game. A different bias and a different structure for common coins will have both probabil-
ity theory and experimental results favoring d’Alembert’s solution instead.
More generally, d’Alembert’s riddle—like many puzzles surrounding confirmation7—
suffers from the ready availability of evidence beyond that explicitly provided by the riddle
itself. Both reactions above stem from natural though illicit attempts to supplement the
evidence available in the riddle with our own experiences. The tossing of coins is some-
thing each of us is intimately familiar with, and so there is intense pressure to utilize this
additional information in evaluating the likelihood that at least one coin toss lands heads.
Students of probability theory have an even greater difficulty; not only must they contend
with their own experiences tossing coins but also training to interpret ‘coin toss’ as code
for a very particular kind of probabilistic event. Nevertheless, understanding d’Alembert’s
riddle requires setting aside this illicit background evidence. All that is intended in the
riddle is that we are faced with a process which is certain, once invoked, to resolve in one
of exactly two ways.
6Whether or not d’Alembert intentionally omitted these assumptions is unclear; in all likelihood,
d’Alembert simply lacked the sharp distinctions between probabilities, frequencies, chances, and degrees
of confirmation typical of modern work. Intentional or not, this omission is crucial to the viability of
d’Alembert’s solution.
7Most famously, The Paradox of the Ravens presented in Hempel (1945).
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Rather than a simple error on d’Alembert’s part, the conflicting solutions to the riddle
stem from two incompatible interpretations of how the world will be by the game’s conclu-
sion. The standard response imagines that the coin is tossed twice whereupon a victor is
crowned. In contrast, d’Alembert’s proposal makes use of the fact that if the coin initially
lands heads, a second toss would be irrelevant to the outcome of the game. With this in
mind, the game may instead be played by making a first toss and then a second only if the
game is not already settled. Nothing in d’Alembert’s description stipulates one version or
the other; the choice here is apparently arbitrary.
Accepting d’Alembert’s proposed solution as legitimate, the classical equipossibility
account no longer supplies an unambiguous probability for player 1’s victory. This failure
ultimately derives from indeterminacy in the notion of ‘case’ or ‘possibility’ invoked by
the account. D’Alembert’s crucial contribution here is an intuitively acceptable yet non-
standard space of possibilities. Unlike the classical equipossibility account, however, (1’)
and (2’) explicitly derive degrees of confirmation from a set of atomic possibilities. In this
context, d’Alembert’s riddle fails to motivate any indeterminacy. If the four possibilities
laid out in the standard solution are the atomic possibilities, then the standard solution is
correct. Similarly, if the three possibilities laid out in d’Alembert’s solution are the atomic
possibilities, then d’Alembert’s solution is correct. D’Alembert’s riddle nevertheless casts
doubt on the possibility of identifying atomic possibilities. This point does not undermine
the atomic confirmation account as a whole because atomic possibilities are at least some-
times explicitly stipulated. It does, however, greatly restrict the account’s applicability if all
choices outside such cases are subjective. D’Alembert’s riddle thus represents a substantial
threat to the atomic confirmation account presented in the previous section.
It is tempting to pin the conflict between the standard solution and d’Alembert’s on a
simple, one-shot ambiguity between the two proposed solutions. Natural language sen-
tences often admit of multiple logically distinct interpretations; the sentence ‘everyone
loves someone’ may, for instance, be understood as asserting either that there is some sin-
gle individual loved by everyone (∃x∀yL(y, x)) or that for any person, there is someone
they love (∀y∃xL(y, x)). Similarly, the description of d’Alembert’s riddle may be ambigu-
ous between two well-defined games: one where two tosses of the coin always occur and
one where the second toss occurs only if necessary. On this treatment, there would be no
true conflict between the two proposed solutions and no robust challenge to either equipos-
sibility account. Each solution targets one of the two viable interpretations for the provided
description.
Unfortunately, the phenomenon underlying d’Alembert’s riddle runs far deeper than
only two incompatible interpretations. D’Alembert’s description of his game is in fact
consistent with an infinite number of interpretations. For a particularly striking example,
note that nothing in d’Alembert’s description of the game rules out the first player being
required to clap if the coin lands heads on the first toss. Incorporating the possibility of this
clapping (C) into the standard analysis now gives six possibilities:
HHC HTC THC TTC TH¬C TT¬C
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Of these six, four possibilities have the coin landing heads at least once. If these are our
atomic possibilities, then the degree of confirmation associated with ‘at least one coin toss
lands heads’ is 23 . If we instead follow d’Alembert and minimize the number of coin flips,
the proper degree of confirmation for the game with clapping is 35 . Regardless of our
position on coin flips, the introduction of clapping produces a shift in how likely victory is
for the first player.
Even amongst those friendly to d’Alembert’s original challenge, there is great pressure
to declare this new example defective. While the original riddle was induced by a part of
the game itself, the first player’s clapping is a clearly irrelevant addition. Accordingly, the
introduction of clapping into the possibilities considered is illegitimate, and the resulting
degrees of confirmation need not be taken seriously. Despite the intuitive appeal of this
response, it repeats the error flagged at the outset of this section. Given only the evidence
provided, the relevance of clapping to the outcome of the coin toss is entirely undetermined.
Only by helping ourselves to additional, illicit evidence (e.g., observed non-interaction
between quarters and clapping) does the outright dismissal of the new clapping proposition
become attractive. Given only d’Alembert’s specification of the game, the first player’s
clapping might well be of immense importance.
Recognizing this, there is a clear parallel between the standard assumption that the coin
must be tossed twice and the assumption that the first player must clap if the first toss
lands heads. Neither of these assumptions are necessary for the completion of the game
d’Alembert described. Similarly, neither assumption is explicitly endorsed nor explicitly
rejected by d’Alembert’s description. Indeed, the only robust disanalogy between these
two is the feeling of naturalness and irrelevance respectively delivered by an illicit appeal
to our own experiences. Neither is properly relevant to the riddle, and so requiring clapping
for a heads result on the first toss is on par with requiring a second coin flip. If the standard
solution is legitimate, so too are both clapping solutions.8
Examples of this kind are easily multiplied. In fact, ‘at least one coin lands heads’ can
be brought arbitrarily close to both zero and one with different choices for atomic possi-
bilities. D’Alembert has identified not a one-shot ambiguity but a general phenomenon
that threatens to undermine atomic confirmation in any situation which is not antecedently
equipped with a set of atomic possibilities.
4.4.1 Propositional Formalization of D’Alembert’s Riddle
The atomic confirmation account presented in the previous section makes extensive use of
the framework developed for propositional logic, and the standard solution to d’Alembert’s
riddle is particularly compelling when presented in these terms. Formulating and motivat-
ing d’Alembert’s solution in this framework not only helps to clarify the riddle itself but
also the riddle’s relationship to propositional logic.
8The outlier here is actually d’Alembert’s solution rather than the standard proposal. Given the specifica-
tion of the game, every possibility d’Alembert recognizes is necessary. The same cannot be said for any of
other solutions proposed in this section.
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Formally, the discrepancy between the standard solution and d’Alembert’s alternative
appears with the initial translation into a formal language:
Standard Solution
H1: The coin lands heads on the first toss.
T1: The coin lands tails on the first toss.
H2: The coin lands heads on the second toss.
T2: The coin lands tails on the second toss.
D’Alembert’s Solution
H1: The coin lands heads on the first toss.
T1: The coin lands tails on the first toss.
HD2 : There is a second toss, and the coin lands heads on it.
T D2 : There is a second toss, and the coin lands tails on it.
Whether or not H2 and HD2 or T2 and T
D
2 are properly equivalent, the two solutions defini-
tively differ on the meaning postulates adopted for these propositional atoms.
Standard Solution D’Alembert’s Solution
H1 ↔ ¬T1
H2 ↔ ¬T2
H1 ↔ ¬T1
HD2 → ¬T D2
T D2 → ¬HD2
H1 → ¬T D2 ∧ ¬HD2
On the standard solution, not landing heads on the second toss is taken to imply landing tails
and vice-versa for landing tails on the second toss. On d’Alembert’s solution meanwhile
neither implication holds. Indeed, landing heads on the first toss implies that no second
toss occurs. While the former scheme is simpler, neither is clearly wrong. The established
discrepancy in atomic models is readily apparent:
H1 T1 H2 T2
v1 : T F T F
v2 : T F F T
v3 : F T T F
v4 : F T F T
H1 T1 HD2 T
D
2
vD1 : T F F F
vD2 : F T T F
vD3 : F T F T
The critical behavior here thus arises not only with a choice of atomic models but also with
the selection of propositional atoms and meaning postulates.
In propositional logic, propositional atoms are characterized by (i) their restriction to
exactly one of two truth values—true and false—and (ii) their lack of further structure. The
contributions of the first are explicit in the accompanying formal semantics while the im-
plications of (ii) have often—as Burgess (2003) argues at length—been misinterpreted by
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even sophisticated commentators. Despite the unstructured nature of propositional atoms,
these symbols need not correspond to either contingent or atomic sentences. Rather, propo-
sitional atoms correspond to sentences of arbitrary complexity (propositional or otherwise).
It is thus entirely legitimate to associate propositional atoms with complex sentences as in
HD2 and T
D
2 . As a direct result, particular propositional atoms may be assessed as true in
a model while the associated sentence is necessarily false or assessed as false while the
associated sentence is necessarily true. Propositional logic thus exhibits a fundamental
blindness towards the actual sentences associated with propositional atoms.
The blindness induced by (ii) is simultaneously a critical advantage and a severe lim-
itation of propositional logic. In its favor, this blindness allows the formalism to advance
without consideration of semantic and syntactic complexities beyond those explicitly intro-
duced. It is this disconnect that makes the simplicity of the propositional account possible.
At the same time, many of these suppressed complexities are also the basis for legitimate
inferences. Propositional logic therefore suffers from an immediate yet necessary shortfall
as a result of (ii); some truly legitimate inferences have been sacrificed in order for the
account as a whole to proceed.
Thankfully, this shortfall can be partially repaired. While propositional atoms lack
further structure, additional truth-functional information may be directly encoded in the
propositional formalism by imposing outside restrictions—meaning postulates—on propo-
sitional atoms. This is precisely what occurs above, for instance, when ‘the coin lands
heads on the first toss’ and ‘the coin lands tails on the first toss’ are associated with the
propositional atoms H1 and T1 respectively and then immediately supplemented by a claim
relating these. In isolation, propositional logic recognizes four possibilities for the pair of
atoms:
H1 T1
T T
T F
F T
F F
Introducing the meaning postulate H1 ↔ ¬T1, however, rules out the first and last. In this
manner, some of the information within the original sentences is reintroduced despite (ii).
The atomic confirmation account upends this entire approach; the desired models are
now the truly atomic ones, and any simplification compromises the resulting degrees of
confirmation. D’Alembert’s contribution is only to dramatize the difficulties inherent in
this demand for atomicity. Both the standard solution and d’Alembert’s alternative accept
the syntactic description of d’Alembert’s game but interpret this description differently.
Nothing in the syntax of the sentences themselves marks out one interpretation or the other
as correct, and so it seems that both must be accounted legitimate. As the formalization
above illustrates, the contrast between these two interpretations can be viewed either as
a disagreement over which set of atomic models to adopt or as a disagreement over the
appropriate choice of formal language and meaning postulates. On this latter formulation,
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proponents of each solution are naturally regarded as speaking syntactically identical but
semantically distinct languages.
4.4.2 D’Alembert’s Riddle and Interpreted Propositional Languages
Formulating d’Alembert’s riddle as a disagreement in language suggests a simple char-
acterization of when changes in the atomic confirmation ranking are and are not to be
expected. For simplicity, we restrict our attention in this subsection to model spaces ΩL
that are composed entirely of L-models.
Definition 4.4 An interpreted propositional languageL is a pair of a propositional language
L and a set of L-models ΩL.
The standard solution and d’Alembert’s alternative thus differ in the interpreted language
they endorse. In many cases, atomic model spaces may be generated by specifying a con-
sistent set of meaning postulates ΣM ⊆ L and then taking all L-models consistent with this
set. A formal language L, exhaustive collection of L-models, and set of meaning postulates
thus suffice to generate an interpreted language though the reverse is not always true.
The simplest relationship between two distinct interpreted languages is extension:
Definition 4.5 An interpreted propositional language L+ extends an interpreted language
L if and only if L+ extends L and for any v+ ∈ ΩL+ , v+|L ∈ ΩL.
While the language difference underpinning d’Alembert’s riddle is not an instance of exten-
sion, any difference between interpreted languages can be viewed as a succession of exten-
sions from a common base language. Understanding the behavior of atomic confirmation
rankings under interpreted language extensions can thus supply a general understanding of
when shifts in the atomic confirmation ranking can be expected.
The atomic confirmation ranking proves resilient to interpreted language extensions
in only two general cases. The first of these cases is the extension of an interpreted lan-
guage by a symbol which is already—barring the expressive weaknesses of the language—
representable.
Definition 4.6 Given an interpreted propositional languageL = 〈L,ΩL〉, an extensionL+ =
〈L+,ΩL+〉 of L is completely restricted if and only if for every new propositional letter P in
L+, there exists RP ⊆ ΩL such that
~PΩL+ = {v+ ∈ ΩL+ : for some v ∈ RP, v+|L = v}.
The propositions introduced by a completely restricted extension are equivalent to some
already existing subset of ΩL. Every atomic model for the extended language L+ then
corresponds to exactly one atomic model from the original language L.
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Proposition 4.7
For any interpreted propositional languages L = 〈L,ΩL〉 and L+ = 〈L+,ΩL+〉, if L+
is a completely restricted extension of L, then there exists a bijection δ : ΩL → ΩL+
which preserves the truth of all L-sentences.
The atomic confirmation ranking is then fixed under this extension whenever it is defined,
viz. when the set of atomic models consistent with the evidence Σ is finite.
Proposition 4.8
Let interpreted propositional languages L = 〈L,ΩL〉 and L+ = 〈L+,ΩL+〉 as well as
a consistent (with respect to ΩL) theory Σ be given. If L+ is a completely restricted
extension of L and ΩL+,Σ is finite and non-empty, then for any set A ∈ F +L ,
µL
Σ
(A) = µL
+
Σ
(A+)
where A+ = {v+ ∈ ΩL+ : v+|L ∈ A}.
In the case where A = ~ϕΩL,Σ , we thus have that µ
L
Σ
(ϕ) = µL
+
Σ
(ϕ). Completely restricted
extensions of interpreted propositional languages leave the atomic confirmation ranking
fixed.
The second fixed case for the atomic confirmation ranking is unrestricted extensions.
Definition 4.7 Given an interpreted propositional languageL = 〈L,ΩL〉, an extensionL+ =
〈L+,ΩL+〉 of L is unrestricted if and only if
ΩL+ = {L+ valuations v+ : v+|L ∈ ΩL}.
Unrestricted extensions introduce propositional atoms without any accompanying meaning
postulates or, equivalently, with no restrictions on the truth values assigned.
Proposition 4.9
Let L = 〈L,ΩL〉 be an interpreted propositional language and Σ ⊆ L a theory such
that ΩL,Σ is finite and nonempty. If L+ = 〈L,ΩL+〉 is a finite, unrestricted extension of
L, then for any A ∈ F +L,Σ,
µL
Σ
(A) = µL
+
Σ
(A+)
where A+ = {v+ ∈ ΩL+ : v+|L ∈ A}.
In the case where A = ~ϕΩL,Σ , we thus have that µ
L
Σ
(ϕ) = µL
+
Σ
(ϕ). Unrestricted extensions
of interpreted propositional languages also leave the atomic confirmation ranking fixed.
Not all extensions of interpreted languages which fix the atomic confirmation ranking
fall into the two general cases presented. These further instances, however, have an air of
happenstance, a series of additions which would individually shift the ranking but when
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combined happen to balance. Accordingly, further instances of interpreted language sensi-
tivity can typically be generated simply by avoiding completely restricted and unrestricted
extensions. The mechanism underlying d’Alembert’s riddle is then a general feature of the
atomic confirmation ranking for propositional languages. Without a specified set of atomic
possibilities, inconsistent interpreted propositional languages can be readily generated by
adding propositional atoms whose truth values are only partially restricted.
4.5 Finite Confirmation for First-Order Languages
The cumulative effect of the previous section is a robust challenge to any application of
the atomic confirmation account for propositional languages when a set of atomic possi-
bilities is not explicitly specified as part of our evidence. Further, this was cast as a severe
limitation of the theory. The current section sketches a two-part response to the issues
raised by d’Alembert’s riddle. First, first-order logic supplies the resources for an exhaus-
tive characterization of atomic possibilities. Transitioning to a first-order account of atomic
confirmation thus allows for the identification of a collection of atomic possibilities given
any set of evidence. Second, confirmation relations ought to exhibit a general sensitivity
to changes in the collection of atomic models under consideration. Appearances aside,
the discrepancy between the standard solution and d’Alembert’s proposal reveals a radical
disagreement about the nature of the world.
4.5.1 First-Order Logic
If we are speaking entirely meaningfully, our use of a name picks out a unique object, our
use of a relation-name picks out a unique relation, and so forth. In so far as these crite-
ria fail, our words likewise fail to have a single, well-defined meaning; we speak to some
degree vaguely and ambiguously. The large part of human discourse falls into this latter
category; complete precision is a high standard, and it is typically good enough to just nar-
row down the available extensions of our symbols. It is of little practical consequence after
all whether a particular rock formation on Pluto qualifies as a chair, and accordingly little
attention is paid to its position vis-á-vis the extension of ‘chair’. So far as the important
objects around us are sorted appropriately into chairs and non-chairs, ‘chair’ is meaningful
enough.
First-order logic leverages this situation into an account of logical consequence. If
unambiguous or ideal use of a language requires appropriate extensions for each component
of the language, then the structure of these extensions induces restrictions on what follows
from the truth of particular sentences. The parallel with propositional logic is striking here,
and the progression from this point appears to parallel the propositional case. Supplied
with a formal language, a collection of models exhausting all possible extensions can be
constructed. A sentence ϕ can then be defined as a logical consequence of a sentence ψ
just in case every model in the exhaustive collection which makes ϕ true also makes ψ true.
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The only difference between propositional and first-order logic appears, then, to be the shift
from extensions of sentences to extensions of parts of sentences.
As Etchemendy (1990) observes, the foundations of first-order logic are not quite so
straightforward as this. Since the extensions our symbols could have are naturally con-
strained by which objects actually exist, exhausting all (actually) possible extensions does
not produce first-order logic. Instead, this produces ‘constant-domain first-order logic’,
the usual formal definitions relative to a single, unchanging domain of (actually existing)
objects.9 The simplest differences introduced by the use of a constant domain concern the
existence of objects themselves. In first-order logic, ∃x∃y(x , y) is a contingent claim;
there exist models which make this claim true and models which make it false. In constant-
domain first-order logic, however, ∃x∃y(x , y) is a logical truth; there actually exists two
objects, and so every model contains at least two objects. First-order logic is thus commit-
ted to strictly more than just appropriate extensions for each part of a first-order language.
As the discrepancy above suggests, the additional commitment built into first-order
logic concerns objects themselves. First-order logic properly endorses both a normative
claim about first-order languages and their extensions as well as a further normative claim
about how objects could be, viz. any set whatever. There are a number of reasons this
latter claim is attractive; the important point for current purposes, however, is only the
modal nature of this assertion. First-order logic is not just swapping linguistic extensions.
It imposes a real restriction on how the world could be.
In first-order logic proper, this restriction is only used to circumscribe possible models
relative to a language. Characterizing possible domains with sets also unlocks, however,
an exhaustive characterization of atomic possibilities. If sets exhaust all possible domains,
then whatever the atomic structure of the world, there exists a corresponding set. Further,
the extensions of any (first-order) properties must correspond to subsets of the domain set.
Taking all possible collections of subsets of all possible sets thus delivers all atomic pos-
sibilities. By providing an exhaustive characterization of all the objects there could be,
first-order logic likewise allows for an exhaustive characterization of all atomic possibili-
ties.
4.5.2 Finite, Atomic Confirmation for First-Order Languages
The proposed derivation of equal possibility from atomic possibility also admits of a
straightforward first-order formalization.
9Interestingly, Mancosu (2006, 2010) observes that Tarski’s early logic papers use a constant domain
semantics of precisely the sort suggested by this view.
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Finite, Atomic Confirmation for First-Order Languages
Let L be a first-order language, ΩL a collection of canonical-domain models for
L, and Σ ⊆ L a consistent (with respect to ΩL) set of evidence.
(1’) If ΩL is an exhaustive collection of atomic possibilities, then every possibility in
the subcollection ΩL,Σ is an equal possibility relative to ΩL and Σ.
(2’) For a finite, non-empty set of equal possibilities, the degree of confirmation for a
sentence ϕ is the number of equal possibilities which make ϕ true divided by the
total number of equal possibilities.
Talk of possibilities is again understood in terms of models for some formal language, and
degrees of confirmation result from taking a finite set of these models to be atomic.
Canonical-Domain Models
The first major complexity introduced by the move to first-order atomic confirmation is
the notion of model to be used. A minimal example shows the insufficiency of standard
first-order models for the proposed account:
Small World 1.
Suppose that the world contains either only a single object or exactly two ob-
jects. Formally, the first-order sentence ∀x∀y∀z(x = y ∨ y = z ∨ x = z) is
true. Moreover, the world is—as it turns out—quite bland; the only non-trivial
property in the world is the single non-identity just noted. How many total
possibilities exist here? How many of these ways make it the case that there
exists exactly one object, i.e., that ∃!x(x = x) is true?
The intuitive answers are two and one respectively. The world contains either one object or
two, and only the former makes ∃!x(x = x) true. In contrast with this first,
Small World 2.
Suppose again that the world contains either a single object or two, but in
addition a single object in the world has been stamped with a blue mark. How
many total possibilities exist? How many of these ways make it the case that
there exists exactly one object, i.e., that ∃!x(x = x) is true?
The intuitive answers are in this case three and one respectively. If there is only a single
object, it must be the one stamped blue; if there are two objects, then either one or the other
may be stamped. ∃!x(x = x) is, of course, only true on the first of these ways.
The existence of a blue mark in Small World 2 shifts the answers to our two questions
by introducing additional structure for the world. Even if we do not know which entity
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bears the mark, some object has acquired an additional facet to its existence, and the space
of possibilities must shift accordingly. The problem with first-order models is that they do
not recognize shifts of this kind. There are only two (non-isomorphic) first-order models
which satisfy the constraints stipulated in Small World 2:
M1 : {a0}
bM
′
1 = a0
M2 : {a0, a1}
bM
′
2 = a0

M3 : {a0, a1}
bM
′
2 = a1
More generally, first-order models are only regarded as distinct when no extension-
preserving bijection exists between their respective domains. All individual objects are,
on this approach, interchangeable. This suffices with the all or nothing nature of logical
consequence but badly miscounts with the finer-grained notion of confirmation.
From a purely objective perspective, objects are distinct regardless of whether or not
this fact is or even could be recognized. There is thus a difference between a blue dot on
object a0 and a blue dot on object a1 in Small World 2 even if we should lack the resources
to actually distinguish a0 from a1. God, as it were, knows the difference even if we do not.
First-order models ignore this and conflate distinct possibilities on the basis that they cannot
be distinguished using only the supplied extensions. As a result, the first-order equipossi-
bility account requires a revised notion of model which distinguishes objects even in the
absence of extensional differences. Canonical-domain models accomplish precisely this by
building an explicit labeling over objects into the models themselves. Relative to a fixed
first-order language, first-order models supply all possibilities which can be distinguished
by their extensions; canonical-domain models supply all possibilities simpliciter.
While only the notion of model deviates from the standard construction of first-order
logic, a complete set of definitions for the desired logic is provided alongside the proofs for
this section in the appendix. Underpinning the definition of a canonical-domain model, we
will need a collection of canonical domains.
Definition 4.8 A canonical-domain class C is a class of sets satisfying
(i) for every cardinality, there exists a unique set of that cardinality within C
(ii) for any two cardinalities ℵi and ℵi′ such that ℵi ≤ ℵi′ , the set of cardinality ℵi is a
subset of the set of cardinality ℵi′
A canonical-domain class is a collection of nested sets that contains exactly one set for
every cardinality. The particular choice of a canonical-domain class C is irrelevant; we
merely wish to secure a canonical set at each cardinality. For ease of use, we may suppose
that elements of the smaller sets are subscripted by natural and then real numbers. The
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unique one element domain set is thus {a0}, the unique two element domain set is {a0, a1},
and so forth.
Unlike first-order models, canonical-domain models all draw their domain from a par-
ticular canonical-domain class C.
Definition 4.9 For a first-order language L, a canonical-domain L-modelM is a canonical
domain dom(M) ∈ C ("the domain set") together with an extension drawn from the domain
set for each component of L’s signature, i.e.,
 for any constant-symbol ci,M supplies an element ai from the domain set, cMi .
 for any n-ary function-symbol fi,M supplies an n-ary function over the domain set,
fMi .
 for any n-ary relation symbol Ri,M supplies an n-ary relation over the domain set,
RMi .
Examples of canonical-domain models include each ofM1,M2, andM3 above. Further,
these last two now represent distinct models.
Having defined a collection of models over first-order languages, a model-theoretic
consequence relation immediately follows.
Definition 4.10 For a first-order language L, Γ ⊆ L, and ϕ ∈ L, ϕ is a canonical-domain
consequence of Γ, notated Γ |=C ϕ, if and only if every canonical-domain model which
makes Γ true also makes ϕ true.
This relation is equivalent to that induced by the standard definitions.
Proposition 4.10
Let L be a first-order language, Γ ⊆ L, and ϕ ∈ L. Then,
Γ |= ϕ if and only if Γ |=C ϕ.
The modified notion of model used here thus fails to introduce any change in the resulting
consequence relation. More generally, for any canonical-domain model there exists an
isomorphic first-order model and vice-versa; the difference between the two approaches is
restricted only to equivalence between models. In this area, the canonical-domain approach
recognizes strictly more distinctions than the standard construction as a direct result of
tracking distinct objects.
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The First-Order Atomic Confirmation Ranking
Given a first-order language L, a finite set of atomic canonical-domain models ΩL defined
over L, and evidence Σ ⊆ L consistent with ΩL, the first-order atomic confirmation account
supplies a unique degree of confirmation for every sentence in L.
Definition 4.11 For a first-order language L, finite set of canonical-domain models ΩL for
L, and evidence Σ ⊆ L consistent with ΩL, the first-order atomic confirmation ranking is
µL
Σ
(ϕ) =
|~ϕL,Σ|
|ΩL,Σ| .
Definition 4.12 For a first-order language L, finite set of canonical-domain models ΩL for
L, and evidence Σ ⊆ L consistent with ΩL, the comparative first-order atomic confirmation
ranking is
ϕ -L
Σ
ψ⇔ µL
Σ
(ϕ) ≤ µL
Σ
(ψ).
As with the propositional account, L together with a set of models ΩL for L straightfor-
wardly gives rise to the algebras FL = {~ϕΩL : ϕ ∈ L} and F +L = P(ΩL). Further, both
µL
Σ
and -L
Σ
may be unambiguously extended to F +L by setting
µL
Σ
(E) =
|E ∩ΩL,Σ|
|ΩL,Σ|
for any E ∈ F +L .
Just like finite atomic confirmation over propositional languages, finite atomic confir-
mation for first-order languages is not only probabilistic but Bayesian.
Proposition 4.11
Let L be a first-order language, ΩL a finite set of canonical-domain L-models defined
over L, and Σ ⊆ L a set of sentences consistent with ΩL. Then, µLΣ satisfies Kol-
mogorov’s probability axioms over F +L .
Corollary 4.1
Let L be a first-order language, ΩL a finite set of canonical-domain L-models defined
over L, and Σ ⊆ L a set of sentences consistent with ΩL. Then, for any ϕ consistent
with ΩL,Σ and any ψ,
µL
Σ
(ψ|ϕ) = µL
Σ∪{ϕ}(ψ).
The extension to first-order languages thus shifts none of the high-level properties of the
account.
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4.5.3 The Reemergence and Resolution of D’Alembert’s Riddle
As with the propositional account, the finite atomic confirmation ranking for first-order
languages exhibits a general sensitivity to interpreted language extensions. The move to a
first-order account alone thus blocks neither d’Alembert’s riddle itself nor the underlying
phenomenon. The move to a first-order account does, however, provide the resources for a
principled response.
The Reemergence of D’Alembert’s Riddle
The earlier discussion of interpreted propositional languages carries over almost verbatim
to the case of first-order languages. As earlier, we restrict our attention in this subsection
to model spaces ΩL that are composed entirely of L-models.
Definition 4.13 An interpreted first-order language L is a pair of a first-order language L
and a non-empty collection ΩL of canonical-domain L-models.
The notion of an interpreted language extension is likewise unchanged from the proposi-
tional account.
Definition 4.14 A first-order interpreted language L+ = 〈L+,ΩL+〉 extends a first-order
interpreted language L = 〈L,ΩL〉 if and only if L ⊆ L+ and for any model M+ in ΩL+ ,
M+|L ∈ ΩL.
Finally, the behavior of the atomic confirmation ranking with respect to different interpreted
languages can again be usefully characterized by restricting our attention to extensions.
Formalizing the small world example from the previous section establishes that the first-
order confirmation account is sensitive to extensions of the underlying interpreted language.
In this case, an empty signature is expanded by a single constant b.
Small World 1 Small World 2
M1 : {a0}
M2 : {a0, a1}
⇒
M′1 : {a0}
bM
′
1 = a0
M′2 : {a0, a1}
bM
′
2 = a0
M′3 : {a0, a1}
bM
′
3 = a1
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By adding a new constant b to the underlying first-order language, some object has been
(metaphorically) emblazoned with a special mark. Not only do the possibilities under con-
sideration shift in response but so too does the degree of confirmation attributed to the
sentence ∃!x(x = x).
Just as with the propositional case, extensions of interpreted first-order languages divide
into three general categories. Unrestricted extensions of an interpreted language impose no
restrictions on the extensions of the introduced symbols.
Definition 4.15 A first-order interpreted language L+ = 〈L+,ΩL+〉 is an unrestricted exten-
sion of a first-order interpreted language L = 〈L,ΩL〉 if and only if L+ is an extension of
L and ΩL+ contains every canonical-domain modelM+ satisfyingM+|L ∈ ΩL.
Unrestricted extensions thus occur when moving from a starting interpreted language L
to an interpreted language L+ with no accompanying limits on the resulting models. The
example below illustrates an unrestricted extension by a unary relation-symbol P:
M1 : {a0}
M2 : {a0, a1}
Unrestricted
Extension
⇒
M′1 : {a0}
PM
′
1 = {}
M′2 : {a0}
PM
′
2 = {a0}
M′3 : {a0, a1}
PM
′
3 = {}
M′4 : {a0, a1}
PM
′
4 = {a0}
M′5 : {a0, a1}
PM
′
5 = {a1}
M′6 : {a0, a1}
PM
′
6 = {a0, a1}
Note that the unrestricted language extension allows for models with every possible exten-
sion for P relative to the original model space. This kind of language extension corresponds
to the introduction of a new symbol with no antecedent connection to other parts of the lan-
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guage.
Unlike this first kind, a completely restricted extension of an interpreted language dic-
tates a unique extension for each added symbol.
Definition 4.16 An interpreted first-order language L+ = 〈L+,ΩL+〉 is a completely re-
stricted extension of a first-order interpreted language L = 〈L,ΩL〉 if and only if L+ is
an extension of L and for every canonical-domain modelM in ΩL, there exists a unique
canonical-domain modelM+ in ΩL+ such thatM+|L =M.
Thus, while we again transition from L to an extended language L+, the models of the
extended language are in complete agreement as to the extension of the new symbol(s):
M1 : {a0}
M2 : {a0, a1}
Completely
Restricted
Extension
⇒
M′′1 : {a0}
PM
′′
1 = {a0}
M′′2 : {a0, a1}
PM
′′
2 = {a0}
Informally, the meaning of the new symbols entirely determines what their extensions are.
We may, for example, imagine introducing a new symbol that picks out all and only that
object or which by definition picks out nothing at all.
The third and final kind of extension are those intermediate between unrestricted and
completely restricted.
Definition 4.17 An interpreted first-order language L+ = 〈L+,ΩL+〉 is a partially restricted
extension of an interpreted first-order language L = 〈L,ΩL〉 if and only if L+ is an exten-
sion of L and L+ is neither an unrestricted extension nor a completely restricted extension.
Extensions of this sort neither dictate a unique extension for the new symbols nor allow all
possible extensions. The meaning of the new symbols is partially restricted. Consider, for
example, adding a new predicate which must be non-empty.
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M1 : {a0}
M2 : {a0, a1}
Partially
Restricted
Extension
⇒
M′′1 : {a0}
PM
′′
1 = {a0}
M′′2 : {a0, a1}
PM
′′
2 = {a0}
M′′3 : {a0, a1}
PM
′′
3 = {a1}
M′′4 : {a0, a1}
PM
′′
4 = {a0, a1}
The extension of P is neither fixed nor allowed to vary freely.
As in the propositional case, completely restricted extensions of interpreted first-order
languages fix the atomic confirmation ranking.
Proposition 4.12
Let L be an interpreted first-order language, L+ a completely restricted extension of
L, and Σ ⊆ L. If ΩL,Σ is non-empty and finite, then for any A ∈ F +L ,
µL
Σ
(A) = µL
+
Σ
(A+)
where A+ = {M+ ∈ ΩL+ : M+|L ∈ A}.
If A = ~ϕΩL for some ϕ ∈ L above, we thus have µLΣ (ϕ) = µL
+
Σ
(ϕ). In the first-order case,
unrestricted extensions no longer need preserve the atomic confirmation ranking. Both the
example of an unrestricted extension provided earlier and the small world example illustrate
this. Only when restricted to a fixed domain is preservation guaranteed.
Proposition 4.13
Let L be a first-order interpreted language, L+ an unrestricted extension of L by a
finite number of symbols, and Σ ⊆ L. If every canonical-domain modelM ∈ ΩL has
the same domain and ΩL,Σ is both nonempty and finite, then for any set A ∈ F +L ,
µL
Σ
(A) = µL
+
Σ
(A+)
where A+ = {L+-modelsM+ ∈ ΩL+ : M+|L ∈ A}.
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Finally, partially restricted extensions only occasionally preserve the atomic confirmation
ranking. Examples here have the air of happenstance; multiple additions which alone would
produce a shift but when combined balance one another out. The atomic confirmation
ranking for first-order languages thus exhibits a widespread sensitivity to the particular
interpreted language used. D’Alembert’s riddle extends here too.
Resolving D’Alembert’s Riddle
The first-order atomic confirmation account endorses a widespread dependence between
confirmation and interpreted first-order languages. In the presentation of d’Alembert’s
riddle, this sort of dependence was cast as a severe loss. This subsection revisits the topic
from a first-order perspective and argues that (1) a unique collection of atomic models can,
in fact, be identified for any well-defined set of evidence and (2) confirmation ought to be
sensitive to the exact set of atomic models under consideration. Both components of this
defense derive from the interrelation of atomic canonical-domain models and properties.
By a ‘property’, I understand a feature of the world itself (as opposed to either an ex-
tension or a property-name). This is some bit of structure that is stamped into reality rather
than a product of oneself or a component of a useful model. Properties in this sense under-
write much of our talk of extensions but are not themselves only sets. I take it that upon
reflection it is obvious that properties permeate our world view. We really do think that
there are such things as being green, being gold, and being a father. These are something
independent of us and beyond mere collections of disparate objects. It is of course possible
to deny that this or that is a property in my intended sense. Regardless, the use of prop-
erties itself—like the use of truth or causation—is a tenacious practice, and I adopt it here
without further defense.
Properties are particularly important in the current framework because adopting a par-
ticular collection of canonical-domain models as atomic entails a corresponding position
on the number and kind of properties in the world. This interrelation between atomic mod-
els and properties is most prominent in unrestricted extensions of an interpreted first-order
language. Consider, for example, the unrestricted extension of an interpreted first-order
language L by a single unary relation-symbol P. The strictures on first-order languages re-
quire that P, once introduced, has a definite extension. In the case of a first-order language,
this is the extent of the change. Interpreted first-order languages, however, are equipped
with a collection of atomic models. An unrestricted interpreted language extension en-
tails not only a new symbol but also that P’s extension varies freely across the collection of
atomic models. Meaning alone does not determine when objects are in P and when they are
not. P’s extension must therefore be determined by the world itself. The relation-symbol
P corresponds to a property stamped into the possibilities under consideration. This unre-
stricted extension of an interpreted language has more likeness to suddenly being informed
that many of the objects which surround us are emblazoned with a glowing ‘P’ than to the
mere addition of a new symbol to our vocabulary.
These comments extend well beyond the example above. In every unrestricted exten-
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sion of an interpreted first-order language, the extensions of the introduced symbols cannot
by their very nature be attributed solely to the meanings of the symbols in question and
so too must correspond to properties. Partially restricted extensions of an interpreted first-
order language provide a mixed case. The extensions of symbols introduced in this manner
are partially determined by their connection to other parts of the language. Properties must
again be posited, however, in order to make up the shortfall between a partially determined
extension and a determinate one. Indeed, only completely restricted extensions of an inter-
preted first-order language need not invoke properties. In this case, the extensions of new
symbols are entirely determined by their relationship to other parts of the language. In the
current framework, changes in interpreted first-order languages thus generally accompany
revisions in the number and kind of properties accepted.
In light of this, the atomic confirmation ranking’s sensitivity to the particular inter-
preted first-order language adopted takes on a new significance. Since the only kind of
interpreted language extension which doesn’t introduce new properties likewise fixes the
atomic confirmation ranking, confirmation disagreements between an interpreted language
and some extension thereof reduce to a disagreement over properties. Noting that any two
first-order languages L and L′ can be viewed as extensions of a common language L− and
that this in turn is an extension of the language with no signature L∅, confirmation dis-
agreements between any two interpreted first-order languages must derive either from an
antecedent disagreement about how many objects there are (disagreement at the L∅ stage),
a disagreement over the meaning of their common symbols (disagreement at L− stage), or
a disagreement over properties (disagreement at the L, L′ stage). In all three cases, the
confirmation relation intuitively should vary between the two perspectives.
Dependence on the particular collection of atomic models adopted in the first-order
atomic confirmation account is thus necessary. Differences in these collections correspond
to divergent positions on the meaning of symbols, on the structure of the world itself,
or a combination of the two. The choice of atomic models is thus neither arbitrary nor
inconsequential. Different selections represent materially different views, and a precise
degree of confirmation requires as it were a precise question.
Returning to d’Alembert’s riddle, the two different solutions here are the result of two
contrasting views about the properties surrounding coins. The standard solution holds that
the world demands the equivalence of not landing heads and landing tails. In contrast,
d’Alembert’s proposal maintains that landing heads on the first toss necessitates no second
toss. These are two different pictures of the world and adopting one or the other naturally
shifts the degree of confirmation for a coin landing heads within two tosses. Intuitions
in this case are further complicated by the fact that both these solutions are absurd. Not
only are the models here clearly not atomic, but our explicit evidence demands neither the
equivalence of not landing heads and landing tails nor that landing heads on the first toss
necessitates no second toss. The interpreted language sensitivity displayed by d’Alembert’s
riddle is important but both proposed solutions to the riddle are inadequate.
The beginning of this section noted that first-order logic supposes that sets exhaust
all possible domains and from this a characterization of all atomic possibilities could be
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had. This characterization was then developed in the following subsection in the form of
canonical-domain models. Whatever the atomic structure of the world really is, there ex-
ists a corresponding canonical-domain model in some language. From this perspective,
adopting a particular collection of atomic models operates as a particular sort of evidence,
viz. that there are these properties and they are related like so. The standard solution
and d’Alembert’s proposal, for example, are naturally construed as making two different
assumptions about how the world is structured. Generalizing away from a particular col-
lection of atomic models is then only a matter of reversing course and including more
canonical-domain models for more first-order languages.
At the furthest extreme, we have the situation raised by d’Alembert’s riddle. Given only
a set of evidence Σ in some first-order language L, can we identify an objective collection
of atomic models? The answer is that we can. The collection we desire is the collection
of all canonical-domain models (for either L or an extension of L) that make Σ true. If the
collection of all canonical-domain models gives all atomic possibilities, then the collection
of all canonical-domain models consistent with Σ provides all atomic possibilities consis-
tent with the evidence Σ. As a result, the proposed account does not need to suppose that a
collection of atomic models is provided.
Finite Confirmation for First-Order Languages
Let L be a first-order language and Σ ⊆ L a consistent10 set of evidence.
(0) The collection of all canonical-domain models is an exhaustive collection of
atomic possibilities.
(1’) If ΩL is an exhaustive collection of atomic possibilities, then every possibility in
the subcollection ΩL,Σ is an equal possibility relative to ΩL and Σ.
(2’) For a finite, non-empty set of equal possibilities, the degree of confirmation for a
sentence ϕ is the number of equal possibilities which make ϕ true divided by the
total number of equal possibilities.
In the case where ΩL is the collection of all canonical-domain models, we will say that the
subcollection ΩL,Σ is the collection of equal possibilities relative only to Σ. Unless Σ itself
is quite restrictive, the result of failing to provide an interpreted first-order language is a
proliferation of atomic possibilities.
In the case of d’Alembert’s riddle, the collection of all atomic possibilities consistent
with the description of d’Alembert’s game contains models with both arbitrarily large do-
mains and arbitrarily many properties. Thus while d’Alembert’s challenge has been met,
10If ΩL is supplied, this is consistency with respect to ΩL. If ΩL is not supplied, this is first-order consis-
tency or, equivalently, consistency with respect to the collection of all canonical-domain models.
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the correct degree of confirmation for ‘the coin lands heads within two tosses’ requires an
extension of (2’) beyond finite sets of equal possibilities. This challenge is taken up in the
next chapter.
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Chapter 5
A Logical Theory of Confirmation
This chapter extends the account of confirmation proposed in Chapter 4 to infinite collec-
tions. The primary barrier here is Bertrand’s paradox, the last of our three objections to
confirmation. The first section begins with a review of well-known instances of Bertrand’s
paradox as well as proposed solutions. Comparing these with the standard analysis of the
paradox makes it clear, however, that commentators have systematically underestimated
the phenomenon in question. The final contribution of the first section is thus a revised
analysis of Bertrand’s paradox that significantly expands its scope.
Even under this revised analysis, however, Bertrand’s paradox fails to block accounts
of confirmation generally. The second section of this chapter develops an extension of
the finite confirmation account from chapter four that is both immune to the paradox and
satisfies a large number of intuitive properties. This solution to Bertrand’s paradox is, more-
over, maximal; any alternative account of confirmation either falls victim to the paradox or
is strictly weaker. Our discussion of confirmation ends with a return to absolute rankings
and an extension of the proposed account to support talk about degrees of confirmation.
5.1 Bertrand’s Paradox
Cataloged and popularized by Bertrand (1889), instances of Bertrand’s paradox first appear
in mathematics periodicals two decades earlier (Myrvold 2019). The most well known in-
stances of the paradox are Bertrand’s (1889) Circles and Chords, von Kries’ (1886) Specific
Volume and Density, von Mises’ (1957) Water and Wine, and most recently van Fraassen’s
(1989) The Mystery Cube Factory. After presenting each variant, we also review both stan-
dard solutions to and the standard analysis of the paradox. Ironically, it is only Bertrand’s
(1889) Circles and Chords which fails to conform to the standard analysis. In light of this
failure, a revised analysis of Bertrand’s paradox is presented and defended.
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5.1.1 Standard Instances of Bertrand’s Paradox
Circles and Chords
Although Bertrand presented his paradox in a number of different settings, his most well-
known formulation is geometric. Bertrand begins with an apparently well-defined question:
Given a circle of radius r, how likely is it that an arbitrary1 chord on this circle
will be longer2 than the side of an inscribed equilateral triangle?
A chord on a circle is a line segment each of whose endpoints lie on the circle; an example
is pictured in Figure 1 below. The side-length of the unique (up to rotation) equilateral
triangle which can be inscribed in a circle with radius r is
√
3r, pictured in Figure 2 below.
A
B
Figure 1
√
3r
O
r
r
2
Figure 2
Bertrand proposes three methods by which the desired likelihood could be found. Each
proposal leverages a small amount of geometry in order to characterize both all avail-
able chords and chords with length greater than
√
3r in a more intuitively tractable format.3
1In Bertrand’s original writings, he writes of taking a chord "au hasard" which is typically translated as "at
random". I have substituted ‘arbitrary’ instead to highlight the availability of several distinct interpretations
for both this challenge and the paradox that follows. If, for example, ‘arbitrary’ is interpreted as code for a
particular distribution of physical propensities, then the resulting paradox pertains to physical propensities of
this form. If ‘arbitrary’ is interpreted instead as shorthand for a particular distribution in the mathematical
theory of probability (e.g., the uniform distribution), then the paradox pertains to the mathematical theory
of probability. If ‘arbitrary’ is interpreted only as ruling out additional evidence about the chord selected,
then the paradox pertains to absolute confirmation. Contemporary philosophy recognizes both a number of
distinct notions of likelihood and a number of formal representations for these notions. Bertrand’s paradox
proper belongs to no single notion or formalism.
2Bertrand (1889) actually asks after chords shorter than the side of an inscribed equilateral triangle. Con-
temporary discussion of the paradox, however, almost exclusively concerns chords that are longer, and so I
too adopt this formulation of the paradox.
3Shackel (2007) and Rowbottom (2013) rightly observe that there is cause for worry with all three of
Bertrand’s proposals. Each of the proposed methods treats a subset of the available chords and then lifts
this treatment to the total space. No guarantee of the adequacy of such a method is ever explicitly provided,
and in some cases the operation is highly unintuitive, e.g., in the third method, the centerpoint of the circle
corresponds with uncountably many chords while other points correspond to only one (Rowbottom 2013).
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Circles and Chords - Distance from Origin to Chord Mid-
point
A chord AB is longer than
√
3r if and only if the distance
from the origin O to the midpoint of AB, labeled MAB in
Figure 3, is between 0 and r2 (compare with the inscribed
equilateral triangle in Figure 2). Since the length between
O and MAB can be anywhere in the interval [0, r], exactly
half of all the possible lengths result in a chord longer than√
3r. Since AB was arbitrary, a chord longer than
√
3r will
then occur with likelihood 12 !
A
O
MAB
B
Figure 3
A
B
O
θ
Figure 4
Circles and Chords - Angle from Tangent
For any point A, we can inscribe an equilateral triangle with
A itself as one of the triangle’s points. The endpoint B of
the chord is entirely determined by the angle θ between A
and the line tangent to the circle at A as in Figure 4. Since
the sides of the inscribed equilateral triangle occur at 60◦
and then again at 120◦ from the tangent, the chord AB is
longer than
√
3r if and only if θ is strictly between 60◦ and
120◦. Since θ can be drawn from anywhere in the interval
[0◦, 180◦), exactly one third of all possible angles result in a
chord longer than
√
3r. A chord longer than
√
3r will then
occur with likelihood 13 !
105
Circles and Chords - Area of Midpoint Regions
Just as above, a chord AB is longer than
√
3r if and only
if the distance from the origin O to the midpoint of AB is
less than r2 (compare with Figure 2). Since any point within
the circle C is the midpoint of some chord and only those
points within the smaller circle C′ of radius r2 are midpoints
of chords longer than
√
3r, we need only take the area of
C′ divided by the area of C:
Area(C′)
Area(C)
=
pi
( r
2
)2
pir2
=
1
4r
2
r2
=
1
4
.
A chord longer than
√
3r will then occur with likelihood 14 !
A
O
B
r
2
MAB
Figure 5
Each of Bertrand’s proposed methods thus generates a distinct value. Since the re-
quested likelihood cannot be simultaneously 12 ,
1
3 , and
1
4 , at most one of these methods is
legitimate.
Specific Volume and Density
The German logician von Kries offers his own variant of the paradox. Unlike Bertrand,
von Kries (1886) formulates the paradox using two intrinsic properties of matter: specific
volume and density. The density of an object is the ratio of the object’s mass to its volume;
the specific volume of an object meanwhile is the ratio of its volume to its mass. Consider
then the following two cases:
Specific Volume and Density - Specific Volume
A substance is presented which is known only to have specific volume between
1 and 3. How likely is it that the substance’s specific volume is between 1 and
2? How likely is it that the substance’s specific volume is between 2 and 3?
The intuitive answer is that the requested intervals each represent half of the total collec-
tion of possibilities—the entire [1, 3] interval—and so the desired likelihoods are each 12 .
Consider now a similar situation with density:
Specific Volume and Density - Density
A substance is presented which is known only to have density between 13 and
1. How likely is it that the substance’s density is between 13 and
2
3? How likely
is it that the substance’s density is between 23 and 1?
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Again, the intuitive answer is that the requested intervals each represent half of all possible
density values—in this case, the interval [13 , 1]—and so the desired likelihoods are both
again 12 . Finally, note that the density of a substance is simply the reciprocal of its specific
volume. Thus, if the substance has specific volume v, it necessarily has density 1v . The
two situations described above are thus equivalent to one another, and the intuitive answers
supplied should cohere. Supposing that there is a non-zero likelihood for any possible in-
terval, these answers are instead inconsistent. If a specific volume between 1 and 2 has
likelihood 12 , then so too must a density between
1
2 and 1. This is only consistent with den-
sities between 23 and 1 also having likelihood
1
2 however if densities between
1
2 and
2
3 have
likelihood zero—which is intuitively not the case. Despite the correspondence between
specific volume and density, the intuitive solution thus shifts based on which property of
the substance is emphasized.
The contradictory commitments here can be made more obvious with a minor modifica-
tion to the original puzzle. Consider again the specific volume formulation of the paradox,
only instead we desire the likelihood that this lies in the interval [1, 32 ]. Since the specific
volume must be drawn from [1, 3], the requested likelihood is intuitively 14 . A density be-
tween [ 23 , 1] meanwhile intuitively makes up
1
2 the total space of available densities, [
1
3 , 1].
Since specific volumes in [1, 32 ] correspond to densities in [
2
3 , 1], the same possibility has
been assigned both likelihood 14 and
1
2—a contradiction.
Water and Wine
Richard von Mises (1957) offers the following variation:
Water and Wine - Water/Wine
A glass is presented which contains a mixture of water and wine. It is known
only that the glass contains at least as much water as wine and at most twice as
much water as wine, i.e., the proportion waterwine is in [1, 2]. How likely is it that
the ratio of water to wine is between 1 and 32? How likely is it that the ratio of
water to wine is between 32 and 2?
The intuitive answer is that the requested intervals each represent half of the total collec-
tion of possibilities—the entire [1, 2] interval—and so the desired likelihoods are each 12 .
Consider now the exact same situation only rephrased in terms of the ratio of wine to water:
Wine and Water - Wine/Water
A glass is presented which contains a mixture of water and wine. It is known
only that the glass contains at least half as much wine as water and no more
than an even mix, i.e., the proportion winewater is in [
1
2 , 1]. How likely is it that
the ratio of wine to water is between 12 and
3
4? How likely is it that the ratio of
wine to water is between 34 and 1?
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Again, the intuitive answer is that the requested intervals each represent half of all possible
values—in this case, the interval [12 , 1]—and so the desired likelihoods are both again
1
2 .
Finally, observe that water to wine ratios are just the reciprocals of wine to water ratios
and vice-versa. If we suppose, as von Mises (1957) appears to,4 that there is a non-zero
likelihood for any possible interval, then the intuitive answers in the two cases above are
inconsistent with one another. A water to wine ratio between 1 and 32 is a wine to water
ratio between 23 and 1; this is only consistent with our second set of responses if wine to
water ratios between 23 and
3
4 are assigned likelihood zero.
A more direct contradiction can be established by asking after water and wine mixtures
in the interval [1, 43 ]. Since the mixture must lie somewhere within [1, 2], the likelihood of
a mixture in [1, 43 ] is intuitively
1
3 . Considering instead ratios of wine to water, all values
in [12 , 1] are possible. The likelihood that the wine to water ratio is in [
3
4 , 1] is intuitively
1
2 . Since water to wine ratios and wine to water ratios are reciprocals, the two intuitive
solutions of 13 and
1
2 directly contradict one another.
The Mystery Cube Factory
The best-known instance of Bertrand’s paradox is The Mystery Cube Factory first elabo-
rated by van Fraassen (1989):
The Mystery Cube Factory - Length.
A factory produces perfect cubes with side-length ≤ 2 cm. Given this, how
likely is it that a cube produced by this factory has side-length ≤ 1 cm?
The expected answer is that the requested value is 12 . If cubes may have any side-length less
than 2 cm, then those side-lengths less than 1 cm intuitively make up half the total interval.
Side-Lengths
0 1 2
Of course, the description in terms of side-length above isn’t necessary; the mystery cubes
at issue also have areas, volumes, and so forth. Consider a similar question then with area
instead of side-length:
The Mystery Cube Factory - Area.
A factory produces perfect cubes with faces whose areas are ≤ 4 cm2. Given
this, how likely is it that a cube produced by this factory has a face with area
≤ 1 cm2?
4Richard von Mises (1957) claims that the intuitive attributions themselves are inconsistent; this is not
the case. In von Mises’ defense, proponents of (POI) are committed to a number of premises sufficient for a
contradiction at this point.
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The intuitive answer is now that the requested likelihood is 14 . If cubes may have any area
less than 4 cm2, then those with area less than 1 cm2 intuitively make up a quarter of all
possibilities.
Face-Areas
0 41
The paradox is sealed by noticing that a cube with side-length less than 2 cm is a cube
whose faces have area less than 4 cm2. Similarly, a cube with side-length less than 1 cm
is a cube whose faces have area less than 1 cm2. The intuitive answers of 12 and
1
4 are thus
inconsistent.
5.1.2 Standard Solutions to Bertrand’s Paradox
Solutions to Bertrand’s paradox have been largely skeptical in nature. Bertrand (1889)
endorsed this reaction, writing:
Among these three answers, which one is proper? None of the three is incor-
rect, none is correct, the question is ill-posed. (5)
While Bertrand ultimately favored a move to finitism, most commentators have embraced
a less radical proposal. In so far as there exists a standard solution to the paradox, this so-
lution holds that selecting a chord "au hasard" is simply ambiguous. For a definite solution
to be identified, a more precise description of the desired procedure is required. Marinoff
(1994) provides a well-known, contemporary instance of this line though similar sentiments
were expressed by both Borel and Poincaré5 decades earlier (Keynes 1921, 52-53).
This standard response successfully resolves the paradox from the perspective of con-
temporary probability theory but affords little protection to theories of confirmation. Even
if the standard response is correct about the ambiguity of ‘au hasard’, theories of confir-
mation claim to transform evidence—even ambiguous evidence—into a rigorous, objective
measure of evidential support. The purported ambiguity in Bertrand’s question ought then
be no special barrier, and a single, correct degree of confirmation is still owed. By their very
nature, theories of confirmation cannot make use of the standard response to Bertrand’s
paradox.
5Contra van Fraassen (1989), neither Jaynes (1973) nor Poincaré (1923) fall easily into the group of those
"who believed that the Principle of Indifference could be refined and sophisticated, and thus saved from
paradox" (306). Both authors explicitly recognized not only the shortcomings of their invariance criteria but
also the tension between their response and the principle of indifference.
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The Invariance Program
The best-known strategy for identifying a unique solution to an instance of Bertrand’s para-
dox rests on invariance. This strategy originates with Poincaré’s (1923) observation that
there exists a unique probability density function on the xy plane,
p(x, y) = (x2 + y2)−
3
2 ,
which is invariant under both rotations and translations (Kendall and Morán 1963, 14-16).
Poincaré himself appears to have read relatively little into this result; Bertrand did not, after
all, stipulate invariance under rotation and translation of the xy plane as a part of Circles
and Chords. Two decades later, Jeffreys (1967, 99-107) made a similar observation in the
context of Specific Volume and Density. For a positive, real-valued parameter x, setting
p(x) ∝ 1
x
gives a prior density function invariant (up to the choice of a constant) under power trans-
formations. Unlike Poincaré, however, Jeffreys regarded this family of improper6 priors as
objectively correct.
Jeffreys’ (1967) discussion here has proven influential. The basis of Specific Volume
and Density is the observation that if one has no information about specific volumes, then
one likewise has no information about densities. The true "uninformative" prior ought then
to be preserved by the transformation T : (0,∞) → (0,∞) defined by T (x) = x−1. Further,
there is nothing special here about the exponent −1. Any power transformation T (x) = xβ
for β ∈ R − {0} provides a well-behaved, bijective map from (0,∞) to (0,∞). Accordingly,
the "uninformative" prior over (0,∞) must be preserved under power transformations gen-
erally. Since p(x) ∝ 1x is the only prior distribution over (0,∞) invariant under all power
transformations, this must then be the correct "uninformative" distribution.
Bertrand’s paradox is thus a product of the mistaken assumption—sometimes dubbed
"Bayes’ Postulate"—that the uniform distribution is the "uninformative" distribution. Jef-
freys contends instead that the correct representation of complete ignorance varies depend-
ing on the nature of the parameter under consideration. The uniform distribution is, for in-
stance, the correct representation of complete uncertainty over a finite space while p(x) = 1x
is the correct representation over (0,∞). By carefully considering invariance properties, we
may identify the "uninformative" distribution for still further cases. Jeffreys (1967) thus in-
troduced the search for invariant or uninformative priors into the foundations of Bayesian
statistics, arguing that Bertrand’s paradox could be resolved simply by identifying the ap-
propriate "uninformative" distribution for each kind of parameter.
6An improper prior is a measure µ which is not normalized, i.e., does not set µ(Ω) = 1. In many cases,
such a function will still produce a posterior probability function despite the lack of normalization in the
prior. In these circumstances, the resulting posterior probability function is fixed for any proportional prior
function. This is the apparent basis for Jeffreys’ lack of concern over endorsing a family of proportional
priors instead of a single unique prior.
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Jeffreys’ argument for p(x) ∝ 1x is insufficient as stated. Power transformations are
not the only well-behaved, bijective maps from (0,∞) to (0,∞), and it is easy to construct
examples for which Jeffreys "uninformative" prior over (0,∞) is not invariant.7 Consider,
for instance,
T (x) =
{
x x ∈ (0, 1)
2x − 1 otherwise
which shifts the density function over [1,∞):
1
T (x)
dT (x) =
2
2x − 1 dx
6∝ 1
x
dx.
The disagreement here is not restricted to only the form of the probability density function.
The weight ascribed to the interval [1, 2], for example, shifts under the transformation T :∫ 2
1
1
x
dx = ln(2)
≈ .693
while ∫ 2
1
1
T (x)
dT (x) =
∫ 2
1
2
2x − 1 dx
= ln(3)
≈ 1.099.
If Jeffreys’ solution to Bertrand’s paradox is to succeed, a principled reason for restricting
the invariance requirement to only power transformations is required.
For his part, Jeffreys does appear to attempt such a justification:
The point may be put in another way. If a parameter v is a dimensional mag-
nitude and not a number, and we want to assess P(dv|H), where H contains
no information about v except that it is positive, this can only be of the form
Avn dv where A and n are constants. For the ratio of two probabilities must
be a number, which would not be satisfied if we took the first factor, say, as
sin v—the sine of a length means nothing. Nor could it be e−
v
a , where a is
some constant of the same dimensions as v. For then it would assign a definite
value to the ratio of the probabilities that v is less or greater than a. If, then,
a is known, it contradicts the condition that we know nothing about v except
its existence and that it lies between 0 and +∞...The coefficient of dv must be
7As Robert et al. (2009) observes, Jeffreys appears to recognize this in a subsequent paragraph but main-
tains that p(x) ∝ 1x is nevertheless better than the Bayes-Laplace rule. This sudden pragmatic turn is both at
odds with his explicitly objective conception of probability and typical of Jeffreys’ work.
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something that involves no magnitude other than v, and if v is dimensional this
can be satisfied only by a power of v. (Jeffreys 1967, 105)
In order to narrow the admissible probability density functions, Jeffreys appeals to a pair
of criteria:
 The probability density function must be positive.
 For any a ∈ (0,∞), the probabilities of (0, a) and (a,∞) ought to be infinite.
While the first of these is axiomatic, the second represents an additional appeal to intu-
ition. A truly "uninformative" prior, according to Jeffreys, would avoid assigning definitive
weights to (0, a) and (a,∞) for any a ∈ (0,∞) since we don’t actually know how the two
intervals compare to one another. Even if we accept these criteria, they do not—contra
Jeffreys’ suggestion in the quote above—suffice to fix a probability density function of the
form Axn dx. The (improper) probability density function pT : (0,∞) → [0,∞) derived
above provides a ready counterexample:
pT (x) =
{ 1
x x ∈ (0, 1)
2
2x−1 otherwise.
It is easy to verify that pT meets both criteria yet is not of the form Axn dx. Jeffreys’
justification for considering only power transformations thus fails.
Indeed, the introduction of further intuitive requirements on "uninformative" priors only
serves to worsen Jeffreys’ situation. For all the intuitive appeal of Jeffreys’ new constraint,
it is again unclear why this restriction should not generalize beyond the bounds he provides,
viz. intervals of the form (0, a) and (a,∞). Given complete ignorance about x ∈ (0,∞), is it
not equally illicit to adopt determinate weights for two disjoint intervals [a, b] and [a′, b′]?
or, as Milne (1983) observes, to declare that the probability of (0, a) is infinite while [a, b]
is finite? If we are truly ignorant, should we not avoid a determinate assignment to even
singletons {a} and {a′}? Just as with his initial appeal to invariance, taking Jeffreys new
constraint seriously quickly threatens to deliver a set of restrictions which rules out all non-
trivial measures. For all its intuitive appeal, Jeffreys’ invariance program cannot succeed
without serious modification.
Jeffreys’ program was revived by Jaynes (1973) who not only extended the account to
Circles and Chords but more importantly provided a new criteria for when invariance under
a transformation was and was not required. Unlike Jeffreys, Jaynes relativized the choice
of distribution not to the kind of parameter considered but rather to the problem posed.
Jaynes held that problems themselves are resilient to certain transformations and so require
solutions that are likewise invariant (Jaynes 1973; Rosenkrantz 1977). In the case of Circles
and Chords, Bertrand does not bother, for example, to fix a particular orientation for the
circle, nor a particular size, nor a particular spatial location. The problem itself is invariant
under these transformations. Jaynes concludes that the desired likelihood must also be
unaffected. That is, our reasoning in Circles and Chords ought also to be invariant under
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rotations, scale transformations, and translations. This inference from problem invariance
to solution invariance has, as Jaynes observes, significant intuitive appeal. Anyone who
proposes that the correct likelihood for Circles and Chords depends on the time of day or
color of the circle is clearly to be ignored. The only novelty here is in recognizing that a
number of mathematical transformations ought to be similarly irrelevant.
Specifying chords by the polar coordinates (d, θ) of their midpoint, Jaynes (1973) shows
that requiring invariance under rotations, scale transformations, and translations suffices to
uniquely determine a probability density function for Circles and Chords:
p(d, θ) =
1
2pird
for 0 ≤ d ≤ r and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 2pi. In fact, the requirement of translation invariance alone
suffices to determine this probability density function (Jaynes 1973). Solving with respect
to p(d, θ) identifies the correct likelihood as 12 in agreement with Bertrand’s first method,
Distance from Chord Midpoint to Origin.
Jaynes’ account readily extends to Specific Volume and Density and arguably to The
Mystery Cube Factory as well. The key insight in both cases is that measuring physical
quantities is often arbitrary in particular respects, and so both the problem and solution in
such cases ought to be invariant along these same dimensions. The basics of this insight
date to at least Keynes (1921, 50-51):
The objective quality measured may not, strictly speaking, possess numerical
quantitativeness, although it has the properties necessary for measurement by
means of correlation with numbers. The values which it can assume may be
capable of being ranged in an order, and it will sometimes happen that the se-
ries which is thus formed is continuous, so that a value can always be found
whose order in the series is between any two selected values; but it does not
follow from this that there is any meaning in the assertion that one value is
twice another value. The relations of continuous order can exist between the
terms of a series of values, without the relations of numerical quantitativeness
necessarily existing also, and in such cases we can adopt a largely arbitrary
measure of the successive terms, which yields results which may be satisfac-
tory for many purposes, those, for instance, of mathematical physics, though
not for those of probability.
A full response would nevertheless wait until Rosenkrantz (1977) and van Fraassen (1989).
Each of length, area, mass, and volume are equipped with a greatest lower bound or
"natural zero" as well as an appropriate "addition" operation ◦. Taking length as an exam-
ple, all values are at least as large as a single mark acting as both beginning and end. Any
acceptable scale for lengths thus has a unique "zero" point. Lengths are similarly equipped
with a salient "addition" operation ◦ by placing quantities end to end:
a ◦ aa
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Following Krantz et al. (1971), these two characteristics suffice to fix real-valued measure-
ment of a quantity up to choice of a unit. For all its formal sophistication, this point is
readily apparent in the joint acceptability of measuring lengths in centimeters, inches, feet,
and so forth; different scales which are all related by a constant factor α. More generally,
length, area, mass, and volume are standard examples of quantities which admit of a ratio
scale, a system of measurement m such that all and only similarity transformations,
T (m(x)) = αm(x)
for α > 0, produce a satisfactory measure.
Since all the physical quantities in both Specific Volume and Density and The Mystery
Cube Factory are only fixed up to a choice of unit, the solution to each ought to be invariant
under similarity transformations:
Similarity Invariance. For any transformation T (x) = αx with α > 0, the likelihood
of a value in Ic,d relative to a larger interval Ia,b is equal to the likelihood of a value in
IT (c),T (d) relative to the larger interval IT (a),T (b).
As the following argument shows, this requirement suffices to almost uniquely determine a
solution:
Consider Ia,b = (0,∞) and thus IT (a),T (b) = (0,∞). Supposing that a continuous
probability density function f exists for x and a continuous probability density
function fT exists for T (x), the probability of an -interval dx is
p(dx) = f (x) dx
while the probability of an -interval dT (x) is
p(dT (x)) = fT (T (x)) dT (x)
= α fT (αx) dx.
Since x ∈ dx if and only if T (x) ∈ d(T (x)),
f (x) = α fT (αx).
By Similarity Invariance over Ia,b = IT (a),T (b) = (0,∞), f and fT must be equiv-
alent over every subinterval of (0,∞), and thus f and fT must be the same
function. It follows immediately that
f (x) = α f (αx)
for any α > 0. This is uniquely satisfied by
f (x) ∝ 1
x
.
Requiring invariance under similarity transformations thus determines a prior over (0,∞)
up to a choice of a constant.
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Restricting this prior to a particular interval Ia,b ⊂ (0,∞) with a > 0, this choice of
constant is determined by normality. The correct prior pIa,b over an interval Ia,b is thus the
log-uniform density:
pIa,b(x) =
( 1
ln(b) − ln(a)
)1
x
.
The probability of a subinterval Ic,d relative to a larger interval Ia,b ⊂ (0,∞) is then
pIa,b(Ic,d) =
ln(d) − ln(c)
ln(b) − ln(a) .
Similarity Invariance thus fixes a unique class of improper probability density functions
over (0,∞). Requiring normality over an interval Ia,b ⊂ (0,∞) with a > 0 then determines
a unique function from this class.
Using the log-uniform density function with Specific Volume and Density, the probabil-
ity of a specific volume in [1, 32 ] from a total space of [1, 3] is
p[1,3]([1, 32 ]) =
ln( 32 ) − ln(1)
ln(3) − ln(1)
=
ln(3) − ln(2)
ln(3)
≈ .369.
Meanwhile, the probability of a density in [23 , 1] from a total space of [
1
3 , 1] is
p[ 13 ,1]
(
[23 , 1]
)
=
ln(1) − ln( 23 )
ln(1) − ln( 13 )
=
ln(3) − ln(2)
ln(3)
≈ .369.
The contradiction underlying Specific Volume and Density thus disappears when the log-
uniform density is used. Despite their differences, Jaynes’ approach to invariance resolves
the paradox and identifies Jeffreys’ proposal as the unique solution.
Applying the same procedure to The Mystery Cube Factory is complicated by the fact
that 1x diverges at 0 and leaves
∫ a
0
1
x dx undefined for any a ∈ (0,∞). If we consider instead
cubes with side-lengths in Ia,b ⊂ (0,∞) with a > 0, however, it is easy to verify that the
log-uniform density again provides consistent probabilities after reformulation in terms of
face-areas. More generally, for any Ia,b ⊂ (0,∞) with a > 0, adopting the log-uniform
density provides invariant probabilities under any transformation
T (x) = αxβ
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for α > 0 and β ∈ R − {0} since
pIT (a),T (b)(IT (c),T (d)) =
ln(αdβ) − ln(αcβ)
ln(αbβ) − ln(αaβ)
=
β ln(d) + α − β ln(c) − α
β ln(b) + α − β ln(a) − α
=
ln(d) − ln(c)
ln(b) − ln(a)
= pIa,b(Ic,d).
While p(x) ∝ 1x is only invariant up to the choice of a constant for power transformations,
adopting the normalized prior proportional to 1x for a specific interval Ia,b ⊂ (0,∞) with
a > 0 fixes the assigned probabilities under power transformations generally. While these
probability density functions are not invariant simpliciter under power transformations, the
probabilities they deliver relative to a specific interval Ia,b ⊂ (0,∞) with a > 0 are.
As Milne (1983) notes, the sudden concordance here between invariance under similar-
ity transformations and invariance under power transformations has the air of happenstance.
It seems a cosmic coincidence that the invariance requirement introduced by measurement
also forces probabilistic invariance under the power transformations used by both Specific
Volume and Density and The Mystery Cube Factory. Drawing on Ellis (1960), Milne pro-
poses that this is due to an oversight in the foregoing analysis. While a "natural zero" and
an intuitive "addition" operation suffice to fix measurement up to similarity, it does not
follow that all measurement systems are thereby exhausted. Natural zeros and intuitive ad-
dition operations are suggestions rather than mandates. Though undoubtedly odd, it is also
legitimate for example to ‘add’ lengths at 90◦ angles with the diagonal as the sum:
a
a ◦ a a ◦ a ◦ a
Setting a as 1 inch, Ellis shows that a length of x inches corresponds to a length of
√
x
diagonal inches or ‘dinches’ (Ellis 1960, 45). While not a similarity transformation of
the usual measurement scheme, dinches are nevertheless a legitimate method of measuring
length.
Specific Volume and Density and The Mystery Cube Factory thus require a prior which
is invariant under not only similarity transformations but also alternative measurement
schemes like Ellis’ dinches. Since dinches make use of the transformation T (x) = x
1
2 ,
invariance is presumably required for power transformations in addition to similarity trans-
formations. While requiring invariance over both power and similarity transformations
leaves only trivial measures, Milne (1983) shows that weakening the invariance criteria to
invariance up to a constant factor allows us to again establish p(x) ∝ 1x as the desired class
of priors over (0,∞).
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The invariance strategy thus claims a number of successes. Plausible solutions have
been identified for not only Bertrand’s Circles and Chords but also both Specific Vol-
ume and Density and The Mystery Cube Factory. Further, while the underlying measure-
theoretic justification does not apply, simply adopting the log-uniform distribution in Wine
and Water does again provide an invariant solution. As a result, Jeffreys’ (1967) proposal
to resolve Bertrand’s paradox by identifying an appropriately invariant prior has dominated
attempts to provide an objective solution, especially in light of Jaynes’ (1973) suggested
relativization to problems.
The Inadequacy of Invariance
Despite these successes, the invariance approach to Bertrand’s paradox has ultimately
proven inadequate. In general, invariance criteria need deliver neither a unique solution
to an instance of Bertrand’s paradox nor any solution at all. The resolutions cited above
are happy accidents, cases when salient invariance criteria happen to align with a particular
transformation from one parameterization to another. In general, these need not agree and
so the invariance program does not provide a general resolution of Bertrand’s paradox.
A simple modification of Wine and Water apparently due to Milne (1983) demonstrates
the program’s shortcomings. Milne asks after not just the proportion of wine to water and
water to wine, but also the fraction of the total solution made up by wine:
Water and Wine - Wine/(Wine+Water)
A glass is presented which contains a mixture of water and wine. It is known
only that the glass contains at least half as much wine as water and no more
than an even mix, i.e., the fraction of wine in the glass winewine+water is in [
1
3 ,
1
2 ].
How likely is it that the ratio of water to wine is in [37 ,
1
2 ]?
While the log-uniform distribution provides consistent probabilities in both Water and Wine
- Wine/Water and Water and Wine - Wine/Water, the shift to the fraction of wine relative
to the whole reintroduces the paradox. This is, of course, because the transformation in
question—T (x) = xx+1—is not of the form αx
β for α > 0 and β ∈ R−{0}. Further, if we now
add probabilistic invariance under T (x) = xx+1 to our list of demands, the only solutions are
trivial measures.
More generally, the invariance program never truly escaped the original criticism laid
against Jeffreys. No non-trivial prior is invariant under all transformations, and so the
invariance program must justify restricting our attention to only a particular set of transfor-
mations. Jaynes’ proposal to relativize invariance criteria to problems only disguises this
difficulty by emphasizing the particular transformation or transformations provided in the
problem. Inconsistency is nevertheless guaranteed under some bijective transformation,
and so the paradox can always be reintroduced by specifying an additional transformation.
In the end, neither Jeffreys nor Jaynes nor their later proponents provide a compelling rea-
son for restricting the transformations we consider. As a result, proving that this or that
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set of transformations suffices to eliminate all or almost all priors is entirely irrelevant. No
non-trivial measure is invariant under all acceptable transformations.
5.1.3 The Standard Analysis of Bertrand’s Paradox
Discussion of Bertrand’s paradox has largely focused on resolving particular instances
rather than characterizing the underlying phenomenon. One of the few commentators to
diverge from this trend is Keynes (1921, 52):
In general, if x and f (x) are both continuous variables, varying always in the
same or in the opposite sense, and x must lie between a and b, then the prob-
ability that x lies between c and d, where a < c < d < b, seems to be d−cb−a ,
and the probability that f (x) lies between f (c) and f (d) seems to be f (d)− f (c)f (b)− f (a) .
These expressions, which represent the probabilities of necessarily concordant
conclusions, are not, as they ought to be, equal.
Nearly a century later, Bangu (2009, 31) provides a nearly identical analysis:
One begins with a variable x uniformly distributed in an interval [a, b] and then
one considers a scaling transformation θ such that x′ = θ(x). For a fixed value
c such that a ≤ c ≤ b, two questions (or ‘problems’, as Bertrand calls them)
are formulated:
Q1: What is p1 = P(x ∈ [c, b], if x is random in [a, b])?
Q2: What is p2 = P(x′ ∈ [c′, b′], if x′ is random in [a′, b′])?
These two questions are said to be ‘identical’, so they should receive the same
answer. However, if we calculate the probabilities using [the principle of in-
difference] (and the standard Lebesgue measure of the intervals), we notice
that p1 = |b − c|/|b − a| is different from p2 = |b′ − c′|/|b′ − a′|, for many
transformations θ, and values of a, b and c.
Though less explicit, Jeffreys (1967), Rosenkrantz (1977, 1981), Gillies (2000), Mikkelson
(2004), and Howson and Urbach (2006) all sketch similar accounts.
Let Ia,b denote an interval from R of the form [a, b], [a, b), (a, b], or (a, b) with a < b.
The common core for these accounts can be summarized as:
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Standard Analysis of Bertrand’s Paradox:
Every instance of Bertrand’s paradox invokes a space of possibilities Ω and an event
E ⊆ Ω together with
(i) a bijection g : Ω→ Ia,b such that g[E] = Ic,d and
(ii) a bijection f : Ia,b → I f (a), f (b) (or I f (b), f (a)) such that f [Ic,d] = I f (c), f (d) (or I f (d), f (c))
where
(iii) |d−c||b−a| ,
| f (d)− f (c)|
| f (b)− f (a)| .
Further, in so far as this structure clearly obtains, we likewise have an intuitive instance of
Bertrand’s paradox.
E ⊆ Ω
g f ◦ g
a bc d f (b)f (a) f (d)f (c)
f
On this analysis, the paradox is induced by representing the space of possibilities8 Ω in
terms of two intervals Ia,b and I f (a), f (b) wherein some single event E—represented by the
two subintervals Ic,d and I f (c), f (d)—receives two different "sizes", namely |d−c||b−a| and
| f (d)− f (c)|
| f (b)− f (a)| .
Applying the analysis to the The Mystery Cube Factory, the space of possibilities Ω is
the set of cubes which can be produced by the factory, viz. cubes with side-length ≤ 2 cm
and face-area ≤ 4 cm2. The event E in question is then the desired subset of these cubes,
viz. cubes with side-length ≤ 1 cm and face-area ≤ 1 cm2. Note that both sets are well
defined. Problems arise, however, when this space and event are viewed under two intuitive
bijections, g and f ◦ g. The first of these bijections, g, maps the set of possible cubes to
their side-lengths in [0, 2]. The second bijection, f ◦ g, maps the set of possible cubes to
their face-areas in [0, 4]. To complete the diagram, note that side-lengths and face-areas are
themselves related by an intuitive bijection f (x) = x2. Finally, the size of E relative to all
possible cubes varies depending on which of g and f ◦ g is used, satisfying condition (iii)
of the standard analysis.
8The existence of a well-defined set of possibilities (or sample space) is sometimes missed by commen-
tators, e.g., Pettigrew (2016). Nevertheless, this is a key part of the paradox. A situation wherein different
likelihoods are ascribed over different sets of possibilities is unremarkable; the contradictory solutions are
troubling precisely because the underlying space and event are fixed.
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As Rowbottom and Shackel (2010) have also observed, Circles and Chords does not
conform to the standard analysis.9 Of his three methods, only Bertrand’s last—Area of
Midpoint Regions—appears to supply a bijection between the set of all possible chords
and another space. This other space, however, is R2 not R, and Bertrand uses relative area
rather than relative interval length to generate the associated likelihood. To make matters
still more complicated, there is only the appearance of a bijection here because, while any
point in a circle besides the center is the midpoint of a unique chord, the center of a circle is
the midpoint for uncountably many chords. Even if we emphasize appearance and overlook
this failure to construct a bijection, Bertrand’s third method still breaks with the standard
analysis by using R2 rather than R.
Bertrand’s first and second methods retain the use of intervals on R but drop all pretense
of a bijection with the set of all chords. Bertrand’s first method, Distance from Origin to
Chord Midpoint, appears to partition the set of all chords Ω and then supplies a collection
of bijections from the parts of this partition which not only all map into the same interval
but which also all send their share of chords longer than
√
3r to the same subinterval.
E ⊆ Ω
gi gi′ g j. . .
. . .
a bc d
Two chords A1B1 and A2B2 share a part in the apparent partition if and only if they are
parallel and their midpoints lie along the same radius. As Bertrand observes, the distance
of a chord’s midpoint from the center of the circle defines a natural bijection between any
single part in this partition and the interval [0, r]. Finally, chords from any part are longer
than
√
3r if and only if they fall into [0, r2 ) under their associated bijection. The likelihood
of a chord longer than
√
3r with respect to any part is thus 12 . Since this result holds for
every part, the overall likelihood of a chord longer than
√
3r is also 12 .
Bertrand’s second method, Angle from Tangent, has a parallel structure. Fix a point A∗
on the circle. An apparent partition of the set of all chords can now be had by placing two
chords A1B1 and A2B2 in the same part if and only if for a particular rotation T , there exists
B∗1 and B
∗
2 such that T (A∗B
∗
1) = A1B1 and T (A
∗B∗2) = A2B2.
9While it is possible to construct a superficially similar situation which does fit, Bertrand clearly makes use
of premises which deviate from those of the standard analysis. Since paradoxes (or instances of paradoxes)
are individuated in part by their premises, constructing clever bijections cannot save the standard analysis
here. It is important not that (i)-(iii) could be satisfied for Ω and E but rather that (i)-(iii) are the premises
which lead to paradox.
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A∗
B∗1A1
B1
T
Each part is then generated by taking the chords with A∗ as an endpoint and rotating by
some fixed amount. Since the set of chords with A∗ as an endpoint can be put into bijection
with the interval [0◦, 180◦) using the degree θ from the tangent at A∗, every part in this
partition can likewise be put into bijection with [0◦, 180◦) by the same process. Finally,
chords from any part are longer than
√
3r if and only if they fall into (60◦, 120◦) under their
associated bijection. The likelihood of a chord longer than
√
3r with respect to any part is
thus 13 . Since this result holds for every part, the overall likelihood of a chord longer than√
3r is also 13 .
Despite their intuitive appeal, both arguments follow Bertrand’s third method in playing
fast and loose with chords which run through the center of the circle. The "partitions"
defined for both the first and second methods are no such thing (Shackel 2007; Rowbottom
2013). Fix a chord AB which intersects the center of the circle. For the construction used
in the first method, note that there are two distinct radii which both intersect the midpoint
of AB and are perpendicular to AB, viz. one in each direction. It follows immediately
that chords perpendicular to each radius share a "part" with AB but not with each other. It
follows immediately that the apparent partition underlying the first method is ill-defined.10
For the second method, the failure of the apparent partition can be demonstrated by
taking the "part" consisting of all chords with A as an endpoint and rotating 180◦. In most
cases, this rotation behaves as intended and produces a new chord. Rotating AB by 180◦,
however, produces AB. The apparent partition underlying Bertrand’s second method thus
assigns AB to both the original "part" and the "part" generated by a 180◦ rotation. It follows
immediately that the apparent partition underlying the second method is also ill-defined.
Close examination of both Bertrand’s first and second methods thus reveals a systematic
double counting of chords which intersect the center of the circle.
Circles and Chords thus greatly complicates the status of the standard analysis. Taking
all three methods seriously suggests that the standard analysis ought to be generalized
along two distinct dimensions. First, Bertrand’s use of relative area in his third method
suggests that the paradox ought to extend beyond the relative length of intervals. Second,
Bertrand’s use of partitions in his first and second methods suggests that the paradox does
not require explicit bijections for the entire space of possibilities. At the same time, there
is good reason to object to all three methods, potentially undercutting the case for these
generalizations altogether.
10As Shackel (2007) observes, the first method can be repaired by dropping reference to a radius and
putting two chords in a part if and only if they are parallel. This is not, however, Bertrand’s method.
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5.1.4 Revised Analysis of Bertrand’s Paradox
In light of the standard analysis, Bertrand’s paradox is strongly associated with continuous
intervals, relative interval lengths, and the mathematical theory of probability. Despite this
long association, none of these are an essential feature of the paradox. Rather, the core
of the paradox is a conflict between the intuition that bijections ought to preserve relative
sizes and a host of particular measures which do not. The two generalizations suggested by
Circles and Chords are well taken.
Infinite collections have long been associated with paradox. Zeno’s paradoxes are a
famous case from antiquity but difficulties continued throughout the middle ages and well
into the 20th century. Galilei (1638) provides a classic example with the intuitive attrac-
tiveness of both (1) and (2):
(1) Natural numbers are more numerous than squares of natural numbers.
(2) There are just as many squares of natural numbers as there are natural numbers.
The initial plausibility of (1) stems from the part-whole intuition, the conviction that proper
parts are smaller than the whole. Since
{0, 1, 4, 9, 16, . . . } ⊂ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . }
it ought to be that the natural numbers are strictly larger than set of all squares of nat-
ural numbers. (2) meanwhile is supported by a similarly appealing bijection invariance
intuition, the conviction that bijections between sets preserve size. Since squaring natural
numbers
0 1 2 3 4 . . .
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
0 1 4 9 16 . . .
clearly produces a bijection between the natural numbers and their squares, these sets ought
to be the same size. As Mancosu (2009) argues at length, the proper response to this
situation is to recognize that both part-whole and bijection invariance encode consistent
intuitions about size but that the move to infinite sets requires a choice between them.
Bertrand’s paradox is a similar situation only for the relative size of sets. Suppose
we wish to know how the relative size of a set E compares to the relative size of a set
E′ where E, E′ ⊆ Ω. If Ω is not itself equipped with a salient notion of relative size,
it is natural to represent Ω in terms of a set which is so equipped and thereby obtain our
desired comparison. Bertrand’s paradox appears when two or more of these representations
contradict one another.
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Revised Analysis of Bertrand’s Paradox:
Every instance of Bertrand’s paradox invokes a space of possibilities Ω and events
E, E′ ⊆ Ω together with
(i’) a set U1 and notion of relative size -1 such that either
(a) there exists a bijection g1 : Ω→ U1 or
(b) there exists a partition P of Ω such that, for any choice of Pi ∈ P, there is a
corresponding bijection gi1 : Pi → U1, and for any i, j, both
gi1[E ∩ Pi] = g j1[E ∩ P j]
gi1[E
′ ∩ Pi] = g j1[E′ ∩ P j]
(ii’) a set U2 and notion of relative size -2 such that either
(a) there exists a bijection g2 : Ω→ U2 or
(b) there exists a partition P of Ω such that, for any choice of Pi ∈ P, there is a
corresponding bijection gi2 : Pi → U2, and for any i, j, both
gi2[E ∩ Pi] = g j2[E ∩ P j]
gi2[E
′ ∩ Pi] = g j2[E′ ∩ P j]
where
(iii’) -1 and -2 do not agree on the relative sizes of E and E′ (under g1 and g2 respectively).
Further, in so far as this structure clearly obtains, we likewise have an intuitive instance of
Bertrand’s paradox.
E, E′ ⊆ Ω
g1 g2
g2 ◦ g−11
g1[E] -1 g1[E′] g2[E] 2 g2[E′]
More precisely, Bertrand’s paradox is the result of two representations 〈U1,-1〉 and 〈U2,-2〉
which engender conflicting relative size intuitions over two sets E and E′ drawn from a
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common superset Ω. A set U and notion of relative size - may qualify as a representation
either by means of a bijection g : Ω→ U or by means of a collection of uniform bijections
from the parts in some partition of Ω to U. A conflict between representations can be
constructed whenever relative size is not preserved under bijection, viz. when it is not the
case that E - E′ if and only if g[E] - g[E′] for any bijection g : Ω→ Ω′.
In the case where U1 and U2 are equipped not just with comparative size relations
-1 and -2 but quantitative measures µ1 and µ2 over a shared scale, explicit reference to
a second set E′ can be dropped and (iii’) collapsed into a disagreement over the relative
size of E, namely µ1(g1[E]) , µ2(g2[E]). Under these circumstances, we obtain a clear
generalization of the diagram for the standard analysis:
E ⊆ Ω
g1 g2
g2 ◦ g−11
While the standard instances of Bertrand’s paradox all use quantitative measures of relative
size, purely comparative variations of, for example, The Mystery Cube Factory are easy to
construct.
All of the standard instances of Bertrand’s paradox can be explained on the revised anal-
ysis. The Mystery Cube Factory presents a space of possibilities Ω containing all cubes of
side-length ≤ 2cm (and thus also face-areas ≤ 4cm2) and then asks after the relative size of
a particular subset E, the cubes with side-length ≤ 1 cm and face-areas ≤ 2 cm2. The para-
dox arises when these sets of cubes are distilled into just lengths (g1[E] and U1) and areas
(g2[E] and U2) respectively, representations which possess intuitive measures of relative
size which vary under bijection. The underlying comparative nature of the disagreement
can be seen by comparing E with its complement Ec, the set of cubes with a side-length of
1−2 cm and face-area of 1−4 cm2. In the side-length representation, g1[Ec] -1 g1[E] but in
the face-area representation g2[Ec] 2 g2[E]. The pattern repeats verbatim with Water and
Wine. Again, a well-defined set of water and wine mixtures is presented and a particular
subset, waterwine ratios within [1, 2] and
wine
water ratios within [
1
2 , 1], is distinguished. Representing
this single set in terms of only one ratio or the other again suggests relative interval length
as an intuitive measure of size for each. By construction, the result is a pair of inconsistent
sizes despite clear bijections.
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Unlike The Mystery Cube Factory and Wine and Water, Circles and Chords only ap-
pears to conform to the revised analysis. Circles and Chords considers all chords on a
circle of radius r (the total space Ω) and then asks after all these chords longer than
√
3r
(the subset E). The first method in Circles and Chords opts for the appearance of case (b),
a partition of Ω wherein every part Pi admits of representation by the interval [0, r], and
E ∩ Pi is always identified with the subinterval [0, r2 ). As Bertrand illustrates, this uniform
representation across parts intuitively entails a matching likelihood for the union of these
parts, licensing the move from a likelihood of 12 for E in every part to a likelihood of
1
2
for E full stop. The second method likewise provides the appearance of satisfying case
(b), providing an apparent partition and collection of bijections which not only map every
part Pi to [0, 180◦) but also E ∩ Pi to [60◦, 120◦]. The third method in Circles and Chords
breaks with the previous two and supplies an apparent bijection from the set of all chords
on a circle of radius r to points within the same circle. This latter space comes equipped
with a natural measure of relative size in the form of relative area. Regardless of its actual
shortcomings, Circles and Chords thus appears to satisfy the revised analysis and thereby
generates an apparent instance of the paradox.11
Just as the paradox of infinity presented by Galilei (1638) forces a choice between
bijection invariance for sizes and the part-whole intuition, so too does Bertrand’s paradox
force a choice between bijection invariance for relative sizes and various intuitive notions
thereof. Within the current literature, only Shackel (2007), Norton (2008), and Gyenis and
Rédei (2014) hint at such a conception of Bertrand’s paradox. Norton (2008) is, however,
led astray by his emphasis on descriptions while both Shackel (2007) and Gyenis and Rédei
(2014) restrict themselves to the probability formalism. None recognize that Bertrand’s
paradox is not inherently tied to likelihood at all. Properly understood, Bertrand’s paradox
concerns all and only the conflict between the intuition that relative size is preserved under
bijection and measures of relative size which are not so preserved.
The adequacy of the revised analysis requires not only a satisfactory treatment for ac-
cepted instances of Bertrand’s paradox but also that further instances of the revised analysis
give rise to further cases of the paradox. To motivate this latter claim, I present two new in-
stances of Bertrand’s paradox which deviate significantly from canonical cases along with
a general schema for generating further instances. For Ic,d ⊆ Ia,b ⊆ R, the natural measure
of relative size is relative interval length:
µR(Ic,d, Ia,b) =
d − c
b − a .
These same intuitions, however, readily provide a natural measure of relative size over
11As the phrasing here suggests, I am inclined to reclassify Circles and Chords as only an apparent instance
of Bertrand’s paradox. This is owed in large part to the availability of instances which don’t depend on the
formal errors underlying Bertrand’s methods. Anyone who wishes to retain Circles and Chords as a proper
instance of the paradox, however, need only weaken the revised analysis so that it stipulates the appearance
of the presented structure.
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rational intervals as well. For Ic,d ⊆ Ia,b ⊆ Q, define
µQ(Ic,d, Ia,b) =
d − c
b − a .
Since µQ—like µR—is not preserved under bijection, the revised analysis holds that an
instance of Bertrand’s paradox is available.
A simple modification of Wine and Water suffices. Consider a glass containing a mix-
ture of wine and water where the two liquids were mixed in some rational ratio12 with
at least half as much wine as water and no more than equal parts wine and water, i.e.,
water
wine ∈ [1, 2] and winewater ∈ [ 12 , 1]. Focusing on the proportion of water to wine, the likeli-
hood that the mix is a rational number in [1, 43 ]—µQ([1,
4
3 ], [1, 2])—is once again intuitively
1
3 . Considering instead ratios of wine to water, all rational numbers in [
1
2 , 1] are possible.
The likelihood that the wine to water ratio is in [34 , 1]—µQ([
3
4 , 1], [
1
2 , 1])—is once again
intuitively 12 . Since water to wine ratios and wine to water ratios are reciprocals, the two
intuitive solutions of 13 and
1
2 directly contradict one another. Bertrand’s paradox extends
to intervals of rational numbers and thus beyond the probability formalism.
The use of a dense13 space is similarly inessential. For an infinite collection Y of natural
numbers and X ⊆ Y , one intuitive notion of relative size is given by a minor generalization
of natural density:
µN(X,Y) = lim
n→∞
|X≤n|
|Y≤n|
for n ∈ N where
X≤n = {x ∈ X | x ≤ n}
Y≤n = {y ∈ Y | y ≤ n}.
It is this notion of size which leads us to say, for instance, that even numbers make up half
the natural numbers—µN(Even,N) = 12—while multiples of four make up one quarter of the
naturals and one half of all evens—µN(MultipleOf4,N) = 14 and µN(MultipleOf4,Even) =
1
2 .
Since µN ascribes different sizes to the set of even numbers and the set of multiples of
four relative to N, µN does not preserve relative size under bijection. This can be immedi-
ately leveraged into an intuitive instance of Bertrand’s paradox:
Tupperware Factory. A factory produces tupperware with a natural number n
printed on the lid and another m printed on the bottom. Further, every natural
number appears exactly once in each position. How many of the tupperware
have an even number on their lid? How many of the tupperware have a multiple
12For those tempted to label such a case outlandish, note that it is no less wild to think that any possible
real value was available in the original case. Appearances aside, a glass of water is composed of only a finite
number of H2O molecules.
13An (partial or total) ordering 〈X,≤〉 is dense if and only if for any x1, x2 ∈ X such that x1 < x2, there
exists x ∈ X satisfying x1 < x < x2.
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of four on their bottom?
The intuitive responses (à la µN) are that evens make up exactly 12 of all possible lid values,
and so the first likelihood is 12 . It is similarly plain that multiples of four make up exactly
1
4 of all possible bottom values, and so the second likelihood is
1
4 . Bertrand’s paradox now
appears when it is revealed that the factory pairs lids and bottoms in the somewhat odd
fashion described by f :
f (x) =
{
2x if x = 2n for some n ∈ N
n + 1 + (n + 1) Div 4 if x = 2n + 1 for some n ∈ N.
The function f pairs all even numbered lids with bottoms bearing a multiple of four and
shuﬄes all odd numbered lids to the remaining bottoms:
0 1 2 3 4 5 . . .
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
0 1 4 2 8 3 . . .
As a result, the set of tupperware with an even numbered lid is the set of tupperware with
a bottom bearing a multiple of four, and so the intuitive values of 12 and
1
4 contradict one
another.
As promised, this particular puzzle easily generalizes into a schema for further instances
of Bertrand’s paradox whenever relative sizes are not preserved under bijection:
Generalized Tupperware Factory. A factory produces tupperware with ele-
ments from U1 printed on the lid and elements from U2 printed on the bottom.
All elements from U1 and U2 are used exactly once in this process. Finally,
these markings are related by a particular function f so that, should the lid
and bottom of a tupperware accidentally be separated, the appropriate match
can be identified. How do the tupperware with an element from g1[E] on their
lid compare (more, less, equal, incomparable) to those with an element from
g1[E′] on their lid? How do the tupperware with an element from g2[E] on
their bottom compare (more, less, equal, incomparable) to those with an ele-
ment from g2[E′] on their bottom?
If the answer for g1[E] and g1[E′] differs from that for g2[E] and g2[E′], f is unveiled
as matching lids with elements from g1[E] to bottoms marked with elements from g2[E]
as well as lids with elements from g1[E′] to bottoms marked with elements from g2[E′].
Generalized Tupperware Factory thus forces a confrontation between these relative size
judgments and the clear bijection between tupperware lids and tupperware bottoms.
While the revised analysis greatly expands the scope of Bertrand’s paradox, not all
intuitive measures of relative size are susceptible. The most obvious example of a relative
measure which is immune to the paradox is counting elements in finite sets. For a finite set
Ω and E ⊆ Ω, define
µFin(E,Ω) =
|E|
|Ω| .
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Unlike previous examples, this measure is fixed under any bijection g : Ω → Ω′ and thus
satisfies the bijection invariance intuition.
Proposition 5.1
For any finite Ω and A ⊆ Ω, if g : Ω→ Ω′ is a bijection, then
µFin(A,Ω) = µFin(g[A], g[Ω]).
Supposing that the counting measure µFin is the only acceptable metric for relative size
over finite sets, Bertrand’s paradox cannot then arise in a finite setting. An infinite set of
possibilities is an essential component of the paradox, and so Bertrand’s paradox can be
properly accounted a paradox of infinity.
Finally, given an infinite set of possibilities and a few particular sets in F , all non-trivial
measures are susceptible to Bertrand’s paradox:
Proposition 5.2
Let Ω be a set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, and µ : F → [0,∞] a measure.
Suppose that
(i) Ω is infinite,
(ii) B ∈ F is an infinite set with 0 < µ(B) < ∞, and
(iii) there exists A, A′, A′1, A
′
2 ∈ F such that |A| = |A′| = |A′1| = |A′2|, A, A′ partition B,
and A′1, A
′
2 partition A
′.
Then, there exists a bijection g : Ω→ Ω such that
µ(A) , µ(g[A]).
As a matter of pure mathematics, this measure-instability can be blocked by either remov-
ing enough propositions from F or by sufficiently restricting the available bijections g.
The philosophical basis for either strategy with respect to a theory of confirmation is sus-
pect in the extreme. As a result, the measure-theoretic framework—and thus contemporary
probability theory—is incompatible with an objective resolution to Bertrand’s paradox.
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5.2 First-Order Confirmation
The previous chapter laid the foundations for a theory of confirmation based on the classical
equipossibility account of probability. These foundations are summarized in the following
pair of principles:
(0) The collection of all canonical-domain models is an exhaustive collection of atomic
possibilities.
(1’) If ΩL is an exhaustive collection of atomic possibilities, then every possibility in the
subcollection ΩL,Σ is an equal possibility relative to ΩL and Σ.
Unlike these first two, the last component of the finite confirmation account was left almost
entirely unchanged from Laplace’s presentation of the equipossibility account.
(2’) For a finite, non-empty set of equal possibilities, the degree of confirmation for a
sentence ϕ is the number of equal possibilities which make ϕ true divided by the
total number of equal possibilities.
The restriction to only finite sets of equal possibilities here is severe, and so an extension
of (2’) to infinite sets is desired.
The primary barrier to extending (2’) is Bertrand’s paradox. While early formulations
of the paradox only undercut intuitive measures—relative interval length and relative area
in particular—the revised analysis defended in the previous section shows that an instance
of Bertrand’s paradox can be constructed whenever a metric for relative size varies under
bijection. This criteria straightforwardly rules out not just a number of intuitive measures
for particular infinite sets but any non-trivial measure. Confirmation theory demands a
notion of relative size which is more general than that offered by contemporary probability
or even measure theory.
Echoing Jeffreys’ influential discussion, the "uninformative distribution" for a parame-
ter known only to lie in (0,∞) ought to be invariant under power transformations. Having
no information about a parameter x drawn from (0,∞) entails a corresponding lack of in-
formation about the parameter x2 also drawn from (0,∞). There is no reason, however, to
stop with only power transformations. If one truly has no information about a parameter
x drawn from (0,∞), then—beyond what is encoded in g itself—one has no information
about g(x) for any transformation g. Even if we take the lesson of the previous chapter
to heart and make explicit that each value in (0,∞) represents an atomic possibility, any
bijection g still induces a parameter g(x) and a second set of atomic possibilities g[(0,∞)].
The "uninformative distribution" demands invariance under not just power transformations
or similarity transformations but any bijection.
Jeffreys’ desire for particular incomparabilities—though he never uses the word—was
also well conceived but overly restricted. If a parameter is known only to lie in (0,∞)
with each value atomic, then one ought not endorse a definitive relation between (0, a) and
(a,∞) for any a ∈ (0,∞) on pain of contradiction. There is, however, no reason to stop
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with just these sets. If one truly knows only that x lies in (0,∞) with each value atomic,
then a definitive relation between any pair of disjoint intervals Ia,b and Ia′,b′ is similarly
illicit. The uninformative distribution ought to really, truly be uninformative. In so far
as Jeffreys’ initial discussion is compelling, it ought to convince us that no probability
density function (proper or improper) supplies an adequate "uninformative" prior and thus
no adequate solution to Bertrand’s paradox exists in the probability formalism.
As stringent as these restrictions appear, the finite confirmation account developed in
the previous chapter as well as the minimalist confirmation theories -PL
Σ
and -FOL
Σ
show that
confirmation is not thereby reduced to triviality. The current section refines the proposed
theory of confirmation by providing a comparative extension over infinite collections. The
resulting confirmation relation is strictly stronger than the confirmation theory induced by
first-order logic, validates almost all the axioms of comparative probability, and exhibits the
bijection invariance required in order to avoid Bertrand’s paradox. Further, it is a maximal
solution in the sense that any refinement either violates the cardinality ordering, violates
monotonicity, or is susceptible to Bertrand’s paradox.
5.2.1 Extending the Equipossibility Account to Infinite Collections
The equipossibiliity account ranks sentences by taking the number of favorable possibili-
ties divided by the total number. This scheme fails immediately in an infinite context since
neither the notion of number nor the division operation dictate a particular extension to
infinite sets. This difficulty can be partially alleviated by noting that the total number of
possibilities serves only to introduce an absolute scale; comparative relationships between
sentences are determined by the number of favorable possibilities alone. Suppressing the
total number of possibilities thus provides us the comparative maxim that greater confir-
mation corresponds to more favorable possibilities.
Applying this comparative maxim to an infinite collection of atomic possibilities ΩL,Σ
delivers a large number of intuitive confirmation relations. First, the confirmation ranking
again ranges between two extremes. At one end are sentences which have no favorable
possibilities in ΩL, claims inconsistent with the supplied evidence Σ. On the other side are
sentences for which every possibility in ΩL is a favorable case, claims which are entailed
by the supplied evidence Σ. In between these two extremes are sentences which correspond
to all the remaining subcollections of ΩL,Σ.
The simplest of these intermediary sentences are those which correspond to finite sets.
Consistency with the rankings adopted for finite ΩL,Σ dictates that these are ranked by
number of atomic possibilities. Any two sentences which correspond to the same number
of atomic possibilities are thus to be accounted equally likely while any sentence which
corresponds to exactly two atomic possibilities is to accounted less likely than any sen-
tence which corresponds to three atomic possibilities and so forth. Having recognized a
significant number of comparative confirmation relations between finite sets, it is tempting
to immediately impose a mirror structure on their complements, the co-finite collections.
Any sentence which corresponds to all atomic possibilities except two, for example, ought
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to be more likely than any sentence which corresponds to all atomic possibilities except
three since on the other end of the ranking three atomic possibilities are more likely than
two. The substantial difficulty in extending the equipossibility account to infinite sets is
thus only in what to do with sentences which correspond to collections which are both
infinite and co-infinite.
The core of the proposed extension is to leverage a relativized form of (2’) and to
declare incomparability for whatever remains.
Definition 5.1 Let Ω be a collection and A, B subcollections. Define
A ≺†
Ω
B if and only if there exists a one-to-one g : A − B→ B − A but not vice-versa.
A ∼†
Ω
B if and only if A − B and B − A are finite with |A − B| = |B − A|.
A -†
Ω
B if and only if A ≺†
Ω
B or A ∼†
Ω
B.
For a first-order language L, collection of canonical-domain models ΩL for L, and evidence
set Σ ⊆ L, the comparative confirmation relation -†
ΩL,Σ may be interpreted as a relation over
L by mapping sentences to the collection of canonical-domain models in ΩL,Σ which make
them true, i.e., ϕ -†
ΩL,Σ ψ if and only if ~ϕΩL,Σ -
†
ΩL,Σ ~ψΩL,Σ . In addition, when Ω is clear
from context, -†
Ω
,≺†
Ω
, and ∼†
Ω
will be abbreviated to -†, ≺†, and ∼†.
In the event that Ω is a set, the proposed comparative confirmation relation -†
Ω
has a
straightforward relationship to cardinalities. The definition of the strict relation, for exam-
ple, collapses into
A ≺†
Ω
B if and only if |A − B| < |B − A|
More generally, any two sets A and B fall into one of the following four cases:
 Case (i): A − B finite and B − A finite.
A -†
Ω
B if and only if |A − B| ≤ |B − A|.
 Case (ii): A − B finite and B − A infinite.
A ≺†
Ω
B.
 Case (iii): B − A finite and A − B infinite.
B ≺†
Ω
A.
 Case (iv): A − B infinite and B − A infinite.
A -†
Ω
B if and only if |A − B| < |B − A|.
Case (i) is a simple relativization of the method of equipossibilities, endorsing the finite
ordering when the difference in the favorable possibilities between two sets is finite. Cases
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(ii) and (iii) extend this to the mixed finite-infinite case by stipulating that an infinity of
additional favorable possibiliities is larger than any finite number. The most complicated
component of the proposed extension is case (iv). Comparisons between infinite A− B and
infinite B − A are endorsed only when there is a difference of cardinality; otherwise, the
two sets are accounted incomparable to one another.
Taking Ω = N as an example, we have the intuitive ranking over finite and co-finite sets
while infinite sets which are also co-infinite exhibit a much more complicated structure.
Taking the set E of even numbers and the set O of odd numbers as an example, E and O are
incomparable to one another as are any sets reachable within a finite number of additions
or subtractions:
[Ω] = N
≺†
[Ω − 1] = N − {0} ∼† N − {1} ∼† . . .
≺†
[Ω − 2] = N − {0, 1} ∼† N − {0, 2} ∼† . . .
≺†
...
· · · ∼† E ∪ {3} ∼† E ∪ {1} = [E + 1]
≺†
· · · ∼† E ∪ {1} − {2} ∼† E = [E]
≺†
· · · ∼† E − {4} ∼† E − {2} = [E − 1]
[O + 1] ∼† O ∪ {2} ∼† O ∪ {4} ∼† . . .
≺†
[O] = O ∼† O ∪ {2} − {1} ∼† . . .
≺†
[O − 1] = O − {1} ∼† O − {3} ∼† . . .
...
≺†
[2] = {0, 1} ∼† {0, 2} ∼† {1, 2} ∼† . . .
≺†
[1] = {0} ∼† {1} ∼† {2} ∼† . . .
≺†
[0] = ∅
. . .
. .
.
..
.
. . .
...
Abstracting further and more fully leveraging the indexing in terms of Z, the defined order-
ing provides a total order at either extreme (isomorphic to Z+ and Z− respectively) with an
infinite number of incomparable Z-chains in between:
132
Z−
...
ZZZ. . .Z Z Z
...
ZZZ. . .Z Z Z
...
Z+
While focusing on only a collection of disjoint infinite and co-infinite sets—e.g., the evens
and odds—delivers a discrete ball of incomparabilities as pictured above, overlapping in-
finite and co-infinite sets will further complicate the diagram by producing overlapping
balls.
Despite this complexity, -† satisfies all of de Finetti’s (1951) axioms for intuitive prob-
ability with the sole exception of comparability:
Proposition 5.3
Let Ω be given. Then for any choice of A, B,C ∈ P(Ω), -†
Ω
satisfies
C0. Nontriviality
∅ ≺ Ω.
C1a. Reflexivity
A - A.
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
C3a. Nonnegativity
⊥ - A.
C3b. Boundedness
⊥ - A - ΩL.
C4. Monotonicity
If A ∩C = B ∩C = ∅, then A - B if and only if A ∪C - B ∪C.
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Failures of comparability are moreover restricted to the infinite case. With a finite collection
of atomic possibilities, -† satisfies all of de Finetti’s axioms:
Proposition 5.4
Let Ω be finite. Then for any choice of A, B ∈ P(Ω), -†
Ω
satisfies
C1b. Comparability
A - B or B - A.
In addition, -† satisfies associativity as well as a number of intuitive principles not endorsed
by the probability formalism:
Proposition 5.5
Let Ω be given. Then for any choice of A, B,C,C′ ∈ P(Ω), -†
Ω
satisfies
FE. Finite Equivalence
If A, B finite and |A| = |B|, then A ∼ B.
CFE. Co-Finite Equivalence
If A, B co-finite and |Ac| = |Bc|, then A ∼ B.
R. Regularity
If A , ∅, then ∅ ≺ A.
PW. Part-Whole
If A ⊂ B, then A ≺ B.
FD. Finite Difference
If C,C′ finite with |C| < |C′| and A ∩C = A ∩C′ = ∅, then A ∪C ≺ A ∪C′.
SC. Strong Cardinality
If |A| < |B|, then A ≺ B.
BI. Bijection Invariance
For any bijection g : Ω→ Ω′, A - B if and only if g[A] - g[B].
CA. Associativity
If A1 ∼ H4, B1 ∼ E3, C2 ∼ A1 ∪ B1, D2 ∼ F3, and G4 ∼ F3 ∪ E3 with matching
subscripts disjoint, then C2 ∪ D2 ∼ H4 ∪G4.
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5.2.2 Confirmation for First-Order Languages
Revising (2’) to make exclusive use of the -† relation completes the proposed account of
first-order confirmation.
Confirmation for First-Order Languages
Let L be a first-order language and Σ ⊆ L a consistent14 set of evidence.
(0) The collection of all canonical-domain models is an exhaustive collection of
atomic possibilities.
(1’) If ΩL is an exhaustive collection of atomic possibilities, then every possibility in
the subcollection ΩL,Σ is an equal possibility relative to ΩL and Σ.
(2”) For a collection of equal possibilities ΩL,Σ with subcollections A and B, A is at
least as confirmed as B if and only if A -†
ΩL,Σ B.
While the comparative confirmation relation -†
ΩL,Σ properly ranges over F +L,Σ, it may be
unambiguously lifted to A, B ∈ F +L by setting A -†ΩL,Σ B if and only if A ∩ ΩL,Σ -†ΩL,Σ
B ∩ΩL,Σ.
Over arbitrary collections of atomic possibilities, the first-order confirmation account
is a strict extension of the relation induced by first-order logic. -FOL
Σ
and -† both satisfy
C01a23b4A as well as regularity, part-whole, and bijection invariance. -†, however, also
endorses a number of additional comparisons based on the number of atomic possibilities
which compose an event or correspond to a given sentence. In finite cases, this delivers
a total preorder; in infinite ones, it suffices for principles like finite equivalence, co-finite
equivalence, finite difference, and strong cardinality.
Given only a set of evidence Σ in a formal language L, however, the comparative con-
firmation relation -† over the collection of all canonical-domain models which make Σ true
and the comparative confirmation relation -FOL
Σ
induced by first-order logic agree over L.
Proposition 5.6
Let L be a first-order language and Σ ⊆ L a consistent theory. Taking all canonical-
domain models for L and any extension of L as ΩL, for any ϕ, ψ ∈ L,
ϕ -†
Σ
ψ if and only if ϕ -FOLΣ ψ.
14As earlier, this is consistency with respect to ΩL if ΩL is supplied. If ΩL is not supplied, this is first-order
consistency or, equivalently, consistency with respect to the collection of all canonical-domain models.
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The proposed account of confirmation is thus an extension of logic in two distinct senses.
First, ϕ -FOL
Σ
ψ entails ϕ -† ψ regardless of ΩL. Second, -FOLΣ and -
† agree over L in the
extreme case where only a set of evidence is provided. An unrestricted space of atomic
possibilities thus reduces first-order confirmation to first-order logic while meaningful re-
strictions produce a strictly stronger relation.
5.2.3 A Maximal Resolution of Bertrand’s Paradox
The comparative confirmation relation -† suffices to provide a unique comparative solution
to any instance of Bertrand’s paradox. In the The Mystery Cube Factory for example, it is
true that a cube with side-length less than 1 cm is no more confirmed than a cube with
side-length greater than 1 cm. Contrary to the intuitive assignment of likelihood 12 to each,
however, this does not entail that these claims are equally confirmed. Despite its intuitive
appeal, ϕ ∼† ψ does not follow from ϕ ⊀† ψ and ψ ⊀† ϕ in infinite contexts. Working
through the definition above, The Mystery Cube Factory is asking after claims which are,
according to -†, incomparable to one another. This pattern repeats for all canonical in-
stances of the paradox; in every case, incomparable events are being forced into a salient
total order.
Incomparability is not a particularly desirable result. It is thus natural to ask if some
of the incomparabilities in -† could be broken one way or the other. This is not possible
without collapsing large portions of the current ranking. So long as we require bijection
invariance, -† uniquely maximizes size distinctions:
Proposition 5.7
Let Ω be a set and - a binary relation on P(Ω) satisfying
WC. Weak Cardinality
If |A| < |B|, then B ⊀ A.
C4. Monotonicity
If A ∩C = B ∩C = ∅, then A - B if and only if A ∪C - B ∪C.
PI. Permutation Invariance
For any permutation pi : Ω→ Ω, A - B if and only if pi[A] - pi[B].
Then, A ≺ B only if A ≺† B.
Supposing (WC), (C4), and (PI), the only means of eliminating incomparabilities is thus to
sacrifice relative size distinctions between sets. Given the alternatives, it is the part-whole
principle which naturally suffers:
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Corollary 5.1
Let Ω be given and let - be a strict extension of -†. Then, at least one of the following
is false:
WC. Weak Cardinality
If |A| < |B|, then B ⊀ A.
C4. Monotonicity
If A ∩C = B ∩C = ∅, then A - B if and only if A ∪C - B ∪C.
PI. Permutation Invariance
For any permutation pi : Ω→ Ω, A - B if and only if pi[A] - pi[B].
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
PW. Part-Whole
If A ⊂ B, then A ≺ B.
These sacrifices, moreover, are neither gradual nor local. Supposing (C4), (WC), (PI), and
(C2), breaking only a single incomparability in -† entails the collapse of all distinctions
between finite sets and all distinctions between co-finite sets:
Corollary 5.2
Let Ω be given and let - be a strict extension of -† satisfying:
WC. Weak Cardinality
If |A| < |B|, then B ⊀ A.
C4. Monotonicity
If A ∩C = B ∩C = ∅, then A - B if and only if A ∪C - B ∪C.
PI. Permutation Invariance
For any permutation pi : Ω→ Ω, A - B if and only if pi[A] - pi[B].
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
Then for any A∗, B∗ ∈ P(Ω) such that A∗ - B∗ but A∗ 6-† B∗ and B∗ 6-† A∗,
(i) ∅ ∼ C for any C ∈ P(Ω) with |C| ≤ |A∗ − B∗| and
(ii) Ω ∼ C for any C ∈ P(Ω) with |Cc| ≤ |A∗ − B∗|.
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Any attempt to eliminate incomparabilities in the proposed ranking entails violation of
an even more fundamental principle. The cost of even a single additional comparison
is giving up either (PI), (WC), (C4), (C2), or the obvious truth that a claim with some
favorable cases is more confirmed than a claim which contradicts our evidence. None
of these is an acceptable price in a theory of confirmation, and so every incomparability
in -† is necessary. The comparative confirmation relation -† is a maximal resolution of
Bertrand’s paradox.
5.2.4 Absolute Rankings and Degrees of Confirmation
Historically, accounts of confirmation—most notably Carnap (1962)—have been for-
mulated as absolute rankings assigning "degrees of confirmation". Since -† satisfies
C01b23a4A, the work of Chapter two entails that the comparative confirmation relation -†
over any particular ΩL,Σ can be represented as a likelihood assignment into the (minimal
representing) likelihood structure induced by -†, 〈P-† , ◦-†〉. It is easy to verify, however,
that no single likelihood structure suffices for every choice of ΩL,Σ merely on cardinality
grounds. As a result, the proposed account of confirmation is not categorical, and thus
there is no fixed set which can be identified as all and only the degrees of confirmation.
While this breaks with both contemporary formalizations of rational credence and histori-
cal accounts of confirmation, it is far from unexpected. The weight of a single possibility
intuitively ought to shrink as the set of all atomic possibilities grows first through finite and
then infinite sets of greater and greater cardinality.15
Talk of degrees of confirmation is nevertheless intuitively appealing, particularly if we
wish to make comparisons between the confirmation of A in ΩA and the confirmation of B
in ΩB. The first two subsections below expand on the relationship between the compara-
tive confirmation relation -† and absolute rankings, showing that the formal structure of -†
precludes unique representation in any likelihood structure outside of the finite case. De-
spite the lack of both categoricity and unique representation, the third and final subsection
presents a minimalist extension of the comparative confirmation relation -† to cross-set
confirmation comparisons. Taking equivalence classes under this cross-set relation as "de-
grees of confirmation" then provides a rigorous basis for degree of confirmation talk.
15This is sometimes presented as an objection to regularity intuitions, e.g., in Hájek (2010). This objection
is only persuasive if we retain the view that circumscribing a set of all degrees of confirmation is possible.
Considering a single possibility relative to larger and larger total sets should convince proponents of regularity
that demanding a fixed set of all confirmation values is a mistake. As the set of atomic possibilities increases
so too does the set of distinct confirmation values.
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Absolute Rankings in the Finite Case
Over a finite set of models ΩL,Σ, the comparative confirmation relation -† is naturally
identified with the absolute ranking µ : F +L,Σ → Q ∩ [0, 1] described by (2’),
µ(E) =
|E|
|ΩL,Σ| .
Proposition 5.8
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, and
Σ ⊆ L a consistent (with respect to ΩL) set. If ΩL,Σ is finite, then -† on F +L,Σ is uniquely
represented in 〈Q ∩ [0, 1],≤,+〉 by
µ(E) =
|E|
|ΩL,Σ| .
This correspondence also readily extends to the algebra F +L .
Corollary 5.3
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, and
Σ ⊆ L a consistent (with respect to ΩL) set. If ΩL,Σ is finite, then -† on F +L is uniquely
represented in 〈Q ∩ [0, 1],≤,+〉 by
µ+(E) =
|E ∩ΩL,Σ|
|ΩL,Σ| .
-† is thus a generalization of the absolute ranking proposed in the equipossibility account.
The existence of a unique representing assignment into a fixed likelihood structure nat-
urally supports a degree of realism about the values in this structure. In the case of -† over
finite sets, this impression is further reinforced by the fact that these values are preserved
under uniform model space expansion of any finite size.
Definition 5.2 For a first-order language L, extension L+ of L, andM+ a canonical-domain
model for L+ or an extension thereof,16 M+|L+L is the canonical-domain modelM obtained
by eliminating all symbols in the signature of L+ and not in the signature of L fromM+.
16Recall that the models in a model space for a formal language L need not be L-models; rather, they must
assign truth values over L. It is thus legitimate to include L+-models in a model space for L so long as L+ is
an extension of L.
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Definition 5.3 For ΩL a model space for L and ΩL+ a model space for L+ with L ⊆ L+,
ΩL+ is an n-uniform model space expansion of ΩL for n ∈ N+ if and only if there exists a
partition {Pi, . . . } of ΩL+ such that for any i, j:
|Pi| = |P j| = n;
For anyM ∈ ΩL there exists a unique Pi such thatM+ ∈ Pi ⇒M+i |L+L =M;
For any Pi there exists a uniqueM ∈ ΩL such thatM+ ∈ Pi ⇒M+|L+L =M.
An n-uniform model space expansion thus extends every model in ΩL to exactly n models
in ΩL+ . Because models are always extended, there is also no difficulty in extending n-
uniform model space expansion to cases including a evidential set Σ.
Proposition 5.9
Let L+ = 〈L+,ΩL+〉 be an n-uniform extension of L = 〈L,ΩL〉 and Σ ⊆ L a consistent
(with respect to ΩL) set. Then, there exists a partition {Pi, . . . } of ΩL+,Σ such that for
any i, j:
|Pi| = |P j| = n;
For anyM ∈ ΩL,Σ there exists a unique Pi such thatM+ ∈ Pi ⇒M+i |L+L =M;
For any Pi there exists a uniqueM ∈ ΩL,Σ such thatM+ ∈ Pi ⇒M+|L+L =M.
Finally, uniformly decomposing each possibility into a set of n possibilities leaves the value
assigned to "events" fixed.
Proposition 5.10
Let ΩL+ be an n-uniform model space expansion of ΩL and Σ ⊆ L a consistent (with
respect to ΩL) set. If ΩL,Σ is finite, then for any E ∈ F +L,Σ,
µ(E) = µ+(E+)
where E+ = {M+ ∈ ΩL+,Σ : M+|L+L ∈ E} and the functions µ : F +L,Σ → Q ∩ [0, 1], µ+ :
F +L+,Σ → Q∩[0, 1] are the unique representing assignments of -† into 〈Q∩[0, 1],≤,+〉.
The finite case thus admits of not only unique assignments relative to a fixed likelihood
structure but also fixed values under decomposition of the possibility space.17 The natural
17This fact engenders a degree of ambivalence towards the atomicity or non-atomicity of possibilities; so
long as decompositions are uniform and the total set of possibilities is finite, it does not matter for our choice
of µ. This finite-case ambivalence seems a likely culprit for the classical equipossibility account’s failure to
recognize the importance of atomic possibilities.
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impression is that degrees of confirmation are (or at least are measured or represented by)
values from 〈Q ∩ [0, 1],+〉.
Absolute Rankings in the Infinite Case
This impression rapidly unravels with infinite sets of atomic possibilities. Not only are
assignments into 〈Q∩[0, 1],+〉 no longer adequate to represent -† but the formal properties
of the comparative confirmation relation -† undercut the possibility of unique assignments
altogether. The formal difficulties here are two-fold.
First, infinite sets of atomic possibilities introduce incomparabilities. Taking assign-
ments into a scale with symmetrically-structured incomparable values guarantees a multi-
plicity of viable assignments since permuting which sets receive which incomparable val-
ues produces further viable assignments. In the following example, for instance, permuting
the values assigned to the intermediate sets {M1} and {M2} produces a second viable as-
signment.
µ({M1,M2}) = 1
µ({M1}) = 12a
µ({M2}) = 12b
µ(∅) = 0
1
≺≺
1
2 b
1
2 a
≺≺
0
Since -† produces an infinite number of symmetrically-structured incomparable sequences,
any adequate likelihood structure for -† admits of an infinite number of viable assignments.
This situation is further exacerbated by the existence of Z-chains—collections of sets
whose ordering is isomorphic to 〈Z,≤〉—within the -† preorder. In both the finite and co-
finite case, values may be fixed by reference to 0˙ and 1˙ respectively. With the intermediate
infinite and co-infinite sets, however, there is no salient, finitely-reachable value off which
to index an assignment. Since the structure of a Z-chain is preserved under any finite
shift in either direction, a single viable assignment again guarantees a multiplicity of such
assignments.
Consider, for example, the set of even numbers E if all natural numbers N are a possi-
bility.
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µ(E)
. . . . . .
µ(E − {2}) µ(E ∪ {1})
Shifting the values assigned to the sequence . . . , E−{2, 4}, E−{2}, E, E∪{1}, E∪{1, 3}, . . .
by a finite amount in either direction produces a viable assignment over the sequence;
propagating this shift throughout the entire assignment gives another assignment which
represents -†.
In contrast with the finite case, the formal structure of the comparative confirmation
ranking -† over infinite sets of atomic possibilities guarantees an infinite number of repre-
senting assignments whenever a likelihood structure suffices for a single assignment. This
is not to say that the proposed theory does not admit of absolute rankings nor that—in the
terminology of §2.1—cross-set comparisons are never available. The comparative confir-
mation preorder -† over an infinite set simply does not admit of unique representations.
As an immediate consequence, there is little reason to regard a salient likelihood structure
as definitive of degrees of confirmation; the realism typical of, for example, probabilism is
untenable in the proposed account. Confirmation is most directly and intuitively encoded
by the -† relation.
Cross-Set Confirmation Comparisons
The most immediate consequence of losing unique representation in some particular like-
lihood structure 〈P, ◦〉 is the loss of the cross-set confirmation comparisons induced by
this representation. As §2.1 noted, two absolute rankings µA and µB over different spaces
P(ΩA) and P(ΩB) which share a scale 〈P, ◦〉 naturally extend to an absolute ranking µ+ over(
P(ΩA) × {ΩA}
)
∪
(
P(ΩB) × {ΩB}
)
by
µ(〈C,ΩC〉) =
{
µA(C) if ΩC = ΩA
µB(C) if ΩC = ΩB.
In this way, the likelihood of A in ΩA may be compared to the likelihood of B in ΩB even
when ΩA and ΩB are distinct. With the canonical representation of -† over finite sets in
terms of functions into 〈Q ∩ [0, 1],+〉, for example, this operation ranks all pairs 〈A,ΩA〉
where ΩA is a finite set of canonical-domain models and A ⊆ ΩA. All events E assigned
the value 12 are then accounted equally confirmed even if the underlying sets of atomic
models differ. With the loss of unique representation in any likelihood structure, a new
approach is required for cross-set confirmation comparisons over arbitrary collections of
atomic models.
142
The remainder of this section focuses on extending the comparative confirmation re-
lation -† to pairs 〈A,ΩA〉. The strategy here is to build up the stock of positive cross-set
comparisons by means of intuitively plausible conditions without contradicting -† itself. A
first, minimalist principle for extending the comparative confirmation relation -† to pairs
〈A,ΩA〉 where A ⊆ ΩA is partwise comparison in the collection of all atomic models Ω.
P. Partwise Comparison
If both A -†
Ω
B and ΩB -
†
Ω
ΩA, then 〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈B,ΩB〉.
Definition 5.4 Let Ω be the collection of all atomic possibilities, ΩA and ΩB non-empty
subcollections, and A, B subcollections of ΩA and ΩB, respectively. Define
〈A,ΩA〉 -P 〈B,ΩB〉 if and only if 〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈B,ΩB〉 is entailed by (P).
Informally, if A is at least as small as B relative to all possibilities and ΩB is at least as small
as ΩA relative to all possibilities, then A in ΩA must be smaller than B in ΩB since it does
worse in both relevant components.
While straightforward, -P does not suffice for a number of expected cross-set confir-
mation comparisons. This is most obvious in the failure to fix either a minimal or maximal
degree of confirmation:
〈∅, {M1}〉 P 〈∅, {M1,M2}〉
〈{M1}, {M1}〉 P 〈{M1,M2}, {M1,M2}〉.
In general, n-uniform model space expansions also generate distinct degrees of confirma-
tion under -P, e.g.,
〈{M1}, {M1,M2}〉 P 〈{M1.1,M1.2}, {M1.1,M1.2,M2.1,M2.2}〉
even if Mi. j is an extension of Mi. Assuming we wish to recover at least those cross-set
comparative confirmation judgments induced by representing -† over finite sets in 〈Q ∩
[0, 1],+〉, a strict extension of -P is required.
Stipulating preservation under uniform model space expansions suffices to make up the
shortfall in the finite case.
U. Finite Uniform Expansion
If Ω+A is an n-uniform model space expansion of ΩA and ΩA is finite, then 〈A,ΩA〉 ∼
〈A+,Ω+A〉 where A+ is the collection of models from Ω+A which extend a model from
A.
Uniform, finite model space expansions in other words preserve degrees of confirmation.
In isolation, (P) and (U) need not deliver a transitive relation. For example, ifMi. j is an
extension ofMi, then
〈{M1}, {M1,M2}〉 - 〈{M1.1,M1.2}, {M1.1,M1.2,M2.1,M2.2}〉
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follows from (U). From (P), we also have that
〈{M1.1,M1.2}, {M1.1,M1.2,M2.1,M2.2}〉 - 〈{M′1,M′2}, {M′1,M′2,M′3}〉.
Nevertheless, neither (P) nor (U) require that
〈{M1}, {M1,M2}〉 - 〈{M′1,M′2}, {M′1,M′2,M′3}〉.
At minimum, the cross-set comparisons delivered by (P) and (U) must thus be closed
so that resulting relation is transitive.
Definition 5.5 Let ΩA be a non-empty collection of canonical-domain models, and A a
subcollection of ΩA. Let -PU denote the transitive closure of those comparisons required
by (P) ∧ (U) over pairs 〈A,ΩA〉.
-PU is the cross-set comparative confirmation relation induced by representation in 〈Q ∩
[0, 1],+〉.
Proposition 5.11
Let ΩA and ΩB be finite but non-empty sets of canonical-domain models with A ⊆ ΩA
and B ⊆ ΩB. Then, 〈A,ΩA〉 -PU 〈B,ΩB〉 if and only if µΩA(A) ≤ µΩB(B) where µΩA :
P(ΩA) → Q ∩ [0, 1] and µΩB : P(ΩA) → Q ∩ [0, 1] are the unique representations of
-†
ΩA
and -†
ΩB
in 〈Q ∩ [0, 1],+〉.
(P), (U), and transitivity thus suffice for all canonical comparisons over finite sets of atomic
possibilities.
Further, it is easy to verify that the cross-set comparison relation -PU agrees with -†
within collections of arbitrary size.
Proposition 5.12
Let ΩA be a collection of canonical-domain models and A, A′ subcollections of ΩA.
Then,
〈A,ΩA〉 -PU 〈A′,ΩA〉 if and only if A -†ΩA A′.
-PU is thus a consistent extension of -† to pairs 〈A,ΩA〉.
The cross-set comparison relation -PU nevertheless fails to capture some important
intuitions. Most saliently, it fails to fix both a unique minimal and maximal degree of
confirmation. For example,
〈∅, {M1,M2,M3, . . . }〉 /PU 〈∅, {M1}〉
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and
〈{M1,M2,M3, . . . }, {M1,M2,M3, . . . }〉 /PU 〈{M1}, {M1}〉.
Neither of these are acceptable, and so a strict extension of -PU is desired.
Given the existing endorsement of (U), one natural strategy is to generalize (U) by
lifting either the restriction to finite sets or the restriction to partitions of finite size. Unfor-
tunately, neither generalization is tenable. Lifting the restriction to partitions of finite size
is straightforwardly inconsistent with -†. Consider, for example, that
〈{M1}, {M1,M2}〉 ∼† 〈{M2}, {M1,M2}〉
but
〈{M′1,M′3,M′5, . . . }, {M′1,M′2,M′3, . . . }〉 6∼† 〈{M′2,M′4,M′6, . . . }, {M′1,M′2,M′3, . . . }〉
despite the existence of a countable uniform expansion. In contrast, the comparative con-
firmation ranking -† is fixed under n-uniform expansions of infinite sets.
Proposition 5.13
Let ΩL+ be an n-uniform model space expansion of ΩL for any n ∈ N+ and Σ ⊆ L a
consistent (with respect to ΩL) set. Then for any A, B from F +L,Σ,
A -†
ΩL,Σ B if and only if A
+ -†
ΩL+ ,Σ
B+
where A+ and B+ are the collections containing all and only those ΩL+,Σ models which
extend models in A and B respectively.
Unfortunately, extending this to cross-set comparisons still leads to undesirable results.
Letting MRk be the canonical-domain model with a single element and non-empty unary
relation Rk, we have
〈{MR0}, {MR0 ,MR1 ,MR2 ,MR3 , . . . }〉 ∼ 〈{MR0}, {MR0 ,MR2 ,MR4 ,MR6 , . . . }〉
despite {MR0} ∼† {MR0} and {MR0 ,MR2 ,MR4 ,MR6 , . . . } ≺† {MR0 ,MR1 ,MR2 ,MR3 , . . . }.
While each individual uniform expansion appears proportion-preserving, transitivity
quickly leads to equivalences that, by the lights of -†, ought not be. Neither generalization
of (U) is viable.
Instead, we stipulate the desired comparisons directly as a third and fourth axiom.
C. Certain Validities
〈ΩA,ΩA〉 ∼ 〈ΩB,ΩB〉.
I. Impossible Contradictions
〈∅,ΩA〉 ∼ 〈∅,ΩB〉.
145
Definition 5.6 Let ΩA be a non-empty collection of canonical-domain models, and A a
subcollection of ΩA. Let -PUCI denote the transitive closure of those comparisons required
by (P) ∧ (U) ∧ (C) ∧ (I) over pairs 〈A,ΩA〉.
The resulting cross-set confirmation relation -PUCI is a strict extension of -PU with a num-
ber of attractive features:
Proposition 5.14
Let Ω be the collection of all atomic possibilities, ΩA and ΩB non-empty subcollections,
and A, B subcollections of ΩA and ΩB respectively. -PUCI satisfies
C0. Nontriviality
〈∅,Ω〉 ≺ 〈Ω,Ω〉.
C1a. Reflexivity
〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈A,ΩA〉.
C2. Transitivity
If 〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈B,ΩB〉 and 〈B,ΩB〉 - 〈C,ΩC〉, then 〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈C,ΩC〉.
C3b. Boundedness
〈∅,Ω〉 ∼ 〈∅,ΩA〉 - 〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈ΩA,ΩA〉 ∼ 〈Ω,Ω〉.
E-† . -† Extension
〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈A′,ΩA〉 if and only if A -† A′.
E≺† . ≺† Extension
If either both A ≺†
Ω
B and ΩB -
†
Ω
ΩA or both ∅ ≺†Ω A -†Ω B and ΩB ≺†Ω ΩA, then〈A,ΩA〉 ≺ 〈B,ΩB〉.
FC. Finite Comparisons
If ΩA and ΩB are finite, then 〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈B,ΩB〉 if and only if µΩA(A) ≤ µΩB(B)
where µΩA : P(ΩA) → Q ∩ [0, 1] and µΩB : P(ΩA) → Q ∩ [0, 1] are the unique
representations of -†
ΩA
and -†
ΩB
in 〈Q ∩ [0, 1],+〉.
ID. Infinitesimal Degrees
If A, B are nonempty and finite sets, ΩA is infinite, and ΩB is finite, then 〈A,ΩA〉 ≺
〈B,ΩB〉.
Whether -PUCI is a maximal solution is unclear. It does, however, suffice for the most
plausible claims about degrees of confirmation, viz. those induced by representation of -†
over finite sets in 〈Q ∩ [0, 1],+〉 and simple generalizations thereof.
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5.3 Conclusion
Over the course of the last century, subjective and probabilistic accounts of rational cre-
dence in the style of Ramsey (1931), de Finetti ([1937] 1980), and Savage (1972) have
entirely supplanted accounts of confirmation. The arguments thought to secure these prob-
abilistic accounts of rational credence, however, establish considerably less than adver-
tised. The Dutch book argument, representation arguments, and gradational accuracy ar-
guments all either outright assume rational credences are real-valued or assume rational
credences satisfy properties characteristic of the real numbers, viz. comparability and the
Archimedean property. As a result, these probabilistic accounts of rational credence estab-
lish, at best, that rational credences are real-valued only if they are probability functions.
At the same time, the objections thought to tell decisively against accounts of confirma-
tion likewise fall short of the mark. Ramsey’s skeptical response to confirmation is undercut
by classical logic itself. Both propositional and first-order logic induce corresponding con-
firmation relations; skeptics need look no further to see their error. D’Alembert’s riddle
meanwhile rightly cast serious doubt on the ease with which classical accounts of proba-
bility purported to identify equally possible cases. The foundations of modern first-order
logic suffice, however, to repair this shortcoming, delivering an account of confirmation for
finite sets of atomic possibilities in the process.
While the nature and scope of the final objection to confirmation has been systemat-
ically understated, Bertrand’s paradox suffices to rule out only probabilistic accounts of
confirmation. Not only is the -†-account of confirmation immune to Bertrand’s paradox,
but also it is the maximal resolution possible in an account of confirmation. Despite the
comparative nature of the -†-account of confirmation, meaningful talk of degrees of confir-
mation can also be recovered with a conservative extension to cross-set comparisons. The
proposed account of confirmation thus survives all three of the objections which originally
drove confirmation into disrepute without sacrificing either objectivity or normativity.
Finally, the -†-account of confirmation dovetails with both the foundations of prob-
ability and the flaws noted in contemporary arguments for probabilism. Not only is the
-†-account of confirmation a generalization of the classical account of probability, but—
under the proposed account—support of a claim ϕ by evidence Σ is probabilistic when the
set of atomic models in question is finite. As a result, rational credences in these same
circumstances are also probabilistic. In infinite contexts, however, support of a claim ϕ
by evidence Σ satisfies neither comparability nor the Archimedean property and thus is
not probabilistic. As a result, rational credences in infinite contexts are not probability
functions. The -†-account thus readily explains both the appeal and the shortcomings of
probabilistic accounts of rational credence.
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Appendix A
Proofs for Chapter 2
A.1 Proofs for Section 2.1
Proposition A.1
Let O be a set and each of -,≺,∼ binary relations over O. Then, the following are
equivalent:
(1) (i) and (ii) hold;
(2) (iii) holds, ∼ is symmetric, and ≺ is exclusive.
Proof. (⇒)
(⇒ for (iii))
Suppose that o - o′. If o′ - o as well, then o ∼ o′ by (ii). If o′  o, then o ≺ o′ by (i). In
either case, o ≺ o′ or o ∼ o′.
(⇐ for (iii))
Suppose that o ≺ o′ or o ∼ o′. By (i) and (ii), this is equivalent to both o - o′ and o′  o or
both o - o′ and o′ - o. This in turn is equivalent to o - o′ as desired.
Symmetry and Exclusivity
Follow immediately from (i) and (ii).
(⇐)
(⇒ for (i))
Suppose o ≺ o′. It follows from (iii) that o - o′. Since o ≺ o′ implies o′ ⊀ o and o / o′,
we likewise have that o′ ⊀ o and o / o′. By (iii), this is equivalent to o′  o.
(⇐ for (i))
Suppose that o - o′ and o′  o. By (iii), either o ≺ o′ or o ∼ o′ and both o′ ⊀ o and o′ / o.
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By ∼ a symmetric relation, o / o′, and thus o ≺ o′.
(⇒ for (ii))
Suppose o ∼ o′. It follows from (iii) that o - o′. Since ∼ symmetric, we likewise have that
o′ ∼ o, and thus o′ - o.
(⇐ for (ii))
Suppose that o - o′ and o′ - o. By (iii), either o ≺ o′ or o ∼ o′ and either o′ ≺ o or o′ ∼ o.
Since o ≺ o′ implies o′ ⊀ o and o′ ≺ o implies o ⊀ o′, it must be that o ∼ o′ or o′ ∼ o. By
∼ symmetric, these latter are equivalent.

Proposition A.2
Let a set of objects O be given. Then,
(i) For any comparative ranking - over O, there exists an absolute scale 〈A,≤〉 and
absolute ranking µ : O→ A such that
o - o′ ⇔ µ(o) ≤ µ(o′).
(ii) For any absolute scale 〈A,≤〉 and absolute ranking µ : O → A, there exists a
comparative ranking - over O such that
o - o′ ⇔ µ(o) ≤ µ(o′).
Proof. (i)
Let an object set O and comparative ranking - over O be given. Let A be the equivalence
classes of O under ∼ and let µ : O→ A be defined by µ(o) = [o]∼. Finally, define ≤ over A
by:
[o]∼ ≤ [o′]∼ ⇔ o - o′.
(ii)
Define - over O by o - o′ ⇔ µ(o) ≤ µ(o′). Reflexivity and transitivity for - follow
immediately from the reflexivity and transitivity conditions on the absolute scale. 
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A.2 Proofs for Section 2.2
Proposition A.3
Given a formal language L with Boolean connectives, a model space ΩL for L, and
a likelihood assignment µ : L → P satisfying (N), (C), and (I), µ satisfies (F) only if
◦ satisfies commutativity, additive identity, and existence of complements over P|µ[FL]
where ◦ : P × P 7→ P is defined by
µ(ϕ) ◦ µ(ψ) = µ((ϕ ∨ ψ))
for ϕ, ψ ∈ L inconsistent.
Proof. Suppose that L is a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL is a model space
for L, and µ is a likelihood assignment µ : L → P satisfying Normativity of Logic, Certain
Validities, and Impossible Contradictions. Define
µ(ϕ) ◦ µ(ψ) = µ((ϕ ∨ ψ))
for ϕ, ψ ∈ L inconsistent. By Functionality for Disjoint Disjunction, ◦ is a well-defined
partial function from P × P to P.
Since (ϕ ∨ ψ) is logically equivalent to (ψ ∨ ϕ), Normativity of Logic requires that
µ((ϕ ∨ ψ)) = µ((ψ ∨ ϕ)) for ϕ, ψ ∈ L inconsistent. By construction, we thus have that
µ(ϕ) ◦ µ(ψ) = µ(ψ) ◦ µ(ϕ).
◦ thus satisfies Commutativity.
Since (ϕ∨⊥) is logically equivalent to ϕ, Normativity of Logic requires that µ((ϕ∨⊥)) =
µ(ϕ) for any ϕ ∈ L. By the construction of ◦ together with Impossible Contradictions, we
thus have that
µ(ϕ) ◦ 0˙ = µ(ϕ)
for all ϕ ∈ L. ◦ thus satisfies Additive Identity over P|µ[FL].
Since (ϕ∨¬phi) is logically equivalent to>, Normativity of Logic together with Certain
Validities requires that µ((ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)) = 1˙ for any ϕ ∈ L. Since ϕ and ¬ϕ are inconsistent, we
thus have that
µ(ϕ) ◦ µ(¬ϕ) = 1˙
for all ϕ ∈ L. ◦ then satisfies Existence of Complements over P|µ[FL].

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Proposition A.4
Given a formal language L with Boolean connectives, a model space ΩL for L, and a
likelihood assignment µ : L→ P satisfying (N), (C), (I), and (M), µ also satisfies
D. Decomposition
For any disjoint A1, B1 ∈ FL and disjoint A2, B2 ∈ FL such that µ(A1)  µ(A2)
and µ(B1)  µ(B2), µ(A1 ∪ B1)  µ(A2 ∪ B2).
F. Functionality for Inconsistent Disjunction / Disjoint Union
For any two pairs of inconsistent sentences ϕ, ψ and ϕ′, ψ′, if µ(ϕ) = µ(ϕ′) and
µ(ψ) = µ(ψ′), then µ((ϕ ∨ ψ)) = µ((ϕ′ ∨ ψ′)).
Proof. We prove (D) first. Let A1, B1 ∈ FL disjoint and A2, B2 ∈ FL disjoint
such that µ(A1)  µ(A2), µ(B1)  µ(B2). Using (M) on the first inequality,
µ(A1 ∪ (B1 − A2))  µ(A2 ∪ (B1 − A2)), and thus µ(A1 ∪ (B1 − A2))  µ(A2 ∪ B1).
Using (M) on the second inequality, µ(B1 ∪ (A2 − B1))  µ(B2 ∪ (A2 − B1)), and thus
µ(A2∪B1)  µ(B2∪(A2−B1)). By transitivity, µ(A1∪(B1−A2))  µ(B2∪(A2−B1)). Finally,
applying (M) one last time gives µ(A1∪(B1−A2)∪(B1∩A2))  µ(B2∪(A2−B1)∪(B1∩A2)),
and thus µ(A1 ∪ B1)  µ(A2 ∪ B2).
(F) now follows by two applications of (D). 
Proposition A.5
For a formal language L with Boolean connectives, a model space ΩL for L, and a
likelihood assignment µ : L→ P,
(i) (N), (C), (I) 6⇒ (M).
(ii) (M), (C), (I) 6⇒ (N).
(iii) (N), (M), (I) 6⇒ (C).
(iv) (N), (C), (M) 6⇒ (I).
Proof.
(i) follows from the example showing that (N), (C), (I), (F), (A) 6⇒ (M).
For (ii), consider the propositional language generated from σ = {P,Q} with
ΩL = {v1, v2, v3, v4} the set of all propositional models for L. Set µ(∅) = 0, µ(ΩL) = 1, and
all remaining sets from FL incomparable between the two. It’s trivial to verify that (C),
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(I), (M), and ¬(N).
For (iii), consider the propositional language generated from σ = {P}with ΩL = {v1, v2}
the set of all propositional models for L. Set µ(∅) = 0, µ({v1}) = 13 , µ({v2}) = 13 , and
µ({v1, v2}) = 23 but 1˙ to 1. It’s trivial to verify that (N), (I), (M), and ¬(C).
For (iv), consider the propositional language generated from σ = {P}with ΩL = {v1, v2}
the set of all propositional models for L. Set µ(∅) = 13 , µ({v1}) = 23 , µ({v2}) = 23 , and
µ({v1, v2}) = 1 but 0˙ to 0. It’s trivial to verify that (N), (C), (M), and ¬(I).

Proposition A.6
Given a formal language L with Boolean connectives, a model space ΩL for L, and a
likelihood assignment µ : L → P satisfying (N), (C), (I), (A), and (M), 〈P|µ[FL], ◦〉 is a
likelihood structure where ◦ : P × P 7→ P is defined by
µ(ϕ) ◦ µ(ψ) = µ((ϕ ∨ ψ))
for ϕ, ψ ∈ L inconsistent.
Proof. Conditions (a)-(c) follow from (F) and thus (M). Condition (d) on ◦ follows imme-
diately from (A); condition (e) on ◦ follows immediately from (M). 
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A.3 Proofs for Section 2.3
Proposition A.7
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, P a
likelihood space, µ : FL → P an NCI-likelihood assignment. Then, the relation -µ
over FL defined by
A -µ B⇔ µ(A)  µ(B)
satisfies
C0. Nontriviality
∅ ≺ ΩL.
C1a. Reflexivity
A - A.
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
C3b. Boundedness
⊥ - A - ΩL.
CN. Normativity of Logic
If A ⊆ B, then A - B.
Proof. (C0) follows from restriction (iv.a) on likelihood spaces together with both restric-
tion (I) and restriction (C) on likelihood assignments. (C1a) and (C2) follow immediately
given the definition of the --relation and restrictions (iv.b) and (iv.c) on likelihood spaces.
The first part of (C3b) is guaranteed by restriction (I) on likelihood assignments together
with restriction (iv.e) on likelihood spaces; the second part of (C3b) is then delivered by re-
striction (C) on likelihood assignments and restriction (iv.e) on likelihood spaces. Finally,
(CN) is guaranteed by restriction (N) on likelihood assignments. 
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Proposition A.8
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, and -
a binary relation on FL satisfying
C0. Nontriviality
∅ ≺ ΩL.
C1a. Reflexivity
A - A.
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
C3b. Boundedness
⊥ - A - ΩL.
CN. Normativity of Logic
If A ⊆ B, then A - B.
Then, there exists a likelihood space P- ("the likelihood space induced by -") such that
- is representable in P- by an NCI-Likelihood Assignment.
Proof. Let FL and - be given. Take the domain of P- to be FL/ ∼ (where A ∼ B iff A - B
and B - A) with 0˙ as [∅], 1˙ as [ΩL], and  the partial ordering induced by -. It is easy to
verify that P- is a likelihood space. Let µ : FL → P- merely map any A ∈ FL to [A] ∈ P-.
µ clearly satisfies (C) and (I). Suppose that ϕ |= ψ. Then, ~ϕ ⊆ ~ψ. By (CN), ~ϕ - ~ψ.
It follows immediately by the construction of µ and P- that µ(~ϕ)  µ(~ψ). µ therefore
satisfies (N) as well. 
Proposition A.9
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, and
- a binary relation on FL. If - is representable in a likelihood space P and P em-
beds into another likelihood space P+, then - is representable in P+. Further, if - is
representable in a likelihood structure 〈P, ◦〉 and 〈P, ◦〉 embeds into another likelihood
structure 〈P+, ◦+〉, then - is representable in 〈P+, ◦+〉.
Proof. Simply rewrite the representing likelihood assignment µ : FL → P into a function
µ+ : FL → P+ with no change in the values assigned. It is trivial to verify that µ+ is a
likelihood assignment which represents - in the extended space. 
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Proposition A.10
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, and -
a binary relation on FL satisfying
C0. Nontriviality
∅ ≺ ΩL.
C1a. Reflexivity
A - A.
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
C3b. Boundedness
⊥ - A - ΩL.
CN. Normativity of Logic
If A ⊆ B, then A - B.
Then, - is representable in a likelihood space P by an NCI-likelihood assignment if
and only if P- embeds into P.
Proof.
(⇒)
Suppose that - is representable in P by an NCI-likelihood assignment. By definition,
there exists µ : FL → P such that for any A, B ∈ FL, A - B if and only if µ(A)  µ(B).
Define δ : P- → P by δ([A]) = µ(A). Note that δ is well-defined since, by above, any
two representatives of the same equivalence class under ∼ must be assigned the same
likelihood by µ. It’s easy to verify both that δ′(0˙P-) = 0˙P and δ(1˙P-) = 1˙P using (I) and (C).
Finally, note that 〈[A], [B]〉 ∈P- if and only if 〈δ([A]), δ([B])〉 ∈P by the construction of δ
and µ representing.
(⇐)
Suppose that P- embeds into P. Let δ : P- → P be this embedding. Define µ : FL → P
by µ(A) = δ([A]). By δ an embedding and µ′ : FL → P- defined by µ′(A) = [A] an
NCI-likelihood assignment, it’s easy to verify both that µ is an NCI-likelihood assignment
and that µ represents - in P. 
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Proposition A.11
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, P a
likelihood space, µ : FL → P an NCIAM-likelihood assignment. Then, the relation -µ
over FL defined by
A -µ B⇔ µ(A)  µ(B)
satisfies
C0. Nontriviality
∅ ≺ ΩL.
C1a. Reflexivity
A - A.
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
C3b. Boundedness
⊥ - A - ΩL.
C4. Monotonicity
If A ∩C = B ∩C = ∅, then A - B if and only if A ∪C - B ∪C.
CA. Associativity
If A1 ∼ H4, B1 ∼ E3, C2 ∼ A1 ∪ B1, D2 ∼ F3, and G4 ∼ F3 ∪ E3 with matching
subscripts disjoint, then C2 ∪ D2 ∼ H4 ∪G4.
Proof. It remains only to establish (C4) and (CA). Note that (C4) is entailed by (M) given
the definition of -µ while (CA) is entailed by (A). 
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Proposition A.12
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, and -
a binary relation on FL satisfying
C0. Nontriviality
∅ ≺ ΩL.
C1a. Reflexivity
A - A.
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
C3b. Boundedness
⊥ - A - ΩL.
C4. Monotonicity
If A ∩C = B ∩C = ∅, then A - B if and only if A ∪C - B ∪C.
CA. Associativity
If A1 ∼ H4, B1 ∼ E3, C2 ∼ A1 ∪ B1, D2 ∼ F3, G4 ∼ F3 ∪ E3, and all sets with
matching subscripts are disjoint, then C2 ∪ D2 ∼ H4 ∪G4.
Then, there exists a likelihood structure 〈P-, ◦-〉 ("the likelihood structure induced by
-") such that - is representable in 〈P-, ◦-〉 by an NCIAM-Likelihood Assignment.
Proof. Let FL and - be given. Define P- as usual and ◦- : P- × P- 7→ P- by
[A] ◦- [B]↓= [C] if and only if there exists disjoint A′, B′ ∈ FL such that A′ ∈ [A],
B′ ∈ [B], and A′ ∪ B′ ∈ [C].
Noting that (C3b) and (C4) entail (CN), P- is a likelihood space by the previous subsection.
We know verify that 〈P-, ◦-〉 is a likelihood structure.
(a) Suppose that [A] ◦- [B] ↓= [C]. By definition, there exists disjoint sets A′, B′ ∈ FL
such that A′ ∈ [A], B′ ∈ [B], and A′ ∪ B′ ∈ [C]. It follows immediately that there
exists disjoint sets A′, B′ ∈ FL such that B′ ∈ [B], A′ ∈ [A], and B′ ∪ A′ ∈ [C], and
thus that [B] ◦- [A]↓= [A] ◦- [B].
(b) Suppose that [A] ∈ P-. Then, A, ∅ are disjoint sets such that A ∪ ∅ = A. It follows
that [A] ◦- 0˙↓= [A].
(c) Suppose that [A] ∈ P-. Then, A, Ac are disjoint sets such that A∪Ac = ΩL. It follows
that [A] ◦- [Ac]↓= 1˙.
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(d) Follows directly from (CA).
(e) Follows directly from (C4).
Let µ : FL → P- merely map any A ∈ FL to [A] ∈ P-. µ clearly satisfies (C) and (I).
Suppose that ϕ |= ψ. Then, ~ϕ ⊆ ~ψ. By (C3a), ∅ - ~ψ − ~ϕ and thus by (C4)
~ϕ - ~ψ. It follows immediately by the construction of µ and P- that µ(~ϕ)  µ(~ψ). µ
therefore satisfies (N) as well. Finally, µ applies ◦- for disjoint unions by construction. 
Proposition A.13
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, and -
a binary relation on FL satisfying
C0. Nontriviality
∅ ≺ ΩL.
C1a. Reflexivity
A - A.
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
C3b. Boundedness
⊥ - A - ΩL.
C4. Monotonicity
If A ∩C = B ∩C = ∅, then A - B if and only if A ∪C - B ∪C.
CA. Associativity
If A1 ∼ H4, B1 ∼ E3, C2 ∼ A1 ∪ B1, D2 ∼ F3, G4 ∼ F3 ∪ E3, and all sets with
matching subscripts are disjoint, then C2 ∪ D2 ∼ H4 ∪G4.
Then, - is representable in 〈P′, ◦′〉 if and only if 〈P-, ◦-〉 embeds into 〈P′, ◦′〉.
Proof.
(⇒)
Suppose that - is representable in 〈P′, ◦′〉. By definition, there exists µ : FL → P such
that for any A, B ∈ FL, A - B if and only if µ(A)  µ(B) and for any disjoint C,D ∈ FL,
µ(C ∪ D) = µ(C) ◦′ µ(D). Define δ : P- → P by δ([A]) = µ(A). Note that δ is well-defined
since, by above, any two representatives of the same equivalence class under ∼ must be
assigned the same likelihood by µ. It’s easy to verify both that δ′(0˙P-) = 0˙P and δ(1˙P-) = 1˙P
using (I) and (C). Note next that 〈[A], [B]〉 ∈P- if and only if 〈δ([A]), δ([B])〉 ∈P by
the construction of δ and µ representing. Finally, let C,D ∈ FL and disjoint. Then,
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δ([C] ◦- [D]) = δ([C ∪ D]) = µ(C ∪ D) = µ(C) ◦′ µ(D).
(⇐)
Suppose that 〈P-, ◦-〉 embeds into 〈P′, ◦′〉. Let δ : P- → P′ be this embedding. Define
µ : FL → P′ by µ(A) = δ([A]). By δ an embedding and µ′ : FL → P- defined by
µ′(A) = [A] representing -, it’s easy to verify that µ represents - in 〈P′, ◦′〉. 
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Appendix B
Proofs for Chapter 3
B.1 Proofs for Section 3.2
Proposition B.1
Let Ω be a set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, and - a binary relation over F .
Then,
(i) (C1b)⇒ (C1a)
(ii) (C5S )⇒ (C2)
(iii) (C3a), (C5S )⇒ (C3b)
(iv) (C5S )⇒ (C4).
Proof.
(i) Trivial.
(ii) Suppose A - B and B - C. Then, 〈A, B,C〉 and 〈B,C, A〉 are sequences which
contain each possibility in Ω the same number of times and have both A - B and B - C.
By (C5S ), we thus have that A - C as desired.
(iii) Let A ∈ F . 〈∅,Ω〉 and 〈Ac, A〉 are sequences which contain each possibility in Ω
the same number of times. Further, ∅ - Ac by C3a. By (C5S ), we thus have that A - Ω,
and thus by another application of (C3a), ∅ - A - Ω.
(iv) Suppose that A ∩C = B ∩C = ∅.
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(⇒) Suppose A - B. Then, 〈A, B ∪ C〉 and 〈B, A ∪ C〉 are sequences which contain each
possibility in Ω the same number of times with A - B. By (C5S ), A ∪C - B ∪C.
(⇐) Suppose A∪C - B∪C. Then, 〈A∪C, B〉 and 〈B∪C, A〉 are sequences which contain
each possibility in Ω the same number of times with A∪C - B∪C. By (C5S ), A - B.

Proposition B.2
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a finite model space for L,
and - a binary relation on FL. - is representable by an NCI-likelihood assignment
into 〈Q ∩ [0, 1], 0, 1,≤,+〉 if and only if - satisfies C01b3a5S .
Proof. The forward direction follows merely in virtue of noticing that the functions under
consideration are a strict subset of those in the Scott (1964) theorem. For the converse,
note that µ is completely determined once each individual model in ΩL has been assigned
a value (ΩL is finite and the eventual likelihood assignment µ must be additive). Our
strategy is simply to nudge any models assigned an irrational value onto a nearby rational
one while maintaining normalization.
Let µ′ be the real-valued function guaranteed by Scott’s result. We now construct
the desired function µ by modifying the probability of any model which is assigned an
irrational value under µ′. Noting that there are only a finite number of non-equivalent
sentences in L under ΩL, there must be a minimum, non-zero value r such that
r = |µ′(ϕ) − µ′(ϕ′)| for ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ L. Let q be a rational value such that 0 < q < r. Next, let
I ⊆ ΩL be the set of all models assigned irrational values by µ′. If |I| = 0, we may simply
take µ = µ′ and be done. Suppose, then, that |I| > 0. For all w ∈ ΩL−I, we set µ(w) = µ′(w).
Treating models in I assigned the same probability by µ′ as a group, we proceed through
the groups (there must be at least two given that the entries of I are irrational and the sum
rational) in order of decreasing probability relative to µ′. For all groups in I besides the
last, set all w in a given group to the same rational value from the interval
(µ′(w), µ′(w) +
( 1
2|ΩL | + 1
)
q].
For every w in the last group G, set
µ(w) =
1 −
∑
w′∈ΩL−G
µ(w′)
|G| .
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It is clear from the construction that µ(∅) = 0, that µ(ΩL) = 1, that µ is additive,
and that µ assigns only rational values; µ is thus an NCI-likelihood assignment to
〈Q ∩ [0, 1], 0, 1,≤,+〉. Similarly, it is obvious that µ has maintained equality relationships
within ΩL − I and within each group in I relative to that group. Notice, moreover, that
none of the groups in I whose probability was increased could now be equal either to
another such group or to a model in ΩL − I (q wouldn’t be less than the smallest difference
between any two sets from F relative to µ′). Finally, the last group in I can be equal neither
to any of the previously adjusted groups (it had the lowest probability and was revised
downward), nor any model in ΩL − I (q again wouldn’t be less than the smallest difference
between any two sets from F relative to µ′). It follows that µ maintains all equalities over
ΩL.
Lastly, notice that for any model w,
|µ(w) − µ′(w)| <
( |ΩL| − 1
2|ΩL | + 1
)
q
Since any A ∈ FL contains no more than |ΩL| models,
|µ(A) − µ′(A)| <
( 2|ΩL |
2|ΩL | + 1
)
q
And so, the largest possible change going from µ′ to µ for any A, B ∈ FL relative to one
another is strictly less than q which, by definition, is less than the smallest non-zero differ-
ence between any two sets under µ′. It follows immediately that µ preserves not only all
equality relations over FL, but also all ≺ relations as well. 
Proposition B.3
Let L be a formal language, ΩL a model space for L which contains only a single
model, and - a binary relation over FL. Then, - satisfies C01b3a5S if and only if it is
representable in
〈{0, 1}, 0, 1,≤〉 with ◦ (x, y) =
↑ if x = 1 and y = 1max(x, y) otherwise.
Proof.
(⇒)
FL is always {∅,ΩL}. Set µ(∅) = 0˙ and µ(ΩL) = 1˙.
(⇐)
FL is always {∅,ΩL}. We must have µ(∅) = 0˙ and µ(ΩL) = 1˙. It follows by definition that
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∅ ≺ ΩL. C01b3a5S are all easy to verify. 
Proposition B.4
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives and ΩL a model space for L.
Then, there exists a binary relation - on FL satisfying C01b3a5S which is not repre-
sentable in 〈[0, 1], 0, 1,≤,+〉.
Proof. It is easy to show that there exist linear orders whose cardinality is strictly greater
than the continuum. Let 〈A, <〉 be such an ordering and set σ = {Pa : a ∈ A} with the
model space which contains only valuations which assign a single ‘T’ value. Given any
sentence ϕ ∈ L can be expressed as a minimal disjunction of conjunctions of literals and
every set in FL corresponds to some such sentence, we may define our preorder over FL
by leveraging the syntactic structure of these disjunctions of conjunctions of literals.
In general, our strategy is simply to take a lexicographic ordering based on 〈A, <〉
of the sets in FL (note that every set either contains a finite number of valuations or is
missing a finite number of valuations). Define - over FL by
 For any A ∈ FL, A - A
 For any Pa, ∅ ≺ ~Pa
 ~Pa ≺ ~Pa′ if and only if a < a′
 For any Pa and Pa′ , ~Pa ≺ ~¬Pa′
 For any Pa and Pa′ , ~¬Pa ≺ ~¬Pa′ if and only if a′ < a
 For any ¬Pa, ~¬Pa ≺ ΩL
That is, each propositional letter identifies a unique valuation and is ordered according to
the associated a ∈ A. Moreover, all negative literals are ordered above all positive ones
with the former reversing the order of the latter; this gives a total ordering over both the
singletons of FL and every set missing only a single valuation.
Note next that intersections between these sets are only nontrivial for negative liter-
als, i.e. sets missing only a single valuation. Given a finite intersection of such sets A, a
finite number of valuations are missing. Ordering these valuations from greatest to least,
set A ≺ ΩL − {v1} where v1 is the greatest of these valuations (note the inversion caused
because we are subtracting valuations). Further, for any valuation v+ greater than v1, set
ΩL − {v+} ≺ A. Finally, for any two finite intersections of such sets A and B, set A ≺ B if
and only if, ordering the missing valuations from greatest to least, there exists a position
in which the nth missing valuation of A is strictly less than the nth missing valuation of B
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and all previous positions are equal, treating the lack of any additional missing valuations
as greater than any valuation. It follows immediately that all conjunctions of literals (and
any sentences equivalent to one of these) inL have been assigned a position in our ordering.
We need now only concern ourselves with disjunctions/unions of the sets above and,
again, we turn to a lexicographic ordering. For any union A, order the union sets from
the greatest A1 to least An. Thus, A = ∪ni=1Ai, and we set both A1 ≺ A and A ≺ A+1 where
A+1 is any non-unioned set greater than A1 from the previous stage. For any two unioned
sets A and B, set A ≺ B if and only if ordering each of the unions from greatest to least
and starting with the former, there exists an n such that the nth greatest set of B is strictly
greater than the nth greatest set of A with all previous disjuncts equal, treating the lack of
any remaining sets as less than any actual set.
It is easy to verify that C0, C1a, Clb, C2, and C3 hold with the defined relation -.
Suppose that two sequences from FL, 〈A1, . . . , AN〉 and 〈B1, . . . , BN〉, contain each point in
ΩL the same number of times. Note that, without loss of generality, every Ai and Bi can
be expressed as a union of intersections of our basic sets (singletons or the complements
thereof). Assume that Ai - Bi for all i < N and—for contradiction—that AN ≺ BN .
Let D denote the largest unioned set occurring within any of B1, . . . , BN which doesn’t
immediately reoccur in the corresponding Ai. Note that, if no such D exists, the two
sequences contain equivalent sentences at each position, and thus BN - AN contra our
supposition. Since the two sequences 〈A1, . . . , AN〉 and 〈B1, . . . , BN〉 contain the same
number of truths, it must be that D also occurs within one of the A1, . . . , AN without
appearing in the corresponding Bi. Consider this Ai and Bi. By the definition of D, there is
no greater disjunct within Bi which doesn’t also occur within Ai. But, the construction of
- together with D’s appearance in Ai and not in Bi entails that Bi ≺ Ai—a contradiction. It
follows immediately that C5a likewise holds for the constructed relation -, and thus also
C4.
Lastly, we show that no function µ represents - in 〈[0, 1], 0, 1,≤,+〉. Note that, by
the construction of L and the mimicking of the 〈A,〉 order within the ~Pa, - makes each
~Pa for a ∈ A distinct from every other. Since |A| > c, there exists, for any µ : L → [0, 1],
a, a′ ∈ A such that a < a′ (and thus ~Pa ≺ ~Pa′), but µ(Pa) = µ(Pa′). 
Proposition B.5
Let 〈P, ◦〉 be a likelihood structure. Then, there exists a propositional language L,
model space ΩL, and C01b3a5S relation - on FL such that - is not represented in
〈P, ◦〉 by any NCI-likelihood assignment.
Proof. Simply run the construction above with a total order whose cardinality is strictly
greater than that of |P|. By construction, any prospective likelihood assignment must assign
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two sets A, B ∈ FL to the same value p ∈ P despite A ≺ B. 
B.2 Proofs for Section 3.3
Proposition B.6
Let Ω be a finite set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, S B the 2-Brier score, and E
a tuple of events 〈E1, . . . , En〉 with n ≥ 1 and E1, . . . , En ∈ F .
(i) For any 2-forecast f over E, if f is not 2-probabilistic, then there exists a 2-
probabilistic 2-forecast f ∗ such that S B( f ∗,w) ≺ S B( f ,w) for every w ∈ Ω.
(ii) For any 2-probabilistic 2-forecast f over E, there exists no 2-forecast f ∗ such
that S ( f ∗,w)  S ( f ,w) for every w ∈ Ω and S ( f ∗,w) ≺ S ( f ,w) for some w ∈ Ω.
Proof. Let f [1] denote the element from [0, 1]n such that fi[1] = f [1]i for every i. Let f [2]
denote the element from [0, 1]n such that fi[2] = f [2]i for every i.
(i): Suppose f is not 2-probabilistic. It follows immediately that either f [1] is not
probabilistic, f [2] is not probabilistic, or both f [1] and f [2] are not probabilistic. In
every case, part (i) of the de Finetti (1979); Savage (1971) theorem provides strictly
dominating probabilistic forecasts, and so we replace the non-probabilistic forecasts with
these probabilistic ones. In the third case for example, part (i) of the de Finetti (1979);
Savage (1971) theorem provides a probabilistic forecast f ∗[1] and f ∗[2] each of which
strictly dominate their non-probabilistic counterparts. f ∗i = 〈 f ∗[1]i, f ∗[2]i〉 is then a
2-forecast. Since the 2-Brier score is simple a pair of Brier scores over the first and second
components, f ∗’s 2-Brier score strictly dominates f ’s simply in virtue of f ∗[1] strictly
dominating f [1].
(ii): Suppose that f is a 2-probabilistic 2-forecast. Assume for reductio that there exists
a 2-forecast f which weakly dominates it. By definition, the 2-Brier score of f is at least
as small as that of f ∗ in every world and strictly smaller in at least one. By part (ii) of
the de Finetti (1979); Savage (1971) theorem, no forecast f ′ weakly dominates f ∗[1], so
the first component of f ’s 2-Brier score cannot be both at least as small as that of f ∗ in
every world and strictly smaller in some world. f must, then, weakly dominate f ∗ by
matching the first component of f ∗’s 2-Brier score in every world and doing better in the
second component. Applying part (ii) of the de Finetti (1979); Savage (1971) theorem
again, however, no forecast f ′′ weakly dominates f ∗[2]. The second component of f ’s
2-Brier score cannot then be both at least as small as that of f ∗ in every world and strictly
smaller in some world. f does not, then, weakly dominate f ∗. 
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Appendix C
Proofs for Chapter 4
C.1 Proofs for Section 4.3
Proposition C.1
For a propositional language L, consistent Σ ⊆ L, and ϕ, ψ ∈ L,
ϕ -PLΣ ψ⇔ ~ϕΣ ⊆ ~ψΣ.
Proof.
(⇒)
Suppose that ϕ -PL
Σ
ψ. By definition, it follows that Σ, ϕ |=PL ψ, and thus that every Σ-model
which makes ϕ true also makes ψ true, i.e. ~ϕΣ ⊆ ~ψΣ.
(⇐)
Suppose that ~ϕΣ ⊆ ~ψΣ, i.e. every Σ-model which makes ϕ true also makes ψ true. It
follows immediately that Σ, ϕ |=PL ψ, and thus ϕ -PLΣ ψ. 
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Proposition C.2
For a propositional language L, consistent Σ ⊆ L, and ϕ, ψ ∈ L,
(i) Non-triviality
⊥ ≺PL
Σ
>.
(ii) Transitivity
For any ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3 ∈ L, if ϕ1 -PLΣ ϕ2 and ϕ2 -PLΣ ϕ3, then ϕ1 -PLΣ ϕ3.
(iii) Reflexivity
For any ϕ ∈ L, ϕ -PL
Σ
ϕ.
(iv) Boundedness
For any ϕ ∈ L such that ϕ /PL
Σ
⊥ and ϕ /Σ >, ⊥ ≺PLΣ ϕ ≺PLΣ >.
(v) Monotonicity
If ϕ ∧ γ ∼PL
Σ
ψ ∧ γ ∼PL
Σ
⊥, then ϕ -PL
Σ
ψ if and only if ϕ ∨ γ -PL
Σ
ψ ∨ γ.
Proof. Characteristics (i)-(v) all follow immediately from the characterization in terms of
sets of models. 
Proposition C.3
For a first-order language L, consistent Σ ⊆ L, and ϕ, ψ ∈ L,
(i) Non-triviality
⊥ ≺FOL
Σ
>.
(ii) Transitivity
For any ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3 ∈ L, if ϕ1 -FOLΣ ϕ2 and ϕ2 -FOLΣ ϕ3, then ϕ1 -FOLΣ ϕ3.
(iii) Reflexivity
For any ϕ ∈ L, ϕ -FOL
Σ
ϕ.
(iv) Boundedness
For any ϕ ∈ L such that ϕ /FOL
Σ
⊥ and ϕ /FOL
Σ
>, ⊥ ≺FOL
Σ
ϕ ≺FOL
Σ
>.
(v) Monotonicity
If ϕ ∧ γ ∼FOL
Σ
ψ ∧ γ ∼FOL
Σ
⊥, then ϕ -FOL
Σ
ψ if and only if ϕ ∨ γ -FOL
Σ
ψ ∨ γ.
Proof. (i) Since Σ is consistent, Σ,⊥ |=FOL > and Σ,> 6|=FOL ⊥.
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(ii) Suppose ϕ1 -FOLΣ ϕ2 and ϕ2 -
FOL
Σ
ϕ3. By definition, Σ, ϕ1 |=FOL ϕ2 and Σ, ϕ2 |=FOL ϕ3. It
follows by elementary metalogic that Σ, ϕ1 |=FOL ϕ3, and thus that ϕ1 -FOLΣ ϕ3.
(iii) For any ϕ, Σ, ϕ |=FOL ϕ.
(iv) Suppose that ϕ /FOL
Σ
⊥ and ϕ /FOL
Σ
>. Since Σ,⊥ |=FOL ϕ and ϕ /FOLΣ ⊥, it must be that
Σ, ϕ 6|=FOL ⊥. It follows that ⊥ ≺FOLΣ ϕ. Similarly, since Σ, ϕ |=FOL > and ϕ /FOLΣ >, it
must be that Σ,> 6|=FOL ϕ. It follows immediately that ϕ ≺FOLΣ >.
(v) Suppose ϕ ∧ γ ∼FOL
Σ
ψ ∧ γ ∼FOL
Σ
⊥.
(⇒)
Assume that ϕ -FOL
Σ
ψ. By definition, Σ, ϕ |=FOL ψ. It follows by elementary metalogic
that Σ, ϕ ∨ γ |=FOL ψ ∨ γ.
(⇐)
Assume that ϕ ∨ γ -FOL
Σ
ψ ∨ γ. By definition, Σ, ϕ ∨ γ |=FOL ψ ∨ γ. Since there are no
Σ-models which make ϕ ∧ γ true, it follows that every Σ-model which makes ϕ true
also makes ψ true, i.e. Σ, ϕ |=FOL ψ.

C.2 Proofs for Section 4.4
Proposition C.4
Let L be a propositional language, ΩL a finite model space for L, and Σ ⊆ L a consis-
tent (with respect to ΩL) set. Then, µLΣ satisfies Kolmogorov’s probability axioms overF +L .
Proof. First, observe that the definition of µL
Σ
entails that µL
Σ
only assigns rational values
between 0 and 1. (K1) thus follows directly from the definition provided. Similarly, (K2)
follows immediately from the fact that µL
Σ
(ΩL) =
|ΩL∩ΩL,Σ |
|ΩL,Σ | = 1. Finally, let E1, E2, . . . be
a countable sequence of disjoint sets. Given ΩL is finite, E1, E2, . . . must produce a finite
sequence E′1, . . . , E
′
n when ∅ is eliminated.
µL
Σ
(∪ni=1E′i ) =
|ΩL,Σ ∩ ∪ni=1E′i |
|ΩL,Σ|
=
|ΩL,Σ ∩ E′1| + · · · + |ΩL,Σ ∩ E′n|
|ΩL,Σ|
=
|ΩL,Σ ∩ E′1|
|ΩL,Σ| + · · · +
|ΩL,Σ ∩ E′n|
|ΩL,Σ|
= Σni=1µ
L
Σ
(E′i ).
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Since µL
Σ
(∅) = 0, the original E1, E2, . . . sequence also satisfies (K3). 
Proposition C.5
Let L be a propositional language, ΩL a finite model space for L, Σ ⊆ L a consistent
(with respect to ΩL) set, and ϕ a sentence consistent with ΩL,Σ. Then, for any ψ,
µL
Σ
(ψ|ϕ) = µL
Σ∪{ϕ}(ψ)
Proof.
µL
Σ
(ψ|ϕ) = µ
L
Σ
(ψ ∧ ϕ)
µL
Σ
(ϕ)
=
( |~ψ ∧ ϕL,Σ|
|ΩL,Σ|
)( |ΩL,Σ|
|~ϕL,Σ|
)
=
|~ψ ∧ ϕL,Σ|
|~ϕL,Σ|
=
|~ψL,Σ∪{ϕ}|
|ΩL,Σ∪{ϕ}|
= µL
Σ{ϕ}(ψ).

Proposition C.6
Let L be a propositional language, ΩL a finite model space for L, and Σ ⊆ L a consis-
tent (with respect to ΩL) set. Then,
ϕ -PLΣ ψ⇒ ϕ -LΣ ψ
ϕ -L
Σ
ψ 6⇒ ϕ -PLΣ ψ.
Proof. Suppose that ϕ -PL
Σ
ψ. By construction, every model of ϕ is also a model of ψ. It
follows immediately that ~ϕL,Σ ⊆ ~ψL,Σ as well and thus ϕ -LΣ ψ.
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Consider the propositional language L generated from signature σ = {P,Q}, ΩL as
every propositional L-model, and Σ = ∅. By definition,
P ∧ Q -L
Σ
P ∧ ¬Q
P ∧ Q PLΣ P ∧ ¬Q

C.3 Proofs for Section 4.5
Proposition C.7
For any interpreted propositional languages L = 〈L,ΩL〉 and L+ = 〈L+,ΩL+〉, if L+
is a completely restricted extension of L, then there exists a bijection δ : ΩL → ΩL+
which preserves the truth of all L-sentences.
Proof. Let v ∈ ΩL. By L+ a completely restricted extension, for every propositional letter
P added between L and L+, there exists a set RP ⊆ ΩL which indicates the truth or falsity
of P. Thus, for each propositional letter P, if v ∈ RP, then all valuations in ΩL+ extending v
assign P the value T ; similarly, for each propositional letter P, if v < RP, then all valuations
in ΩL+ extending v assign P the value F. Put together, these conditions guarantee that there
exists a unique valuation v+ ∈ ΩL+ extending v. Set δ(v) = v+. Since v+ is an extension of
v, v+(ϕ) = v(ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ L. 
Proposition C.8
Let interpreted propositional languages L = 〈L,ΩL〉 and L+ = 〈L+,ΩL+〉 as well as
a consistent (with respect to ΩL) theory Σ be given. If L+ is a completely restricted
extension of L and ΩL+,Σ is finite and non-empty, then for any set A ∈ F +L ,
µL
Σ
(A) = µL
+
Σ
(A+)
where A+ = {v+ ∈ ΩL+ : v+|L ∈ A}.
Proof. Since the truth value of any sentence ϕ ∈ L is fixed across the bijection produced
by the previous proposition, δ[A] = A+, δ[ΩL,Σ] = ΩL+,Σ, and δ[A ∩ΩL,Σ] = A+ ∩ΩL,Σ. As
a result,
|A ∩ΩL,Σ|
|ΩL,Σ| =
|A+ ∩ΩL+,Σ|
|ΩL+,Σ|
and so by definition
µL
Σ
(A) = µL
+
Σ
(A+).
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Proposition C.9
Let L = 〈L,ΩL〉 be an interpreted propositional language and Σ ⊆ L a theory such
that ΩL,Σ is finite and nonempty. If L+ = 〈L,ΩL+〉 is a finite, unrestricted extension of
L, then for any A ∈ F +L,Σ,
µL
Σ
(A) = µL
+
Σ
(A+)
where A+ = {v+ ∈ ΩL+ : v+|L ∈ A}.
Proof. Let v0 ∈ ΩL,Σ. We show by induction that, for any extension of n propositional
letters, there exists exactly 2n total valuations in ΩL+,Σ which extend v0.
If n = 0, then the result holds trivially.
Suppose that for any expansion of n propositional letters, there exists exactly 2n to-
tal valuations in ΩL+,Σ which extend v0. Faced with an extension of n + 1 propositional
letters, we may rewrite this into an n-letter extension to an intermediary language Ln
(defined as above) followed by a one letter extension to L+. By hypothesis, we have
that there exists exactly 2n total valuations in ΩLn,Σ which extend v0. Consider now the
one letter extension from Ln to L+. In particular, let vn be one of the 2n extensions of
v0. Since ΩL+,Σ = {L+-valuations v : v|L ∈ ΩL,Σ} = {L+-valuations v : v ↓Ln∈ ΩLn,Σ},
there exists exactly two valuations in ΩL+,Σ which extend vn; one which maps the new
propositional latter to T and one which maps the new propositional letter to F. Since vn
was arbitrary, this holds for every one of the 2n extensions of v0; further, none of these
extensions can overlap since each of the vn are distinct. It must be then that there exists
exactly 2 ∗ 2n = 2n+1 expansions of v0 in ΩL+,Σ.
Let A ∈ F +L,Σ. Then, for every v0 ∈ A there exists 2n distinct extensions of v0 in
ΩL+,Σ. That is, |A+| = 2n(|A|). Similarly, |ΩL+,Σ| = 2n(|ΩL,Σ|). It follows that
|A+|
|ΩL+,Σ| =
2n(|A|)
2n(|ΩL,Σ|) =
|A|
|ΩL,Σ|
and thus
µL
Σ
(A) = µL
+
Σ (A
+).

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C.4 Proofs for Section 4.6
Definition C.1 A first-order signature σ is a set of symbols each of which is either a con-
stant, a relation symbol with a fixed arity n ∈ N − {0}, or a function symbol with a fixed
arity n ∈ N − {0}.
Definition C.2 The terms of a first-order signature σ are the strings of symbols defined as
follows:
 Every variable is a term of σ.
 Every constant in σ is a term of σ.
 For n > 0, if f is an n-ary function symbol from σ and t1, . . . , tn are terms of σ, then
f (t1, . . . , tn) is a term of σ as well.
 Nothing else is a term of σ.
Definition C.3 A closed term is a term with no variables.
If a term is introduced as t(x¯) this indicates that x¯ is a sequence (x0, x1, . . . , xn) of variables,
and every variable which occurs in t is among the variables in x¯.
Definition C.4 The atomic formulas of a signature σ are the strings of symbols generated
by:
 If s and t are terms of σ, then ‘s = t’ is an atomic formula of σ.
 For n > 0, if R is an n-ary relation symbol from σ, and t1, . . . , tn are terms of σ, then
the expression R(t1, . . . , tn) is an atomic formula of σ.
Definition C.5 An atomic sentence is an atomic formula in which there are no variables
or–equivalently–all of whose terms are closed.
Just as with terms, if we introduce an atomic formula ϕ as ϕ(x¯), then ϕ(s¯) means the
atomic formula got from ϕ by putting terms from the sequence s¯ in place of all occurrences
of the corresponding variables in x¯.
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Definition C.6 The set of well-formed formulas from signature σ is the set defined by:
 Every atomic formula from σ is a well-formed formula from σ.
 For any well-formed formulas ϕ(x¯) and ψ(x¯) from σ,
¬ϕ(x¯) is a well-formed formula of σ.
(ϕ(x¯) ∧ ψ(x¯)) is a well-formed formula of σ.
(ϕ(x¯) ∨ ψ(x¯)) is a well-formed formula of σ.
(ϕ(x¯)→ ψ(x¯)) is a well-formed formula of σ.
(ϕ(x¯)↔ ψ(x¯)) is a well-formed formula of σ.
∀v ϕ(x¯) where v is any variable is a well-formed formula of σ.
∃v ϕ(x¯) where v is any variable is a well-formed formula of σ.
Definition C.7 A variable v in a formula ϕ(x¯) of a signature σ is free if and only if either
 ϕ(x¯) is an atomic formula from signature σ and v occurs in ϕ(x¯) or
 ϕ(x¯) is a formula from signature σ, v was free up to the last step in the construction
of ϕ(x¯), and the last step in the construction of ϕ(x¯) did not prepend either ∀v or ∃v.
Definition C.8 A first-order language L with signature σ is the set of formulas from σwith
no free variables, also called sentences.
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Definition C.9 Let L be a first-order language generated from signature σL, and A a
canonical-domain model for L. Furthermore, let t(x¯) be a term of L and a¯ a sequence
of elements from A at least as long as x¯. Then, by recursion on the complexity of the term
t,
 If t(x¯) is c for some constant c of the signature L, then tA[a¯] is cA.
 If t(x¯) is xi for some variable xi in x¯, then tA[a¯] is ai; that is, the corresponding entry
in the tuple a¯.
 If t(x¯) is f (s¯) for some function symbol f and tuple of terms s¯, then tA[a¯] is
f A(sA1 [a¯], . . . , s
A
n [a¯]).
Note that these three clauses fix the denotation of any term in L when it is paired with a
tuple of elements from dom(A) of appropriate length. This done, we may now define truth
in a (canonical-domain) model or the  relation. Again, the definition is recursive, but now
on the complexity of the formula. First, suppose that ϕ(x¯) is atomic. Then, given a tuple of
elements a¯ at least as long as x¯,
 A  R(t1, . . . , tn)[a¯] is true for some relation symbol R in L if and only if
〈tA1 [a¯], . . . , tAn [a¯]〉 ∈ RA, and
 A  t = s [a¯] if and only if tA[a¯] = sA[a¯].
Finally, the recursive step:
 A  ¬ϕ[a¯] if and only if A 6 ϕ[a¯]
 A  ϕ[a¯] ∧ ψ[a¯] if and only if A  ϕ[a¯] and A  ψ[a¯].
 A  ϕ[a¯] ∨ ψ[a¯] if and only if A  ϕ[a¯] or A  ψ[a¯].
 A  ∀y ϕ[y, a¯] if and only if for every element b of A, A  ϕ[b, a¯]
 A  ∃y ϕ[y, a¯] if and only if for some element b of A, A  ϕ[b, a¯].
Proposition C.10
Let L be a first-order language, Γ ⊆ L, and ϕ ∈ L. Then,
Γ |= ϕ if and only if Γ |=C ϕ.
Proof. Since every canonical-domain model is a first-order model, it suffices to show that
for any first-order modelM there exists an isomorphic canonical-domain modelM′. Let
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M be given. By definition, there exists a canonical domain with the same cardinality as
|M|; let this be the domain of M′. Since |M| and |M′| have the same cardinality, there
exists a bijection δ between them. For any symbol s from σL, set the extension of s as
δ(sM). It follows immediately that δ is an isomorphism betweenM andM′ as desired. 
Proposition C.11
Let L be a first-order language, ΩL a finite model space for L, and Σ ⊆ L a set of
sentences consistent with ΩL. Then, µLΣ satisfies Kolmogorov’s probability axioms overF +L .
Proof. First, observe that the definition of µL
Σ
entails that µL
Σ
only assigns rational values
between 0 and 1. (K1) thus follows directly from the definition provided. Similarly, (K2)
follows immediately from the fact that µL
Σ
(ΩL) =
|ΩL∩ΩL,Σ |
|ΩL,Σ | = 1. Finally, let E1, E2, . . . be
a countable sequence of disjoint sets. Given ΩL is finite, E1, E2, . . . must produce a finite
sequence E′1, . . . , E
′
n when ∅ is eliminated.
µL
Σ
(∪ni=1E′i ) =
|ΩL,Σ ∩ ∪ni=1E′i |
|ΩL,Σ|
=
|ΩL,Σ ∩ E′1| + · · · + |ΩL,Σ ∩ E′n|
|ΩL,Σ|
=
|ΩL,Σ ∩ E′1|
|ΩL,Σ| + · · · +
|ΩL,Σ ∩ E′n|
|ΩL,Σ|
= Σni=1µ
L
Σ
(E′i ).
Since µL
Σ
(∅) = 0, the original E1, E2, . . . sequence also satisfies (K3). 
Corollary C.1
Let L be a first-order language, ΩL a finite model space for L, and Σ ⊆ L a set of
sentences consistent with ΩL. Then, for any ϕ consistent with ΩL,Σ and any ψ,
µL
Σ
(ψ|ϕ) = µL
Σ∪{ϕ}(ψ).
Proof.
µL
Σ
(ψ|ϕ) = µ
L
Σ
(ψ ∧ ϕ)
µL
Σ
(ϕ)
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=( |~ψ ∧ ϕL,Σ|
|ΩL,Σ|
)( |ΩL,Σ|
|~ϕL,Σ|
)
=
|~ψ ∧ ϕL,Σ|
|~ϕL,Σ|
=
|~ψL,Σ∪{ϕ}|
|ΩL,Σ∪{ϕ}|
= µL
Σ∪{ϕ}(ψ).

Proposition C.12
Let L be an interpreted first-order language, L+ a completely restricted extension of
L, and Σ ⊆ L. If ΩL,Σ is non-empty and finite, then for any A ∈ F +L ,
µL
Σ
(A) = µL
+
Σ
(A+)
where A+ = {M+ ∈ ΩL+ : M+|L ∈ A}.
Proof. We construct a bijection δ from ΩL to ΩL+ which preserves the truth of all L-
sentences. Let M ∈ ΩL. Since L+ is a completely restricted extension, there exists a
unique L+-model M+ ∈ ΩL+ such that M+|L = M. Set δ(M) = M+, and note that this
construction guarantees that δ is injective. Surjectivity now follows immediately from the
fact that L+ is an extension of L. Note finally thatM  ϕ if only ifM+  ϕ for any ϕ ∈ L
since the extensions of symbols in L are unchanged between the two. Thus,
|A ∩ΩL,Σ|
|ΩL,Σ| =
|δ[A ∩ΩL,Σ]|
|δ[ΩL,Σ]|
=
|A+ ∩ΩL+,Σ|
|ΩL+,Σ| .

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Proposition C.13
Let L be a first-order interpreted language, L+ an unrestricted extension of L by a
finite number of symbols, and Σ ⊆ L. If every canonical-domain modelM ∈ ΩL has
the same domain and ΩL,Σ is both nonempty and finite, then for any set A ∈ F +L ,
µL
Σ
(A) = µL
+
Σ
(A+)
where A+ = {L+-modelsM+ ∈ ΩL+ : M+|L ∈ A}.
Proof. We show that ΩL+,Σ can be partitioned into parts of equal size with all L+-models
in each part reducing to the same L-model from ΩL,Σ. First, note that since ΩL,Σ is finite
and L+ is an extension by a finite number of symbols, ΩL+,Σ is likewise finite. Partition
the modelsM+ ∈ ΩL+,Σ based on their reduction to L, i.e. based onM+|L. Since L+ is an
extension of L,M+|L ∈ ΩL, and thusM+|L ∈ ΩL,Σ.
Consider any two parts of this partition. By construction, every model in these parts reduces
to M,M′ ∈ ΩL,Σ respectively. Further, these parts must contain every L+-model which
so reduces since L+ is an unrestricted extension. We now construct a bijection between
the parts by pairing models. Let M+ be a model from the first part which reduces to M.
We may fix a unique corresponding model M′+ from the second part by adjoining M+’s
extension for each new symbol toM′. This process clearly delivers an injective function
from the first part to the second. Surjectivity can be established by noting that the process
above can be reversed to find a unique model from the first part for any model from the
second. The defined function is thus a bijection between these two parts. Since these parts
were themselves arbitrary, it follows that every part in the partition has the same cardinality.
Finally, note that each part in the partition assigns identical truth values across L
(though different parts may assign different values) since each corresponds to exactly one
model from ΩL,Σ. Thus, for any A ∈ FL,
|A ∩ΩL,Σ|
|ΩL,Σ| =
number of parts (in ΩL+,Σ) which reduce to an L-model in A
total number of parts (in ΩL,Σ)
=
|A+ ∩ΩL,Σ|
|ΩL+,Σ|
since all parts are of the same finite size. 
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Appendix D
Proofs for Chapter 5
D.1 Proofs for Section 5.1
Proposition D.1
For any finite Ω and A ⊆ Ω, if g : Ω→ Ω′ is a bijection, then
µFin(A,Ω) = µFin(g[A], g[Ω]).
Proof. Let g : Ω → Ω′ be a bijection. By definition, |A| = | f (A)| and |Ω| = |Ω′|. It follows
immediately that µFin(A,Ω) = µFin(g[A], g[Ω]). 
Proposition D.2
Let Ω be a set of possibilities, F an algebra over Ω, and µ : F → [0,∞] a measure.
Suppose that
(i) Ω is infinite,
(ii) B ∈ F is an infinite set with 0 < µ(B) < ∞, and
(iii) there exists A, A′, A′1, A
′
2 ∈ F such that |A| = |A′| = |A′1| = |A′2|, A, A′ partition B,
and A′1, A
′
2 partition A
′.
Then, there exists a bijection g : Ω→ Ω such that for some set A ∈ F ,
µ(A) , µ(g[A]).
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Proof. Since µ is a measure, it must be the case that µ(A) + µ(A′) = µ(B). If µ(A) , µ(A′),
let g send A to A′ bijectively (recall, |A| = |A′|) while leaving all other elements of Ω fixed.
Otherwise, repeat the decomposition on A′ to produce A′1 and A
′
2 with |A| = |A′| = |A′1| = |A′2|
and µ(A′1) + µ(A
′
2) = µ(A
′). At least one of µ(A′1) and µ(A
′
2 must be strictly less than µ(A
′).
Without loss of generality, suppose that it is µ(A′1). Let g send A to A
′
1 bijectively while
leaving all other elements fixed. In all cases, we have µ(A) , µ(g[A]) as desired. 
D.2 Proofs for Section 5.2
Proposition D.3
Let Ω be given. Then for any choice of A, B,C ∈ P(Ω), -† satisfies
C0. Nontriviality
∅ ≺ Ω.
C1a. Reflexivity
A - A.
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
C3a. Nonnegativity
⊥ - A.
C3b. Bounded
⊥ - A - Ω.
C4. Monotonicity
If A ∩C = B ∩C = ∅, then A - B if and only if A ∪C - B ∪C.
Proof.
C0: ∅ trivially embeds in Ω but not vice-versa.
C1a: A − A = ∅ for any A, and thus A ∼† A
C2: We proceed by cases.
 Suppose that A ∼† B and B ∼† C. It follows immediately that |A − B| = |B − A| and
|B −C| = |C − B| with all values finite. Rewriting the former equality, we have
|A ∩ Bc| = |Ac ∩ B|
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The first and second terms here can be expressed as sums:
|A ∩ Bc| = |A ∩ Bc ∩C| + |A ∩ Bc ∩Cc|
|Ac ∩ B| = |Ac ∩ B ∩C| + |Ac ∩ B ∩Cc|.
Substituting we thus have
|A ∩ Bc ∩C| + |A ∩ Bc ∩Cc| = |Ac ∩ B ∩C| + |Ac ∩ B ∩Cc|. (?)
Rewriting |B −C| = |C − B|,
|B ∩Cc| = |Bc ∩C|.
The first and second terms here too can be expressed as sums:
|B ∩Cc| = |A ∩ B ∩Cc| + |Ac ∩ B ∩Cc|
|Bc ∩C| = |A ∩ Bc ∩C| + |Ac ∩ Bc ∩C|.
Substituting we thus have
|A ∩ B ∩Cc| + |Ac ∩ B ∩Cc| = |A ∩ Bc ∩C| + |Ac ∩ Bc ∩C|
|Ac ∩ B ∩Cc| = |A ∩ Bc ∩C| + |Ac ∩ Bc ∩C| − |A ∩ B ∩Cc|.
Replacing the |Ac ∩ B ∩Cc| term in (?) by the righthand side above,
|A ∩ Bc ∩C| + |A ∩ Bc ∩Cc| = |Ac ∩ B ∩C| + |A ∩ Bc ∩C| + |Ac ∩ Bc ∩C|
− |A ∩ B ∩Cc|
|A ∩ Bc ∩Cc| = |Ac ∩ B ∩C| + |Ac ∩ Bc ∩C| − |A ∩ B ∩Cc|
|A ∩ Bc ∩Cc| + |A ∩ B ∩Cc| = |Ac ∩ B ∩C| + |Ac ∩ Bc ∩C|.
Collapsing terms,
|A −C| = |C − A|.
 Suppose that A ≺† B and B ≺† C. By definition, there exists an injection g : A− B→
B − A and an injection g′ : B − C → C − B but no injection h : A − B → B − A and
no injection h′ : C − B → B − C. Represented in terms of disjoint collections and
shortening sequences of intersections A ∩ B ∩C to ABC,
g : ABcCc ∪ ABcC → AcBCc ∪ AcBC
g′ : AcBCc ∪ ABCc → AcBcC ∪ ABcC.
If all collections are finite, then we have by our injections g, g′:
|ABcCc| + |ABcC| < |AcBCc| + |AcBC|
|AcBCc| + |ABCc| < |AcBcC| + |ABcC|.
Summing
|ABcCc| + |ABcC| + |AcBCc| + |ABCc| < |AcBCc| + |AcBC| + |AcBcC| + |ABcC|.
Canceling duplicate terms,
|ABcCc| + |ABCc| < |AcBC| + |AcBcC|
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|A −C| < |C − A|.
It follows by definition that A −C ≺† C − A.
Suppose, then, that at least one collection in g, g′ above is infinite. Since all collec-
tions are disjoint, it follows immediately that there exists an injection
g+ : ABcCc ∪ ABcC ∪ AcBCc ∪ ABCc → AcBCc ∪ AcBC ∪ AcBcC ∪ ABcC
An infinite collection must thus appear in the range of g+. Noting further that two
of the collections appear in both the domain and range, either AcBC, AcBcC, or both
must be both infinite and strictly ‘larger’ than all the other collections in order to
produce the injection discrepancy above (either the axiom of choice or a class-analog
is required here depending on the nature of the collections). Exploiting this size
discrepancy, it follows immediately that there exist an injection
g− : ABcCc ∪ ABCc → AcBC ∪ AcBcC
as well as no inverse injection
h− : AcBC ∪ AcBcC → ABcCc ∪ ABCc
 Suppose that A ∼† B and B ≺† C. By definition, |A− B| = |B−A| with both finite and
there exists an injection g′ : B − C → C − B but no injection h′ : C − B→ B − C. If
all collections are finite, then we have:
|ABcCc| + |ABcC| = |AcBCc| + |AcBC|
|AcBCc| + |ABCc| < |AcBcC| + |ABcC|.
Summing
|ABcCc| + |ABcC| + |AcBCc| + |ABCc| < |AcBCc| + |AcBC| + |AcBcC| + |ABcC|.
Canceling duplicate terms,
|ABcCc| + |ABCc| < |AcBC| + |AcBcC|
|A −C| < |C − A|.
It follows by definition that A −C ≺† C − A.
Suppose, then, that at least one collection in g′ is infinite. Since all collections are
disjoint, it follows immediately that there exists an injection
g+ : ABcCc ∪ ABcC ∪ AcBCc ∪ ABCc → AcBCc ∪ AcBC ∪ AcBcC ∪ ABcC.
An infinite collection must thus appear in the range of g+. Noting further that two
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of the collections appear in both the domain and range, AcBcC must be both infinite
and strictly ‘larger’ than all the other collections in order to produce the injection
discrepancy above (as earlier, either the axiom of choice or a class-analog is required
here). Exploiting this size discrepancy, it follows immediately that there exist an
injection
g− : ABcCc ∪ ABCc → AcBC ∪ AcBcC
as well as no inverse injection
h− : AcBC ∪ AcBcC → ABcCc ∪ ABCc.
By definition, A −C ≺† C − A.
 Suppose that A ≺† B and B ∼† C. By definition, |B − C| = |C − B| with both finite
and there exists an injection g : A − B→ B − A but no injection h : B − A→ A − B.
If all collections are finite, we have:
|ABcCc| + |ABcC| < |AcBCc| + |AcBC|
|AcBCc| + |ABCc| = |AcBcC| + |ABcC|.
Summing
|ABcCc| + |ABcC| + |AcBCc| + |ABCc| < |AcBCc| + |AcBC| + |AcBcC| + |ABcC|.
Canceling duplicate terms,
|ABcCc| + |ABCc| < |AcBC| + |AcBcC|
|A −C| < |C − A|.
It follows immediately that A −C ≺† C − A.
Suppose, then, that at least one collection in g is infinite. Since all collections are
disjoint, there exists an injection
g+ : ABcCc ∪ ABcC ∪ AcBCc ∪ ABCc → AcBCc ∪ AcBC ∪ AcBcC ∪ ABcC
An infinite collection must thus appear in the range of g+. Noting that two of the
collections appear in both the domain and range, AcBC must be both infinite and
strictly ‘larger’ than all the other collections in order to produce the injection dis-
crepancy above (as earlier, either the axiom of choice or a class-analog is required
here). Exploiting this size discrepancy, it follows immediately that there exist an
injection
g− : ABcCc ∪ ABCc → AcBC ∪ AcBcC
as well as no inverse injection
h− : AcBC ∪ AcBcC → ABcCc ∪ ABCc.
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By definition, A −C ≺† C − A.
C3a: For A = ∅, ∅ ∼† A follows from (C1a). Otherwise, ∅ ≺† A follows immediately by
definition.
C3b: Only A -† Ω remains to be shown. Since A − ΩL = ∅, either A = Ω and
A - Ω by (C1a) or A ≺† Ω since only ∅ embeds in ∅. A - Ω follows from each.
C4: For ⇒, suppose A -† B. Since C disjoint from both A and B, it follows imme-
diately that (A ∪ C) − (B ∪ C) = A − B and (B ∪ C) − (A ∪ C) = B − A. Since ≺† is
completely determined by these two values, A ∪C -† B ∪C.
For ⇐, suppose A ∪ C -† B ∪ C. Since C disjoint from both A and B, it follows
immediately that (A ∪ C) − (B ∪ C) = A − B and (B ∪ C) − (A ∪ C) = B − A. Since ≺† is
completely determined by these two values, A -† B.

Proposition D.4
Let ΩL,Σ be finite. Then for any choice of A, B ∈ P(ΩL,Σ), -†L,Σ satisfies
C1b. Comparability
A - B or B - A.
Proof. Since ΩL,Σ is finite, any A, B ∈ P(ΩL,Σ are also finite. It follows immediately that
A − B and B − A must be finite, and thus that only case (i) of -†L,Σ is ever used. Since the
cardinalities of A and B are comparable, so too is -†L,Σ. 
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Proposition D.5
Let ΩL be given. Then, for any choice of A, B,C,C′ ∈ P(ΩL), -∗ satisfies
FE Finite Equivalence
If A, B finite and |A| = |B|, then A ∼ B.
CFE Co-Finite Equivalence
If A, B co-finite and |Ac| = |Bc|, then A ∼ B.
R. Regularity
If A , ∅, then ∅ ≺ A.
PW Part-Whole
If A ⊂ B, then A ≺ B.
FD. Finite Difference
If C,C′ finite with |C| < |C′| and A ∩C = A ∩C′ = ∅, then A ∪C ≺ A ∪C′.
SC. Strong Cardinality
If |A| < |B|, then A ≺ B.
BI. Bijection Invariance
For any bijection g : ΩL,Σ → Ω′, A - B if and only if g[A] - g[B].
CA. Associativity
If A1 ∼ H4, B1 ∼ E3, C2 ∼ A1 ∪ B1, D2 ∼ F3, and G4 ∼ F3 ∪ E3 with matching
subscripts disjoint, then C2 ∪ D2 ∼ H4 ∪G4.
Proof.
FE: Follows directly from case 1; subcase 2.
CFE: A − B ⊆ Bc and B − A ⊆ Ac. Since Ac, Bc finite, both A − B and B − A are
also finite, and we are in case 1 of -∗’s definition. Every element c in either Ac or Bc falls
into one of three categories: c ∈ Ac ∩ Bc, c ∈ Ac only, or c ∈ Bc only. Since |Ac| = |Bc|,
|Ac − (Ac ∩ Bc)| = |Bc − (Ac ∩ Bc)|; that is, the number of category two elements is
equal to the number of category three elements since all category one elements appear
in both Ac and Bc. Note finally, that A − B = A ∩ Bc = Bc − Ac = Bc − (Ac ∩ Bc) and
B − A = B ∩ Ac = Ac − Bc = Ac − (Ac ∩ Bc).
R: Follows immediately from PW.
PW: A, B fall into either case 1; subcase 1 or case 3 with the same result.
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FD: A ∪C and A ∪C′ fall into case 1; subcase 1.
SC: Suppose that |A| < |B|. Then, |A − B| ≤ A while |B − A| = |B|. It follows immediately
that |A − B| < |B − A| with the latter infinite. It follows immediately that there exists a
one-to-one function g : A − B→ B − A but not vice-versa. By definition, A ≺† B.
BI:
(⇒)
Suppose A -†L,Σ B. If A ≺†L,Σ B, then there exists a one-to-one function δ : A → B but
not vice versa. It follows immediately that g ◦ δ ◦ g−1 is a one-to-one function from g[A]
into g[B] and that no one-to-one function from g[B] to g[A] exists. Thus g[A] ≺†
Ω′ g[B]. If
A ∼†L,Σ B, then A−B and B−A are finite with |A−B| = |B−A|. Since g[A−B] = g[A]−g[B]
and g[B − A] = g[B] − g[A], it follows immediately that g[A] − g[B] and g[B] − g[A] are
also finite with |g[A] − g[B]| = |g[B] − g[A]|, and so g[A] ∼†
Ω′ g[B].
(⇐)
Suppose that g[A] -†
Ω′ g[B]. If g[A] ≺†Ω′ g[B], then there exists a one-to-one function
δ : g[A] → g[B] but not vice-versa. It follows immediately that g−1 ◦ δ ◦ g is a
one-to-one function from A into B and that no one-to-one function from B into A exists.
Thus A ≺†L,Σ B. If g[A] ∼†Ω′ g[B], then g[A] − g[B] and g[B] − g[A] are finite with|g[A] − g[B]| = |g[B] − g[A]|. It follows immediately that A − B and B − A are also finite
with |A − B| = |B − A|, and so A ∼†L,Σ B.
Suppose that A1 ∼ H4, B1 ∼ E3, C2 ∼ A1 ∪ B1, D2 ∼ F3, and G4 ∼ F3 ∪ E3 with
matching subscripts disjoint. Then, there exists CA2 and C
B
2 a partition of C2 such that
CA2 ∼ A1 and CB2 ∼ B1 (simply divide the finite number of elements in C2− (A1∪B1) so that
CA2 −A1 = A1−C2 and CB2 −B1 = B1−C2). Then, C2∪D2 = CA2 ∪CB2 ∪D2 where CA2 ∼ H4,
CB2 ∼ E3, and D2 ∼ F3. By (C4) (in particular, the comparative formulation of Decomp),
CB2 ∪ D2 ∼ E3 ∪ F3. By (C2), CB2 ∪ D2 ∼ G4. By (C4) (in particular, the comparative
formulation of Decomp), C2 ∪ D2 = CA2 ∪CB2 ∪ D2 ∼ H4 ∪G4 as desired. 
Proposition D.6
Let L be a first-order language and Σ ⊆ L a consistent theory. Taking all canonical-
domain models for L and any extension of L as ΩL, for any ϕ, ψ ∈ L,
ϕ -†
Σ
ψ if and only if ϕ -FOLΣ ψ.
Proof. (⇐) is trivial.
(⇒)
Suppose ϕ FOL
Σ
ψ. By definition, there exists an L-model Mϕ ∈ ~ϕ ∧ ¬ψΩL,Σ . Since
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arbitrary extensions of L are allowed, it follows that there exists infinitely many models
M+ϕ which reduce toMϕ over L. Every such model is a model of ϕ but not ψ, and so the
difference between ϕ-models and ψ-models in ΩL,Σ is infinite.
It suffices now to show that there exists an injection from ψ ∧ ¬ϕ-models to ϕ ∧ ¬ψ-
models. If ψ -FOL
Σ
ϕ, this is trivial. If ψ FOL
Σ
ϕ, there exists Mψ a ψ ∧ ¬ϕ-model in L.
Let M+ϕ be a ϕ ∧ ¬ψ-model in some extension L+ of L. Both the domain of M+ϕ and the
constants in the signature of L+ have a fixed cardinality; let ℵi be the greater of these. By
the axiom of choice, the set of cardinality ℵi+1 from the canonical-domain class underlying
these models admits of a well-ordering; let ai+1 be the least element from this set which
both does not appear in a set of lesser cardinality in the canonical-domain class and which
does not appear in any form as a subscript of a constant in L. Such an element must exist
given the definition of ℵi. Extend L+ to a language L++ by adding a constant caib for every
element b ∈ M+ϕ , a constant caic for every constant c in L++, a constant cai f (b¯)=b′ whenever
fM
+
ϕ (b¯) = b′ for a function symbol f in L+, and a constant caiR(b¯) whenever R
M+ϕ (b¯) for a
relation symbol R in L+. Define a canonical-domain L++-modelM∗ by setting all constants
not in L to a0 and all functions/relations not in L to the empty set. Finally, set all symbols
from L to their extension inMψ. It follows immediately thatM∗  ψ ∧ ¬ϕ. Finally, any
M+ϕ must give rise to a unique M∗ since the signature of M∗ must contain a collection
of constants which are all subscripted with the same element ai which does not appear
elsewhere and which contains a complete copy of all other constants in the language as a
further subscript. Having identified this collection, M+ϕ may be recovered by noting that
the cai constants encodeM+ϕ’s atomic diagram. 
Proposition D.7
Let Ω be a set and - a binary relation on P(Ω) satisfying
WC. Weak Cardinality
If |A| < |B|, then B ⊀ A.
C4. Monotonicity
If A ∩C = B ∩C = ∅, then A - B if and only if A ∪C - B ∪C.
PI. Permutation Invariance
For any permutation pi : Ω→ Ω, A - B if and only if pi[A] - pi[B].
Then, A ≺ B only if A ≺† B.
Proof. Suppose A ≺ B. By definition, A - B and B  A. By C4, it follows that A−B - B−A
and B − A  A − B. Suppose for reductio that A ⊀† B. Thus, either A -† B and B -† A,
A † B and B † A, or A † B and B -† A.
Case 1: Suppose that A -† B and B -† A. Then, A − B and B − A are both finite and
|A − B| = |B − A|. It follows immediately that there exists a permutation pi : Ω → Ω which
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swaps A−B and B−A but leaves all other objects fixed, viz. for a bijection g : A−B→ B−A
pi(x) =

g(x) x ∈ A − B
g−1(x) x ∈ B − A
x otherwise.
By the construction of pi, pi[A − B]  pi[B − A], contradicting permutation invariance.
Case 2: Suppose that A † B and B † A. Then, both A − B and B − A are infinite and
|A| = |B|. It follows immediately that there again exists a permutation pi : Ω → Ω which
swaps A and B but leaves all other objects fixed. By the construction of pi, pi[A − B] 
pi[B − A], contradicting permutation invariance.
Case 3: Suppose A † B and B -† A. Then, |B − A| < |A − B|, contradicting weak
cardinality.
By reductio, A ≺† B.

Corollary D.1
Let Ω be given and let - be a strict extension of -†. Then, at least one of the following
is false:
WC. Weak Cardinality
If |A| < |B|, then B ⊀ A.
C4. Monotonicity
If A ∩C = B ∩C = ∅, then A - B if and only if A ∪C - B ∪C.
PI. Permutation Invariance
For any permutation pi : Ω→ Ω, A - B if and only if pi[A] - pi[B].
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
PW. Part-Whole
If A ⊂ B, then A ≺ B.
Proof. Suppose A † B and B † A. By definition, A − B and B − A are both infinite with
|A − B| = |B − A|. By the result above extending -† into a binary relation - on P(Ω) by
setting either A ≺ B or B ≺ A contradicts either (WC), (C4), or (PI). Suppose, then, that
we set A ∼ B. By C4, A − B ∼ B − A. Note that since B − A is infinite, it is possible to find
C ⊂ B − A such that |C| = |B − A|; it follows immediately that C ≺† B − A and C † A − B.
If we set only A ∼ B, we now have a failure of transitivity since C - B− A, B− A - A− B,
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but C  A − B.
If we wish to retain transitivity, we must thus have C - A−B. Note, however, that there
exists a permutation which swaps elements of A − B and C but leaves all other elements
fixed, viz. for a bijection g : A − B→ C define
pi(x) =

g(x) x ∈ A − B
g−1(x) x ∈ C
x otherwise.
We must thus also have A − B - C, and thus B − A ∼ A − B ∼ C, contradicting PW.

Corollary D.2
Let Ω be given and let - be a strict extension of -† satisfying:
WC. Weak Cardinality
If |A| < |B|, then B ⊀ A.
C4. Monotonicity
If A ∩C = B ∩C = ∅, then A - B if and only if A ∪C - B ∪C.
PI. Permutation Invariance
For any permutation pi : Ω→ Ω, A - B if and only if pi[A] - pi[B].
C2. Transitivity
If A - B and B - C, then A - C.
Then,
(i) ∅ ∼ C for any C ∈ P(Ω) with |C| ≤ |A − B| and
(ii) Ω ∼ C for any C ∈ P(Ω) with |Cc| ≤ |A − B|.
Proof. Noting that C was arbitrary above, we have B− A ∼ A− B ∼ C for every C ⊂ B− A
with |C| = |B − A|.
Let C1,C2 partition B−A such that |C1| = |C2| = |B−A|. Then, C2 = (B−A)−C1 ∼ A−B
by above. By (C4), B−A ∼ (A−B)∪C1. By (C2), A−B ∼ (A−B)∪C. By (C4), ∅ ∼ C1. Since
there exists a permutation pi which maps C1 to any subset of Ω with the same cardinality,
∅ ∼ C for any C ∈ P(Ω) with |C| = |B − A|. By (WC), it follows immediately that ∅ ∼ C
for any C ∈ P(Ω) with |C| ≤ |B − A|.
Note further that for any C ∈ P(Ω) with |Cc| ≤ |B− A|, Cc ∼ ∅ and thus by (C4) Ω ∼ C.
All co-|A − B| sets thus collapse into equivalence with Ω. 
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Proposition D.8
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, and
Σ ⊆ L a consistent (with respect to ΩL) set. If ΩL,Σ is finite, then -† on F +L,Σ is uniquely
represented in 〈Q ∩ [0, 1],≤,+〉 by
µ(E) =
|E|
|ΩL,Σ| .
Proof. Let L, ΩL, and Σ be given. Define µ : F +L → Q ∩ [0, 1] by
µ(E) =
|E|
|ΩL,Σ| .
µ is clearly an NCI-assignment into Q ∩ [0, 1]. Noting that µ is the first-order atomic
confirmation ranking, µ is an NCI-assignment into 〈Q ∩ [0, 1],≤,+〉. Finally, suppose that
A -† B. By definition, A− B and B−A are finite with |A− B| ≤ |B−A|. Since ΩL,Σ is finite,
it follows immediately that |A| ≤ |B| and thus µ(A) ≤ µ(B). Suppose now that µ(A) ≤ µ(B).
By definition, |A| ≤ |B|. Since ΩL,Σ is finite, it follows immediately that A − B and B − A
are finite with |A − B| ≤ |B − A|, i.e. A -† B.
For uniqueness, note that ΩL,Σ decomposes into a finite number of equal events. For
any n ∈ N+, there exists exactly one q ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] which added to itself n times equals 1.
Any representing µ for the likelihood structure thus maps these minimal events to the same
value. 
Corollary D.3
Let L be a formal language with Boolean connectives, ΩL a model space for L, and
Σ ⊆ L a consistent (with respect to ΩL) set. If ΩL,Σ is finite, then -† on F +L is uniquely
represented in 〈Q ∩ [0, 1],≤,+〉 by
µ+(E) =
|E ∩ΩL,Σ|
|ΩL,Σ| .
Proof. Let L, ΩL, and Σ be given. Suppose A, B ∈ ΩL. By definition,
A -† B if and only if A ∩ΩL,Σ -† B ∩ΩL,Σ
if and only if µ(A ∩ΩL,Σ) ≤ µ(B ∩ΩL,Σ)
if and only if µ+(A) ≤ µ+(B).
Uniqueness follows immediately from the previous result. 
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Proposition D.9
Let L+ = 〈L+,ΩL+〉 be an n-uniform model space expansion of L = 〈L,ΩL〉 and Σ ⊆ L
a consistent (with respect to ΩL) set. Then, there exists a partition {Pi, . . . } of ΩL+,Σ
such that for any i, j:
|Pi| = |P j| = n;
For anyM ∈ ΩL,Σ there exists a unique Pi such thatM+ ∈ Pi ⇒M+i |L+L =M;
For any Pi there exists a uniqueM ∈ ΩL,Σ such thatM+ ∈ Pi ⇒M+|L+L =M.
Proof. Since every partition corresponds to a modelM in ΩL, every model in a part agrees
on the truth of Σ. Further since Σ is consistent (with respect to ΩL), at least one part makes
Σ true. Eliminating all parts which make Σ false from the n-uniform partition thus produces
the desired partition over ΩL+,Σ. 
Proposition D.10
Let ΩL+ be an n-uniform model space expansion of ΩL and Σ ⊆ L a consistent (with
respect to ΩL) set. If ΩL,Σ is finite, then for any E ∈ F +L,Σ,
µ(E) = µ+(E+)
where E+ = {M+ ∈ ΩL+,Σ : M+|L+L ∈ E} and the functions µ : F +L,Σ → Q ∩ [0, 1], µ+ :
F +L+,Σ → Q∩[0, 1] are the unique representing assignments of -† into 〈Q∩[0, 1],≤,+〉.
Proof.
µ(E) =
|E|
|ΩL,Σ|
=
(n)|E|
(n)|ΩL,Σ| .
By ΩL+ an n-uniform expansion,
=
|E+|
|ΩL+,Σ|
= µ+(E+).

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Proposition D.11
Let ΩA and ΩB be finite but non-empty sets of canonical-domain models with A ⊆ ΩA
and B ⊆ ΩB. Then, 〈A,ΩA〉 -PU 〈B,ΩB〉 if and only if µΩA(A) ≤ µΩB(B) where µΩA :
P(ΩA) → Q ∩ [0, 1] and µΩB : P(ΩA) → Q ∩ [0, 1] are the unique representations of
-†
ΩA
and -†
ΩB
in 〈Q ∩ [0, 1],+〉.
Proof.
(⇒)
Suppose 〈A,ΩA〉 -PU 〈B,ΩB〉. This comparison either derives from (P), from (U), or from
closing under transitivity. In the first case, A -†
Ω
B and ΩB -
†
Ω
ΩA. Since all sets are finite,
|A| ≤ |B| and |ΩB| ≤ |ΩA|. It follows immediately that |A||ΩA | ≤ |B||ΩB| and thus by definition
µA(A) ≤ µB(B).
In the second case, either ΩA or ΩB is the n-uniform extension. If the former, both
|A| = n|B| and |ΩA| = (n)|ΩB|. It follows immediately that |A||ΩA | ≤ |B||ΩB| and thus by definition
µA(A) ≤ µB(B). If the latter, both n|A| = |B| and (n)|ΩA| = |ΩB|. It follows immediately that
|A|
|ΩA | ≤ |B||ΩB| and thus by definition µA(A) ≤ µB(B).
For the third case, note that that the first two cases have established that the preorder
induced by representation in 〈Q ∩ [0, 1],+〉 contains all comparisons required by (P) and
(U). Since -PU is the transitive closure of these and the preorder induced by representation
in 〈Q ∩ [0, 1],+〉 is transitive, the induced preorder must contain all instances of -PU . It
follows that µA(A) ≤ µB(B).
(⇐)
Suppose µA(A) =
pA
qA
≤ µB(B) = pBqB . Take a qB-uniform extension of ΩA to Ω+A and a qA-
uniform extension of ΩB to Ω+B. A lifts to a set A
+ in Ω+A of cardinality pA∗qB while B lifts to
a set B+ in Ω+B of cardinality pB∗qA. By assumption, pA∗qB ≤ pB∗qA. It follows immediately
that A+ -†
Ω
B+ and Ω+B -
†
Ω
Ω+A, and thus by (P) we have 〈A+,Ω+A〉 -PU 〈B+,Ω+B〉. By (U) and
A+ -†
Ω+A
A+, 〈A,ΩA〉 -PU 〈A+,Ω+A〉. By (U) and B+ -†Ω+B B
+, 〈B+,Ω+B〉 -PU 〈B,ΩB〉. Since
-PU is the transitive closure, 〈A,ΩA〉 -PU 〈B,ΩB〉. 
Proposition D.12
Let ΩA be a collection of canonical-domain models and A, A′ subcollections of ΩA.
Then,
〈A,ΩA〉 -PU 〈A′,ΩA〉 if and only if A -†ΩA A′.
Proof.
(⇒)
Suppose that 〈A,ΩA〉 -PU 〈A′,ΩA〉. If ΩA is finite, then A -†ΩA A′ follows from the previous
proposition. Suppose further, then, that ΩA is infinite.
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An aside on the the exact structure of -PU is useful here. Note first that closing all
instances of (U) under transitivity reduces all pairs 〈B,ΩB〉 into equivalence classes where
any pair with an infinite ΩB is alone. The equivalence classes induced by the transitive
closure of all (U)-comparisons are further reduced by those ∼ relations required by (P),
viz. if B ∼†
Ω
C and ΩC ∼†Ω ΩB, then 〈B,ΩB〉 ∼ 〈C,ΩC〉. The antecedent here is equivalent
to B−C, C − B, ΩB −ΩC, and ΩC −ΩB are all finite with |B−C| = |C − B| and |ΩB −ΩC | =
|ΩC − ΩB|. The reduced equivalence classes are thus the finite n-uniform extension classes
plus finite replacements in each component. If ΩB is infinite, equivalent pairs at this stage
are exclusively induced by (P).
The only remaining comparisons and the only non-∼ comparisons between equivalence
classes are induced by strictly one-sided instances of (P). We show that these are already
transitive; whenever 〈B,ΩB〉 - 〈C,ΩC〉 and 〈C′,ΩC′〉 - 〈D,ΩD〉 by (P) with 〈C,ΩC〉 and
〈C′,ΩC′〉 in the same equivalence class, there exists 〈B∗,ΩB∗〉 and 〈D∗,ΩD∗〉 equivalent
to 〈B,ΩB〉 and 〈D,ΩD〉 respectively such that 〈B∗,ΩB∗〉 - 〈D∗,ΩD∗〉 by (P). Suppose that
〈B,ΩB〉 - 〈C,ΩC〉 and 〈C′,ΩC′〉 - 〈D,ΩD〉 by (P) with 〈C,ΩC〉 and 〈C′,ΩC′〉 equivalent.
 ΩB, ΩC, and ΩD finite. It follows immediately that ΩC′ is finite as well. Further by
〈C,ΩC〉 and 〈C′,ΩC′〉 in the same equivalence class, |C||ΩC | = |C
′ |
|ΩC′ | . Thus,
|B|
|ΩB| ≤
|C|
|ΩC | =
|C′|
|ΩC′ | ≤
|D|
|ΩD| .
Taking a |ΩD|-uniform extension of ΩB and a |ΩB|-uniform extension of ΩD, gives a
pair 〈B∗,ΩB∗〉 and 〈D∗,ΩD∗〉 equivalent to 〈B,ΩB〉 and 〈D,ΩD〉 respectively. Further,
|ΩB∗ | = |ΩD∗ | and |B∗| ≤ |D∗|. 〈B∗,ΩB∗〉 - 〈D∗,ΩD∗〉 follows by (P).
 ΩB infinite; ΩC, and ΩD finite. It follows immediately that ΩC′ is finite as well. Since
|ΩB| is larger than |ΩD∗ | for any pair 〈D∗,ΩD∗〉 equivalent to 〈D,ΩD〉, we need only
find an n-uniform extension of ΩD with |D∗| ≥ |B|. Since B is finite (ΩC is finite and
|B| ≤ |C| by hypothesis), this is always possible (if D is empty, so too is B; otherwise,
take a |B|-uniform extension). 〈B,ΩB〉 - 〈D∗,ΩD∗〉 then follows by (P).
 ΩB finite; ΩC infinite. Impossible; ΩC 6-† ΩB.
 ΩC finite; ΩD infinite. Impossible; ΩC′ must be finite as well but then ΩD 6-† ΩC′ .
 ΩB and ΩC infinite; ΩD finite. Since 〈C′,ΩC′〉 - 〈D,ΩD〉 by (P), |C′| ≤ |D| and thus
finite. It follows immediately that C is finite as well. Since 〈B,ΩB〉 - 〈C,ΩC〉 by
(P), |B| ≤ |C| and thus finite. Since |ΩB| is larger than |ΩD∗ | for any pair 〈D∗,ΩD∗〉
equivalent to 〈D,ΩD〉, we need only find an n-uniform extension of ΩD with |D∗| ≥
|B|. Since B is finite, this is always possible (if D is empty, so too is B; otherwise,
take a |B|-uniform extension). 〈B,ΩB〉 - 〈D∗,ΩD∗〉 then follows by (P).
 ΩB, ΩC, and ΩD infinite. 〈C,ΩC〉 and 〈C′,ΩC′〉 must be equivalent by (P). B -† D
and ΩD -† ΩB follows by the transitivity of -†. 〈B,ΩB〉 - 〈D,ΩD〉 then follows by
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(P).
Returning to 〈A,ΩA〉 -PU 〈A′,ΩA〉 with ΩA infinite, it must thus be either that
〈A,ΩA〉 -PU 〈A′,ΩA〉 is a result of closing under those ∼ relations required by (P)
or by a strictly one-sided instance of (P). In either case, A -†
Ω
A′ and thus A -†
ΩA
A′ follows
immediately.
(⇐)
Suppose that A -†
ΩA
A′. Then, either A− A′ and A′ − A are finite and have equal cardinality
or there exists an injection g : A − A′ → A′ − A but not vice versa. In either case, A -†
Ω
A′
follows immediately. By (P), we then have 〈A,ΩA〉 -PU 〈A′,ΩA〉. 
Proposition D.13
Let ΩL+ be an n-uniform model space expansion of ΩL for any n ∈ N+ and Σ ⊆ L a
consistent (with respect to ΩL) set. Then for any A, B from F +L,Σ,
A -†
ΩL,Σ B if and only if A
+ -†
ΩL+ ,Σ
B+
where A+ and B+ are the collections containing all and only those ΩL+,Σ models which
extend models in A and B respectively.
Proof. If ΩL,Σ is finite, then the result follows from unique representation in 〈Q∩ [0, 1],+〉.
Suppose, then, that ΩL,Σ is infinite.
(⇒)
Suppose that A -†
ΩL,Σ B. By definition, either A ∼†ΩL,Σ B or A ≺†ΩL,Σ B. In the first case,|A+ − B+| = |B+ − A+| = (n)|A − B| = (n)|B − A| by L+ an n-uniform expansion, and thus
A+ ∼†
ΩL+ ,Σ
B+. In the second case, there exists an injection g from A − B to B − A but not
vice-versa. Extend g to an injection g+ from A+ − B+ to B+ − A+ by sending the kthM+
extendingM+|L to the kth model extending g(M+|L) (the numbering for any given model
can be arbitrary). Finally, no injection from B+ − A+ to A+ − B+ is possible since it would
immediately produce an injection from B − A to A − B.
(⇐)
Suppose that A+ -†
ΩL+ ,Σ
B+. By definition, either A+ ∼†
ΩL+ ,Σ
B+ or A+ ≺†
ΩL+ ,Σ
B+. In the first
case, |A+ − B+| = |B+ − A+| = (n)|A − B| = (n)|B − A| by L+ an n-uniform expansion, and
thus A ∼†
ΩL,Σ B. In the second case, there exists an injection g
+ from A+ − B+ to B+ − A+
but not vice-versa. If A+ − B+ and B+ − A+ are finite, then |A+ − B+| = (n)|A − B| and
|B+ − A+| = (n)|B − A| by L+ an n-uniform expansion, and thus A+ ≺†
ΩL+ ,Σ
B+. If A+ − B+ is
finite and B+ − A+ infinite, then |A+ − B+| = (n)|A − B| by L+ an n-uniform expansion, and
thus A+ ≺†
ΩL+ ,Σ
B+. If both A+ − B+ and B+ − A+ are infinite, we have by choice (Tarski’s
202
theorem) that A − B ≈ (A − B)n ≈ A+ − B+ and B − A ≈ (B − A)n ≈ B+ − A+. It follows
immediately that there exists an injection from A − B to B − A and not vice-versa. Thus,
A+ ≺†
ΩL+ ,Σ
B+. 
Proposition D.14
Let Ω be the collection of all atomic possibilities, ΩA and ΩB non-empty subcollections,
and A, B subcollections of ΩA and ΩB, respectively. -PUCI satisfies
C0. Nontriviality
〈∅,Ω〉 ≺ 〈Ω,Ω〉.
C1a. Reflexivity
〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈A,ΩA〉.
C2. Transitivity
If 〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈B,ΩB〉 and 〈B,ΩB〉 - 〈C,ΩC〉, then 〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈C,ΩC〉.
C3b. Boundedness
〈∅,Ω〉 ∼ 〈∅,ΩA〉 - 〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈ΩA,ΩA〉 ∼ 〈Ω,Ω〉.
E-† . -† Extension
〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈A′,ΩA〉 if and only if A -† A′.
E≺† . ≺† Extension
If either both A ≺†
Ω
B and ΩB -
†
Ω
ΩA or both ∅ ≺†Ω A -†Ω B and ΩB ≺†Ω ΩA, then〈A,ΩA〉 ≺ 〈B,ΩB〉.
FC. Finite Comparisons
If ΩA and ΩB are finite, then 〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈B,ΩB〉 if and only if µΩA(A) ≤ µΩB(B)
where µΩA : P(ΩA) → Q ∩ [0, 1] and µΩB : P(ΩA) → Q ∩ [0, 1] are the unique
representations of -†
ΩA
and -†
ΩB
in 〈Q ∩ [0, 1],+〉.
ID. Infinitesimal Degrees
If A, B are nonempty and finite sets, ΩA is infinite, and ΩB is finite, then 〈A,ΩA〉 ≺
〈B,ΩB〉.
Proof.
C0: 〈∅,Ω〉 - 〈Ω,Ω〉 follows from (P). Since Ω is infinite, it suffices to verify that 〈Ω,Ω〉 -
〈∅,Ω〉 does not follow from any one of (P), (C), and (I) in isolation. Since Ω 6-† ∅, 〈Ω,Ω〉 -
〈∅,Ω〉 does not follow from (P). Since Ω , ∅, neither does this follows from (C) or (I). Since
equivalences between pairs with infinite second parameters are only induced by these, it
must be that 〈Ω,Ω〉  〈∅,Ω〉.
C1a: Follows from (P).
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C2: By definition.
C3b: Follows from (P), (C), (I), and transitivity.
E-†:
(⇒)
Suppose that 〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈A′,ΩA〉. If ΩA is finite, then A -†ΩA A′ follows from unique
representation in 〈Q ∩ [0, 1],+〉. Suppose further, then, that ΩA is infinite.
An aside on the the exact structure of -PUCI is useful here. Note first that closing all
instances of (U) under transitivity reduces all pairs 〈B,ΩB〉 into equivalence classes where
any pair with an infinite ΩB is alone. The equivalence classes induced by the transitive
closure of all (U)-comparisons are further reduced by those ∼ relations required by (P),
viz. if B ∼†
Ω
C and ΩC ∼†Ω ΩB, then 〈B,ΩB〉 ∼ 〈C,ΩC〉. The antecedent here is equivalent
to B−C, C − B, ΩB −ΩC, and ΩC −ΩB are all finite with |B−C| = |C − B| and |ΩB −ΩC | =
|ΩC −ΩB|. The reduced equivalence classes are thus the finite n-uniform expansion classes
plus finite replacements in each component. If ΩB is infinite, equivalent pairs at this stage
are exclusively induced by (P). Finally, these classes are further reduced by (C) and (I) so
that all 〈ΩB,ΩB〉 and all 〈∅,ΩB〉 appear in the same class. Finally, pairs equivalent to 〈B,ΩB〉
are either exclusively induced by (P) and (U) (B¬∅,ΩB), all induced by (C) (B = ΩB), or
all induced by (I) (B = ∅) since in the latter cases all equivalences required by (P) and (U)
are also required by (C) and (I) respectively.
The only remaining comparisons and the only non-∼ comparisons between equivalence
classes are induced by strictly one-sided instances of (P). We show that these are already
transitive; whenever 〈B,ΩB〉 - 〈C,ΩC〉 and 〈C′,ΩC′〉 - 〈D,ΩD〉 by (P) with 〈C,ΩC〉 and
〈C′,ΩC′〉 in the same equivalence class, there exists 〈B∗,ΩB∗〉 and 〈D∗,ΩD∗〉 equivalent
to 〈B,ΩB〉 and 〈D,ΩD〉 respectively such that 〈B∗,ΩB∗〉 - 〈D∗,ΩD∗〉 by (P). Suppose that
〈B,ΩB〉 - 〈C,ΩC〉 and 〈C′,ΩC′〉 - 〈D,ΩD〉 by (P) with 〈C,ΩC〉 and 〈C′,ΩC′〉 equivalent. If
C = ∅, then B = ∅ as well and thus 〈∅,ΩD〉 is equivalent to 〈B,ΩB〉 with 〈∅,ΩD〉 - 〈D,ΩD〉
by (P). If C = ΩC, then C′ = ΩC′ as well and thus 〈ΩB,ΩB〉 is equivalent to 〈D,ΩD〉 with
〈B,ΩB〉 - 〈ΩB,ΩB〉 by (P). Suppose then that C , ∅,ΩC.
 ΩB, ΩC, and ΩD finite. It follows immediately that ΩC′ is finite as well. Further by
〈C,ΩC〉 and 〈C′,ΩC′〉 in the same equivalence class, |C||ΩC | = |C
′ |
|ΩC′ | . Thus,
|B|
|ΩB| ≤
|C|
|ΩC | =
|C′|
|ΩC′ | ≤
|D|
|ΩD| .
Taking a |ΩD|-uniform expansion of ΩB and a |ΩB|-uniform expansion of ΩD, gives a
pair 〈B∗,ΩB∗〉 and 〈D∗,ΩD∗〉 equivalent to 〈B,ΩB〉 and 〈D,ΩD〉 respectively. Further,
|ΩB∗ | = |ΩD∗ | and |B∗| ≤ |D∗|. 〈B∗,ΩB∗〉 - 〈D∗,ΩD∗〉 follows by (P).
 ΩB infinite; ΩC, and ΩD finite. It follows immediately that ΩC′ is finite as well. Since
|ΩB| is larger than |ΩD∗ | for any pair 〈D∗,ΩD∗〉 equivalent to 〈D,ΩD〉, we need only
find an n-uniform expansion of ΩD with |D∗| ≥ |B|. Since B is finite (ΩC is finite and
|B| ≤ |C| by hypothesis), this is always possible (if D is empty, so too is B; otherwise,
take a |B|-uniform expansion). 〈B,ΩB〉 - 〈D∗,ΩD∗〉 then follows by (P).
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 ΩB finite; ΩC infinite. Impossible; ΩC 6-† ΩB.
 ΩC finite; ΩD infinite. Impossible; ΩC′ must be finite as well but then ΩD 6-† ΩC′ .
 ΩB and ΩC infinite; ΩD finite. Since 〈C′,ΩC′〉 - 〈D,ΩD〉 by (P), |C′| ≤ |D| and thus
finite. It follows immediately that C is finite as well. Since 〈B,ΩB〉 - 〈C,ΩC〉 by
(P), |B| ≤ |C| and thus finite. Since |ΩB| is larger than |ΩD∗ | for any pair 〈D∗,ΩD∗〉
equivalent to 〈D,ΩD〉, we need only find an n-uniform expansion of ΩD with |D∗| ≥
|B|. Since B is finite, this is always possible (if D is empty, so too is B; otherwise,
take a |B|-uniform expansion). 〈B,ΩB〉 - 〈D∗,ΩD∗〉 then follows by (P).
 ΩB, ΩC, and ΩD infinite. 〈C,ΩC〉 and 〈C′,ΩC′〉 must be equivalent by (P). B -† D
and ΩD -† ΩB follows by the transitivity of -†. 〈B,ΩB〉 - 〈D,ΩD〉 then follows by
(P).
Returning to 〈A,ΩA〉 -PUCI 〈A′,ΩA〉 with ΩA infinite, it must thus be either that
〈A,ΩA〉 -PUCI 〈A′,ΩA〉 is a result of closing under those ∼ relations required by (P), those
required by (C), those required by (I), or by a strictly one-sided instance of (P). In all four
cases, A -†
Ω
A′ and thus A -†
ΩA
A′ follows immediately.
(⇐)
Follows immediately from -PUCI an extension of -PU .
E≺†: Suppose that either A ≺†Ω B and ΩB -†Ω ΩA or A -†Ω B and ΩB ≺†Ω ΩA. We proceed by
cases.
 Case 1: A ≺†
Ω
B and ΩB -
†
Ω
ΩA. 〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈B,ΩB〉 follows immediately by (P). It
remains only to show that 〈B,ΩB〉  〈A,ΩA〉. 〈B,ΩB〉 and 〈A,ΩA〉 are not equivalent
by (P) alone since A ≺† B. Neither could they be equivalent by (I) since this requires
A = B = ∅. (C) likewise fails since it requires both A = ΩA and B = ΩB from which
it follows that B -† A. If ΩA or ΩB are infinite, we thus have that 〈B,ΩB〉  〈A,ΩA〉
(recall the discussion of -PUCI above). Supposing that both ΩA and ΩB are finite,
then 〈B,ΩB〉  〈A,ΩA〉 by (FC) (proved below) and the observation that |A| < |B|
while |ΩB| ≤ |ΩA|.
 Case 2: A -†
Ω
B and ΩB ≺†Ω ΩA. 〈A,ΩA〉 - 〈B,ΩB〉 follows immediately by (P). It
remains only to show that 〈B,ΩB〉  〈A,ΩA〉. 〈B,ΩB〉 and 〈A,ΩA〉 are not equivalent
by (P) alone since ΩB ≺† ΩA. Neither could they be equivalent by (I) since this
requires A = B = ∅. (C) likewise fails since it requires both A = ΩA and B = ΩB
from which it follows that ΩA -† ΩB. If ΩA or ΩB are infinite, we thus have that
〈B,ΩB〉  〈A,ΩA〉 (recall the discussion of -PUCI above). Supposing that both ΩA
and ΩB are finite, then 〈B,ΩB〉  〈A,ΩA〉 by (FC) (proved below) and the observation
that 0 < |A| ≤ |B| while |ΩB| < |ΩA|.
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(FC): Follows immediately from the corresponding result for -PU by noting that -PU and
-PUCI are equivalent over finite sets (all instances of (C) and (I) here follow from (U), (P),
and transitivity).
(ID): Suppose A, B are nonempty and finite sets, ΩA is infinite, and ΩB is finite. Since ΩB
is finite, construct a |A|-uniform extension of ΩB to ΩB′ . Let B′ be the subset of ΩB′ which
corresponds to B. By (U), 〈B,ΩB〉 ∼ 〈B′,Ω′B〉. Since B , ∅, ∅ ≺† A -† B′ and ΩB′ ≺† ΩA.
By E≺† , 〈A,ΩA〉 ≺ 〈B′,ΩB′〉 and thus 〈A,ΩA〉 ≺ 〈B,ΩB〉 as desired. 
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